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AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BINDING EFFECT OF CLASS
SUITS
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.t
JOHN L. GEDIDlf
STEPHEN SOWLEftt
INTRODUCTION
This essay is a history of the doctrine of res judicata in class suits. It
reveals that the condition of precedent on this issue was from the beginning
equivocal and confused, and that it remains somewhat so today. Specifically, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, English and American decisions oscillated between saying that absent members of a class were
bound by a decree and that they were not. The same pattern of equivocation
persisted over the next century and into the modem era, exemplified by the
decisions in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Caublel on the one hand and
Hansberry v. Lee 2 on the other hand. The pattern persists in the Supreme
3
Court's recent decisions in Cooper v. FederalReserve Bank, Phillips Pe5
troleum Co. v. Shutts,4 Amchem6Products Inc. v. Windsor, and Matsushita
Epstein.
v.
Co.
Electric Industry

t Trustee Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
t" Dean and Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. We acknowledge
with thanks the research assistance given at various points over several years by Anne M.
Murdaugh, Edward C. Schweitzer, Jr., Stephen Smith, and William Taylor at Yale Law
School, and Eric Richman and Tina W. Chao at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
"tt Associate Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
' 255 U.S. 356, 366-67 (1921) (holding that the decree of a federal court with diversity
jurisdiction over a class suit is binding on absent class members who are co-citizens of the
defendant).
2 311 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1940) (holding that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to
absent class members whose interest were not represented by the parties to the original suit).
3 467 U.S. 867, 880-82 (1984) (holding that a judgment against plaintiffs in a Title VII
class action suit does not preclude individual class members from bringing individual claims
of racial discrimination).
4 472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985) (holding that a state's "opt out" procedure for prospective
class members satisfies due process notice requirements and allows a state to assert personal
jurisdiction over an absent class member who does not opt out).
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Whether a class suit decree has binding effects on the class goes to the
essence of the class suit device. If the judgment is indeed conclusive on the
class, the usual rules of merger and bar generally apply. If a class suit
judgment is only nominally conclusive on the class members, however, its
significance is minimally different from a judgment for or against one of
several adversaries of a common opponent. A judgment of the latter kind
may have significant effects now that the "mutuality rule" has been abolished. 7 With the abolition of the mutuality rule, an absentee who is situated
similarly to a prevailing litigant may be able to invoke the prevailing liti-8
gant's judgment in quite the same way a class member could do so.
Moreover, since such a judgment may be invoked offensively against a
common opponent, the judgment has powerful effects on settlement possibilities. It is also true that a victory by the common opponent against one or
more of its antagonists has powerful negative effects on the settlement value
of the claims of similarly situated persons. 9 Thus, a judgment between one
member of a group of similarly situated persons against a common opponent has significant dispute-resolving effects even without any effect of a
class rule.
The key legal question for the class suit therefore has been whether,
where the judgment in such a suit is adverse to the members who were actual parties, the judgment would be not merely discouraging to absentees,
but preclusive against them as a matter of law-whether the rule of bar ap5 521 U.S. 591, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2252 (1997) (holding that a settlement in an asbestos

class action case was not binding since the class lacked "the requirements of common issue
predominance and adequacy of representation").
6 516 U.S. 367, 374 (1996) ("[A] judgment entered in a class action, like any other judgment entered in a state judicial proceeding, is presumptively entitled to full faith and credit
7 See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-28 (1979) (permitting the
offensive use of collateral estoppel when the plaintiff was not bound by the same judgment as
the defendant); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of lll. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 320-50
(1971) (holding that a determination of patent invalidity is res judicata in subsequent litigation
against a different defendant); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982).
a See ParklaneHosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 331 ("We have concluded that the preferable
approach.., in the federal courts is not to preclude the use of offensive collateral estoppel,
but to grant trial courts broad discretion to determine when it should be applied."); BlonderTongue Labs., 402 U.S. at 328-29 (stating that collateral estoppel is proper where a party has
previously had "a full and fair opportunity to litigate" an issue); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982). But cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(3) (1982)
(stating that a party that could have affected joinder in a previous action should not have the
benefit of issue preclusion in a subsequent action).
9 Such is the basis of early and subsequent criticism of the repudiation of the "mutuality
rule," which prevents invocation of issue preclusion by third parties. See, e.g., Michael D.
Green, The Inability of Offensive CollateralEstoppel to Fulfill its Promise: An Examination
of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IOwA L. REv. 141, 180-83 (1984) (discussing the impact of collateral estoppel on settlement rates).
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plies to absent class members.10 A subsidiary question is whether a judgment in favor of a class representative precludes other members of the class
from seeking additional1 relief; that is, whether the rule of merger applies to
absent class members.'
In stark legal terms, the question is whether persons who were not individually parties to a litigation will be treated as part of a set-a class-that
was a party, and hence, being deemed to have participated vicariously, are
now deemed to be precluded vicariously. The resolution of that question in
turn involves tradeoffs between equality of outcome, which is promoted by
treating the members as a group, and individuation of process, which is
promoted by treating them as individuals; between the collective interest of
the group and the separate interests of its members, between the procedural
and strategic interests of the members and the procedural and strategic interests of the opposing party, and between the convenience of society and
the interests of one or more of the parties. Combining these elements, the
choice involves a calculus of the utilities and disutilities of the class suit as a
mechanism of justice. This calculus is at least partially dependent on the
substantive interests at stake in a particular type of class suit.
The problem can be formulated more abstractly: The law can regard
any person either as a member of a group or as a legally distinct individual.12 How the law regards any particular person depends partly on the legal
"0See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 41(1)(e), 42 (stating that an absent

class member is represented by the representative of a class of similarly situated persons and
discussing the impact of collateral estoppel on settlement rates).
n See id. at § 42 cmt. f (citing cases in which a representative's collusion, inadequate
conduct of litigation, or conflict of interest was a basis for refusing preclusion).
12 See also Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action, 27 UCLA L.
REV. 514, 523-35 (1980) [hereinafter Yeazell, From Group Litigation] (discussing the appearance of new group litigants as a result of industrialization in nineteenth-century England).
See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUPS TO THE MODERN CLASS
ACTION (1987) [hereinafter YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUPS] (tracing the history of the
modem class action suit); Stephen C. Yeazell, GroupLitigation and Social Context: Toward
a History of the Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 866, 876 (1977) [hereinafter Yeazell,
Group Litigation and Social Context] (arguing that the seventeenth-century English antecedents to the modem class were social groups such as manorial tenants whose coherence was in
place before the litigation).
It has been noted recurrently that there is not necessarily a perfect homogeneity of interests among members of a group, even if all are victims of a legal wrong, and all would like
some kind of legal redress. In the civil rights field, the seminal article is Derrick A. Bell, Jr.,
Serving Two Masters: IntegrationIdeals and Client Interests in School DesegregationLitigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471 (1976), noting that some minority clients' "educational interests may no longer accord with the integration ideals of their attorneys." See also Leo Crowley, Note, Due Process Rights of Absentees in Title VII Class Actions-The Myth of
Homogeneity of Interest, 59 B.U. L. REV. 661, 666-80 (1979) (arguing that the creation of
Title VII class action suits results in inadequate representation of absentee class members with
divergent interests).
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task at hand. The group most tightly bound in modem law is probably the
corporation, whether business, nonprofit, or municipal. The unitary aspect
of such a group is so strongly emphasized that the members of a corporation
as a group are, for most purposes, treated as a legal personality that is distinct from the constituent members and exists in its own right. 13 Until relatively modem times, another group of individuals treated as a unity for
many legal purposes was the husband and wife. 14 Partners in a business
venture have been, perhaps, next closest in legal affiliation,'165 followed by
the members of fully organized, unincorporated associations.
At the other end of this spectrum, the group most loosely bound is a set
of persons suffering or contributing to common injury, who, in general, are
permitted, but not required, to act together in joinder as plaintiffs or when
joined as defendants. 17 Such a set of persons may form a coalition for pursuit of their common legal interests, but the coalition is usually weak and
unstable. Thus, under present procedural doctrine, the parties joined under
permissive joinder are on their own for most purposes; for example, a8procedural initiative taken by one is generally not attributable to the other.'

"3See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 59 (1982) ("Except as stated in this
Section, a judgment in an action to which a corporation is a party has no preclusive effects on
");
a person who is an officer, director, stockholder, or member of a non-stock corporation ....
see also Harold J. Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARV. L. REV. 404, 408-15
(1916) (providing instances of courts treating corporations as individuals).
14See, e.g., WOMEN INTO WIVES: THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MARRIAGE

84 (Jane Roberts Chapman & Margaret Gates eds., 1977) ("[T]he tax code reinforces the traditional family model-including the dependent wife-by defining her as a family member
15See Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 165 F. Supp. 933, 937 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (holding
that one partner of a dissolved partnership may bring a suit in the partnership's name in federal court); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 60 cmt. a ("At common law, a partnership was treated as an aggregation of individuals and not as a jural entity distinct from its
members.").
16See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(2) (providing for class actions by members of unincorporated
associations); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61 cmt. a ("At common law an unincorporated association was treated as an aggregate of individuals."); Developments in the
Law-JudicialControl of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 983, 1080-81
(1963) ("[S]uing personally all the members of a large association is unworkable; thus jurisdictions normally allow suit against the association in its own name or against the membership at large by means of class action or permit both techniques.").
17See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a) (providing that persons may join as plaintiffs or be joined as
defendants in one action).
18See, e.g., Poston v. Ragan, 187 S.E.2d 503, 505 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that a
party who does not file an appeal properly may not appeal from order of judge dismissing an
appeal perfected by a co-party); Wolfe v. East Tex. Seed Co., 583 S.W.2d 481, 482 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979) (holding that a party may not avail himself of an objection on appeal that was
made by his co-defendant at trial).
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Neither of these polar types, the individual and the group, comes in legally pure form. Those associated in a corporate undertaking, for example,
have divergent interests as well as common ones, so their legal bonds are
contingent, not absolute. These divergences of interest and contingencies of
affiliation in the "corporate connection" are the subject of a whole jurisprudence known as corporation law.' 9 Similar divergences and contingencies
are found in the law of partnerships and associations. 20 On the other hand,
persons associated merely by the fact of their common victimization have
some legal connections among themselves, and accordingly may be treated
as a group for some purposes. One example, already noted, is their being
made the beneficiaries of issue preclusion under the modem formulation of
res judicata. 21 Another legal connection from mere common victimization
is that the victims may be limited to proportionate
recovery where only a
22
claims.
their
satisfy
to
available
is
fund
limited
Bringing these variations to mind warns that it is impossible to formulate an analytically unambiguous legal definition of a "group" or "class."
This means that in formulating and administering a rule of res judicata that
governs class suits there is unavoidable ambiguity in the predicate definition: What, exactly, is a "class" for this purpose? This question, in turn,
suggests that it is also impossible to formulate a completely neat solution to
the problem of res judicata in class suits, however tight or loose the legal
bonds-within the class.
Notwithstanding these complexities, the basic choice in the rule of res
judicata in class suits has been between the alternative of treating the individuals as a more or less tightly knit association acting through agents and
that of treating them as individuals who can act only for themselves. Historically, the resolution of this choice has been cast in terms of the definition
19See generally PHILLP 1. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS:
PROCEDURAL LAW 1 (1983) (discussing the "collapse of the concept of entity," which

"viewed each corporation as a separate legal entity, with separate rights and obligations");
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 30 (1986) (noting that corporations have "relationships" with "a number of participants or affected persons").
20 See HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND

PARTNERSHIP 269 (2d ed. 1990) ("[E]ach partner is not necessarily the agent of each of his
co-partners but rather of the partnership itself."). See, e.g., Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 448 F.2d 1175, 1181-82 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (disqualifying a union's counsel from representing both the union and the union's president where there was a potential for conflict of
interest between the union and its officers).
21See case cited supranote 2 and accompanying text.
22See FED. R. CIV. P. 22 (discussing interpleader of claimants to a limited fund); FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) (discussing class suits that may prevent absent members from being able
to protect their interest). More generally, of course, a bankruptcy judgment imposes proportionate equality of legal position on persons whose only common bond may be that of having
a common debtor. See also discussion infra Part II.B (examining class suit bills by creditors).
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a class. Hence, the definition of the class has been the
of what constitutes
23
key controversy.
The definition of a class in a lawsuit can be specified from two different
chronological points in the course of the lawsuit. One is a prospective definition adopted in connection with framing the suit at the outset. Such a
definition specifies who is a party, or deemed by representation to be a
party, in the instant case. The other chronological point is retrospective,
specifying who was a party in the case formerly adjudicated. A prospective
definition is employed in framing the action and may serve to anticipate
who will be precluded by the adjudication; a retrospective definition is employed in applying the rules of res judicata and determines whether the prior
forecast will actually be fulfilled. In the language of economics, the difference of perspective is that between ex-ante and ex-post.
Considerations of legal consistency and protection of party expectations
require that the two definitions coincide. Of course, these considerations
are not preemptory. Where numerous persons are commonly involved in a
legal controversy, it could be said prospectively that the suit will bind all of
them, including absentees, but then be held retrospectively that the absentees actually are not bound. (It would also be possible to say prospectively
that they are. Surprise!) 24 There is, however, a serious shortcoming in such
inconsistency. Very simply put, if, in the administration of justice, courts
take inconsistent positions ex-ante and ex-post, then party expectations are
rendered uncertain. Serious unfairness can result when party expectations
about the effect of the suit are uncertain.
As we shall see, over the course of history, the courts have been quite
inconsistent in their position on res judicata in class suits. Notwithstanding
these inconsistencies, the courts have seemed to think they were dealing
with two temporal aspects of a single problem and therefore have employed
a single definition both ex-ante and ex-post. The history of the class suit
nevertheless demonstrates that the courts have great difficulty actually
maintaining a consistent position concerning res judicata in cases where res
judicata effects have practical significance.
In formulating a coherent and consistent position as to whether an absentee class member is bound by a class suit judgment, courts have relied on

23 See generally Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context, supra note 12, and

Yeazell, From Group Litigation,supra note 12, for a discussion of the history and changes in
the nature of litigation groups.
24See, e.g., Lee v. Hansberry, 24 N.E.2d 37, 40 (II1.1939) (holding that the doctrine of
res judicata extends not only to matters actually determined in the prior suit, but that it also
applies to all grants of recovery and defense involved which might have been raised), rev'd
311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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two basic concepts. One is that of identity of interest among the class
members. If the members of the class have a relatively strong identity of
interest, then courts will be on safe ground in treating a member of the defined class, or a small group of members, as a legal representative of the
whole group, and, on that basis, binding the group to the judgment. This
concept is formulated in various ways: that there is a "community of interest" of the members of the group, 25 that the claims of the representatives are
"typical of [those] of the claims ... of the class," 26 or that the common interests of the class
"predominate over any questions affecting only individ27
ual members."
28
The other concept of binding effect is that of adequate representation.
If the interests of the class are presented with reasonable competence and
vigor, then courts will be on safe ground in treating members of the class as
bound even if they did not actually participate in the litigation. This concept
is also formulated in various ways, notably as whether the representatives
"fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class" 29 or "prosecute
or
30
defend the action with due diligence and reasonable prudence."
25 See Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses, 198 P.2d 514, 517 (Cal. 1948) (holding
that "there must be a well-defined 'community of interest' in the questions of law and fact
involved as affecting the parties to be represented" (citation omitted)).
26 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
27 FED. R Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
28 See FED. K. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (stating the relationship between adequate representation

and the binding effects of class suits). The differences between these concepts of representation have frequently been the subject of scholarly commentary. See, e.g., YEAZELL, FROM
MEDIEVAL GROUPS, supra note 12, at 145-47 (1987) (stating that requiring "individual consent" for persons to be joined in group litigation during the seventeenth century may indicate
that "the court was less prepared to accept the word of the representatives that their cause was
that of the group"); George M. Strickler, Jr., Protecting the Class: The Searchfor the Adequate Representative in Class Action Litigation, 34 DEPAuL L. REV. 73, 74-84 (1984) (providing a historical overview of the adequacy of representation).
In more recent years, attention has shifted to the adequacy of counsel representing the
class, in terms of experience, vigor, imagination, and financial resources. See, e.g., Dolgow v.
Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (stating that although counsel representing the
class is presumed to be competent, this presumption is not irrefutable and the court is entitled
to examine evidence to the contrary), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2dtCir. 1970);
Note, CollateralAttack on the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments, 87 HARV. L. REV.
589, 603 (1974) (proposing that counsel's performance is a factor which must be taken into
consideration before binding absent class members to a judgment). The adequacy of counsel
appears to be regarded as an additional consideration in assessing adequacy of representation,
and not as a substitute for "adequacy" predicated on either "typicality" or the potency of the
class representatives themselves.
29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 42(d) (1982) (stating that discontinuity of
interests between the class and counsel would not bind the judgment on the class); see also
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Settlement Black Box, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1257, 1260 (1995) (stating that settlements must be fair to the parties involved).
30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 42(l)(e) (1982).

1856

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 146:1849

These two concepts are not mutually exclusive in application. A group
can be regarded as "adequately represented" because the interests of the
representative so clearly coincide with those of the absent members that
there is a compelling inference that the representative did a reasonable job
of conducting the litigation. This inference serves as the basis for the link
between the concept of relative homogeneity of the interests of the class
members and the imposition of res judicata on the basis of the outcome
achieved by the representative. Yet, it is also clear that identity of interest
among class members does not guarantee adequacy of representation.
Identity of interest without adequacy of representation is epitomized in
the problem of a "sellout" by the representative. 31 Although the members of
the class may all have been in one boat in the transaction that is the subject
of the suit, their interests can thereafter divide if their common opponent is
willing to pay off some but not all of them.
There can also be adequacy of representation without identity of interest. The law, for example, is well settled that a trustee's litigation concerning the trust binds the beneficiaries even though the trustee and the benefici32
ary by legal definition do not share the same legal interests. In the case of
by
such fiduciary representation, adequacy of representation
33 is achieved
interest.
of
identity
of
criterion
the
by
than
controls other
456 F.2d 896, 900 (2d Cir. 1972) (finding that representainterest in a class action suit, failed to adequately repsimilar
a
sharing
tive counsel, although
resent the class by settling the suit despite the plaintiff's objection to the proposed settlement);
John C. Coffee, Understandingthe Plaintifj'sAttorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for PrivateEnforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 669, 684-90 (1986) (illustrating the divergence of interests and economic incentives
between counsel and members of the class suit).
32 See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 311 (1950) (holding
that since a trustee's action to close a trust will have a binding effect on all parties involved,
the trustee must undertake appropriate notification procedures to notify all beneficiaries);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41 (1982) ("A person is represented by a party
who is: (a) [t]he trustee of an estate or interest of which the person is a beneficiary."). See
also UnitedStates v. Old Settlers, 148 U.S. 427, 480 (1892), discussed in Strickler, supra note
28, at 79-80, in which the Court sustained a judgment where the representation of members of
an Indian tribe was through government-appointed commissioners who were not members of
the tribe. It is safe to say that representation so constituted would not pass muster today, if
indeed it could get into the courthouse in the first instance.
33 The controls are in the appointment process and in the possibility of legal review of the
trustee's performance. A trustee of a privately constituted trust ordinarily is appointed by the
settlor, who is assumed to have knowledge of the reliability of the designated trustee. A trustee designated by public authority must provide credentials that pass muster with the appointing authority and usually also with judicial authority. Both kinds of trustees are governed by
the exacting legal standards imposed on fiduciaries and are subject to accounting and surcharge proceedings. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41(l)(a) (1982);
31See, e.g., Saylor v. Lindsley,

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 170-85. Both kinds of trustees were involved in

Mullane,339 U.S. at 309, 310. In that case, the Central Hanover Bank had been designated as
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We think that neither of these concepts, alone or together, fully engages
the problem of determining whether binding effect should be given to a
class suit judgment. Our historical study of the precedents reveals that
courts have never unequivocally committed themselves to a set of ex-ante
procedures that will assure ex-post that the judgment will bind the members
of the class in the same way as if the class members had been individually
made parties. This historical record, together with critical reflection on the
problems involved, convinces us (and, we hope, others) that a robust formula of class suit "bindingness" is a chimera-an alluring but unattainable
goal. Concluding that class suit res judicata is a chimera contradicts a great
deal of present wisdom about class suits and repudiates a position one of us
has espoused previously. 34 This sad conclusion, in turn, leads us to suggest
the need for reconsideration of the procedural rules dealing with situations
involving "numerous" persons who ought to be bound by a class suit judgment, and some kind of "one way" class suit for other situations.
We do not have a formulation for these rules. Rather, this study is a
preface to formulating such rules. Its purpose is to provide an informed
historical perspective of the difficulties in giving binding effect to a class
suit judgment. To that extent, our analysis is a mere scholarly endeavor.
There are, however, more pragmatic purposes as well.
We think our study shows that there is no firmly established doctrine
concerning the attributes of a class suit that would make such a suit binding
on absentee members. The verdict of the unquiescent years is, on the contrary, equivocal. It follows that the task of formulating proper doctrine in
the matter requires thoughtful analysis in the present, rather than reliance on
what has been said heretofore. We think our study also shows that the class
suit device has had real utility in dealing with emerging legal problems in
the course of our history: multiple creditors seeking redress from a debtor's
limited assets, citizen suits against allegedly ill-advised public ventures,
disputes within large organizations where the organization's leadership no
longer provides proper leadership, civil rights controversies, and mass torts.

trustee by the private settlors; the guardian ad litem for the absentee beneficiaries was appointed by the court charged with reviewing the Bank's accounting.
34 See DAvID W. LOUISELL & GEOFFREY C. HAzARD, JR., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE:
STATE AND FEDERAL 680 (4th ed. 1979) ("In the class suit, on the other hand, those represented ordinarily have neither of right nor in fact an advance opportunity to challenge the
qualifications of those who undertake to speak on their behalf."). Our analysis does not address other important procedural problems that attend class suits, particularly those in the federal court. These include the definition of citizenship for diversity jurisdiction, the calculation
of the amount in controversy, the problem of personal jurisdiction over the class members,
venue, and others. For a thoughtful review of many of these problems, see Diane Wood
Hutchinson, ClassActions: Joinderor RepresentationalDevice?, 1983 SuP. CT. REv. 459.
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Indeed, all cases in which resort is made to a class suit are in some
sense a kind of mass tort. Our society is increasingly and inevitably characterized by "mass" phenomena, including mass legal wrongs. Simply put,
there are many of us who are "similarly situated" in any given social conflict that evolves into a legal conflict. There can be no sensible expectation
that "the legislature"-whether Congress or its state counterparts-will
adequately and comprehensively deal with these legal problems. The legislature, of course, can create new mechanisms, such as administrative
regulation, to deal with recurrent types of wrongdoing that affect large
numbers of people. It is, however, a political fact that legislatures respond
to a legal problem only after the problem has achieved sufficient visibility to
get a place on the legislative agenda. Even then, legislative response will be
slow in coming because of uncertainty and controversy over appropriate
solutions. In the meantime, the courts must respond somehow to the aggrieved claimants.
Accordingly, the hope that we could somehow abolish class suits and
return to individualized justice is merely wishful thinking. However, sober
thinking requires reconsideration of how to structure the mechanism properly. We hope this study provides illumination in that task.

I. THE ENGLISH ANTECEDENTS

OF THE CLASS SUIT

A. The Necessary PartiesRule

The origins of the class action doctrine are intertwined with problems
presented by the Necessary Parties Rule in English Chancery practice in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Necessary Parties Rule required
35
joined as a party.
that any person with an interest in the object of a suit be
Several reasons were advanced for the rule: complete justice can only be
35 See, e.g., Knight v. Knight, 3 P. Wins. 331,334, 24 Eng. Rep. 1088, 1089 (Ch. 1733)
(holding that when an action in equity is brought against the heir of an estate, the executor
must be made a party); Dunstall v. Rabett, Rep. T. Finch 242, 243, 23 Eng. Rep. 133, 134
(Ch. 1675) (stating that in an action to recover inheritance from an estate, failure to include
other devisees will be grounds for granting a demurrer); Atwood v. Hawkins, Rep. T. Finch
113, 113, 23 Eng. Rep. 62, 62 (Ch. 1673) (reasoning that in order to avoid future suits, failure
to include other devisees in an action to recover from inheritance will result in dismissal);
Weston v. Keighley, Rep. T. Finch 82, 82, 23 Eng. Rep. 44, 44 (Ch. 1673) (holding that in an
action to recover from joint tenancy, a co-tenant must be included as a party); cf John W.
Reed, Compulsory Joinder ofPartiesin Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L. REv. 327, 340-74 (1957)
(detailing the application of the compulsory joinder rule in various contexts). See generally
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Indispensable Party: The HistoricalOrigin of a ProceduralPhantom, 61 COLum. L. REv. 1254, 1255-89 (1961) (tracing the origins and histories of both the
Necessary and Indispensable Party Rules).
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done by determining the rights of all parties connected with the subject of
the suit or the relief to be granted; 36 multiplicity of suits should be prevented; 37 and, assurance should be provided that those persons before the
court could safely execute the decree. 38 This last justification for the Necessary Parties Rule arose from the fact that
nonparties were held not to be
39
bound by a decree made in their absence.
There were, however, situations in which it was impossible or impractical to join all "necessary" parties. Courts therefore formulated exceptions to
the Necessary Parties Rule.40 For example, where one of several coexecutors was out of the jurisdiction, a legatee could maintain a bill against
the remaining executors; or, where a joint obligor 42 or partner 43 was out of
the jurisdiction or bankrupt,44 a creditor could nevertheless proceed against
36 See Knight, 3 P. Vms. at 334, 24 Eng. Rep. at 1089

("Mhe court of equity in all cases

delights to do complete justice, and not by halves.").
37 See Plunket v. Penson, 2 Atk. 51, 51, 26 Eng. Rep. 428, 429 (Ch. 1740) (holding that
"[i]n bills of discovery ... you should make every person a party who is necessarily to be
made so, that you may not multiply suits improperly").
38 See Thompson v. Baskervill, 3 Ch. Rep. 215, 215, 21 Eng. Rep. 770, 770 (Ch. 1688)
(holding that the original mortgagor must be made a party in the second mortgagee's action to
set aside the first mortgage).
39 See Poore v. Clark, 2 Atk. 515, 516, 26 Eng. Rep. 710, 710 (Ch. 1742) (ruling that in a
bill to remove a house brought against the lord of the manor and an occupant, the other nonparty tenants of the manor were not bound); Natchbolt v. Porter, 2 Vein. 112, 114, 23 Eng.
Rep. 682, 682 (Ch. 1689) (holding that a non-party assignee cannot be bound to indemnify
assignor); Woodcock v. Mayne, 73 SELD. Soc'Y 314, 314 (Ch. 1676) (holding that a mortgagor must be party to a junior encumbrancer's bill against a senior mortgagee); Carpenter v.
Stallard, 73 SELD. SOc'Y 109, 109 (Ch. 1674) (stating that a senior mortgagee should not be
bound by a junior mortgagee's suit against the mortgagor); see also Fell v. Brown, 2 Bro. C.C.
275, 279, 29 Eng. Rep. 151, 153 (Ch. 1787) (stating that in a case of redemption of a second
mortgage, the original mortgagor must be present at trial); Hazard, supra note 35, at 1258-59
(discussing Lord Nottingham's contention that absent parties are not bound by judgments).
40 See JOHN MI-FoRD (LORD REDESDALE), PLEADINGS IN CHANCERY 202 (New York,
John S. Voorhies, 3d ed. 1833) ("i~here one general legal right is claimed against several
distinct persons, a bill may be brought to establish the right." (citation omitted)).
41 See, e.g., Cowslad v. Cely, Prec. Ch. 83, 83, 24 Eng. Rep. 40, 40 (Ch. 1698) (holding
that a suit may proceed against one executor where service could not have been effected on a
foreign executor).
42 See, e.g., Quintine v. Yard, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 74, 74, 21 Eng. Rep. 886, 886 (Ch. 1702)
(ruling that in a suit to recover an annuity from a will, the defendant's demurrer for lack of
proper parties was denied since the other two obligators were out of the jurisdiction).
43 See, e.g., Darwent v. Walton, 2 Atk. 510, 511, 26 Eng. Rep. 707, 708 (Ch. 1742) (stating that in a joint demand, when one party is outside the jurisdiction, the other is liable for the
whole demand).
44 See, e.g., Madox v. Jackson, 3 Atk. 406, 407, 26 Eng. Rep. 1034, 1035 (Ch. 1746)
(holding that an obligee may recover against two obligators when the third was dead and his
estate insolvent); Heath v. Percival, 1. P. Wins. 682, 684, 24 Eng. Rep. 570, 571 (Ch. 1720)
(stating that an obligee may recover a debt even though one of the two obligators was bankrupt).
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those who remained; or, where the identity of an absent party was unknown,
his presence would be excused.45 Taken together, these constituted what
can be called the "impossibility exception": When compliance with the
Necessary Party Rule was impossible as a practical matter, the rule was relaxed.
The impossibility exception also covered situations in which interested
parties were so numerous that it was practically impossible to join them all.
This problem of "numerousness" was a chief antecedent of the modem class
suit. When confronted with parties too numerous to be joined, the chancellor sometimes simply allowed such suits to be maintained without joinder of
all such "interested" parties. 46 But as a general principle, as we shall see,
courts tried to establish the principle that the absentee members of a numerous group would be regarded as parties through the medium of representation.
The problem was thus: If the absentees are necessary parties without
whom a decree ordinarily would not be entered, but the absentees cannot be
made parties, then what is the effect on those parties of a decree entered in
their absence? Under the Necessary Parties Rule as applied until about
1780, cases involving one or a few absentees held that the absentees need
not be joined and that they were not bound.47 Later, this formula was inverted, and it was held that the absentee had to be joined because he would
nonetheless be bound-the Indispensable Party Rule.48 Both the old, flexible Necessary Party Rule and the subsequent inflexible, Indispensable Party
Rule, however, shared a premise about binding an absentee member. This
premise was that a person not a party to a suit should not be bound by a
See Bowyer v. Covert, I Vern. 95, 95, 23 Eng. Rep. 337, 337 (Ch. 1682) (denying a
demurrer for lack of parties where the plaintiff did not know the identity of the other executor).
46 See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Wyburgh, I P. Wms. 599,24 Eng. Rep. 534 (Ch. 1719). In
this case, the Attorney General brought a bill to establish the entire charge against only a few
of the devisees. These defendants objected that all of the owners of the charged estates should
be joined. The court held that the defendants' remedy was to bring a bill for contribution
later, but nonetheless appointed a master to determine the amount of arrearage and to "inquire
whether the lands were liable." To the same effect are Attorney Gen. v. Shelley, 1 Salk. 163,
91 Eng. Rep. 151 (Ch. 1712), and Attorney Gen. v. Jackson, 11 Ves. 365, 32 Eng. Rep. 1128
(Ch. 1805). In the latter case, Lord Redesdale, sitting as Chancellor, held that "the rule of
pleading is, that the Charity may bring any one of the estates before the Court.. . ." 11 Ves.
at 369, 32 Eng. Rep. at 1130 (emphasis added), and expressly reserved the question of the effect on absent parties.
47 See Hazard id. at 1257-62 (detailing situations in which joinder of necessary parties
was excusable, and articulating the "settled law" that an absentee was not bound).
41 See id. at 1259-60 (discussing situations in which judgments would bind absentee
members); id. at 1265-66 (discussing Lord Hardwick's approach of the binding effect of the
judgment on all absentee members when including them in the suit was not possible).
45
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purported determination of his rights in such a suit. As has long been said,
it is a first principle of justice that a person have notice and an opportunity
to be heard in the determination of her rights.49
The same problem arose in situations involving numerous parties. Several patterns of cases dealt with the effect of a decree in such situations.
Although some of the cases involved numerous claimants while others involved numerous obligors, most of the cases involved the question of
whether the suit could proceed without the absentees-the view of a class
suit from the prospective or ex-ante perspective, presenting what we now
call the question ofjoinder of necessary parties. A few of the cases, most of
them appearing later in historical sequence, involved the effect of the decree
on the absentees-the retrospective or ex-post view, presenting what we
now call the question of res judicata. The class suit cases presenting the
necessary parties problem and those presenting the res judicata problem
were, however, considered to involve the same issue-whether the absentees were bound. This is evidenced by the fact that the reason offered in the
necessary parties cases for allowing the case to proceed despite the lack of
of the class
complete joinder was the proposition that the absentee members
50
would be bound through the parties who represented them.
B. Early Representative Suits
A large proportion of the early numerous parties cases can be classfled in three categories: bills of peace involving a common benefit to or
burden upon the members of the group, often relating to real property, cases
involving a group having creditor claims against a debtor or legatee claims
against an estate, and cases involving unincorporated associations.

49 See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989) (reiterating the holding of Hansberry v. Lee that "one is not bound by a judgment... in which he is not designated as a party
or to which he has not been made a party by service of process" (citation omitted)).
5o Comparison of the Indispensable Party Rule, as it evolved in the frst half of the nineteenth century, with the Class Suit Rule in the same period reveals a curious paradox. The
Indispensable Party Rule stated that when the absentees were few in number the action could
not proceed without them, lest they be bound by the decree, while the Representative Suit
Rule stated that if the absentees were numerous, the action could proceed without them because they would be bound. Compare Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. 129, 141, 17 How. 137, 150
(1854) (refusing to uphold the rescission of a contract where four of the six parties in the contract were not within the jurisdiction of the lower court), with Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S.
288, 302, 16 How. 307, 322 (1853) (stating that "[f]or convenience, therefore, and to prevent
a failure ofjustice, a court of equity permits a portion of the parties in interest to represent the
entire body, and the decree binds all of them the same as if all were before the court").
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1. Bills of Peace
The earliest cases involved bills of peace concerning a common benefit
or burden. In these situations, a multiplicity of litigation would result unless
a bill of peace was permitted. As its name implies, the raison d'atre of the
bill of peace was prevention of multiple suits over a common question by
bringing all the disputants into one suit. Not all of the bill of peace cases,
however, implicated the necessary parties problem. Most of these cases involved claims that could have been satisfactorily litigated without the absentees, apart from the burden of repetitive litigation. Each of the many
claims could have been coherently litigated without reference to any other
claim. Analytically these proceedings are therefore "common question"
class suits, which today we classify as the "(b)(3)" type of suit.51 That is,
they involved claims such that a resolution for or against an individual
claimant would not implicate rights of other claimants, other than the fact
that inconsistent 52resolutions of the issue would result in unequal treatment
of the claimants.
The decisions in the bill of peace cases upheld the representative device
to the extent that joinder was concerned, but did not advance any theory of
representation by which the absentees would be bound. Professor Yeazell
suggests that at least some of these cases involve actual participation by a
preexisting group that had conferred representative authority on some of
their numbers to conduct the litigation in behalf of all. 53 That analysis certainly covers a good number of the cases. The best example of such cases is
that of villagers having identical claims to common land as against a village
landlord where, as Professor Yeazell has suggested, the villagers undoubtedly had a real affiliation with each other as well as being a class in a procedural sense.5 4 On that basis, these cases can be considered as involving, not

51 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (stating that "questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate ... ").
52 For modem analogues, see, for example, Eisen v. Carlisle, 417 U.S. 156, 160-66
(1974), involving a proposed class of several million stockholders alleging that they were
charged excessive brokerage fees in violation of antitrust laws, and Vasquez v. Superior
Court, 484 P.2d 964, 966-67 (Cal. 1971), involving a proposed class of consumers alleging
fraudulent misrepresentation against several finance companies and a seller of freezers.
53 See Yeazell, GroupLitigationandSocial Context, supra note 12, at 877-81 (illustrating
situations in which numerous litigants were represented by a select few).

54 See id. at 877 (arguing that most groups involved in such early lawsuits "existed as social entities independent of the lawsuit"). The affiliation, of course, would be the shared
"fate" of living one's life in the same village.
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instances of mere common victimization, but prototypes of the unincorporated association type of class suits that later appeared."
The bill of peace cases are perhaps the first recognizable expression of
class suit doctrine. In these decisions, however, there was no coherent theory of representation or firm view as to the effect of a decree on absentees.
One very early decision indicated that the bill could not be maintained without joinder of the absentees; 56 another early case said that the bill could be
maintained but that non-parties who had an interest in the bill could not be
bound.57 Nevertheless, even as early as the late seventeenth century, there
were a few cases saying that the absentees would be bound.
Chief among the cases indicating that absentee members of a numerous
group can be bound through representation is the well-known case of Brown
v. ermuden." This case presented the following scenario: The vicar of a
parish initially had sued to establish a right to a tithe from all mining operations in his parish, the tithe being essentially a land tax to support the parish
church. The miners of the parish appointed four representatives to defend
the suit, and a decree was eventually rendered in favor of the vicar. Plaintiff
Brown thereafter succeeded to the vicarship and some years later sought to
enforce the decree against Vermuden, another miner; that is, Vicar Brown
sought to collect a subsequently accruing tithe on the basis of liability established in the first suit. Vermuden defended on the ground that he had not
been a party to the earlier action. The court held that Vermuden was obligated to pay the tithe on the basis of the earlier decree, stating that otherwise
suits would be "infinite, and impossible to be ended." 59
Similarly, How v. Tenants of Bromsgrove60 affirmed the use of a bill of
peace to prevent a multiplicity of suits in a dispute between a lord and his

" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61 cmt. a (1982) (illustrating liability
against associations with multiple members in the common law).
56See Hudson v. Fletcher, Rep. T. Finch 114, 114, 23 Eng. Rep. 62, 62 (Ch. 1673)
(holding that it was necessary to add the other parties involved for a bill to be examined).
57See Thirveton v. Collier, 1 Ch.Cas. 48, 48, 22 Eng. Rep. 688, 688 (Ch. 1664) (holding
that those who had an interest in the bill, but were not parties to an Agreement for Inclosure,
could not be bound).
" 1 Ch. Cas. 272, 22 Eng. Rep. 796 (Ch.1676). Brown v. Vermuden has been recurrently
cited in the subsequent evolution of class suit doctrine, not least significantly in Hansberryv.
Lee, 311 U.S. 33, 42 (1940). See also Brown v. Booth, 2 Vern. 184, 184, 23 Eng. Rep. 720,
721 (Ch.1690) (holding that miners not originally parties to a suit were nevertheless obligated
to pay the plaintiff and his successors); cf Anonymous, 1 Ch. Cas. 269, 270, 22 Eng. Rep.
795, 795 (Ch.1675) (holding that a corporation could represent a larger group in a suit so as
to avoid confusion).
" Brown, 1 Ch.Cas. at 272, 22 Eng. Rep. at 797.
60 1Vern. 22, 22, 23 Eng. Rep. 277, 277 (Ch.1681) (holding that "[b]ills of peace to prevent multiplicity of suits are proper in equity"); see also Ewelme Hosp. v. Andover, 1 Vein.
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tenants over hunting rights in manorial lands. This could be considered either as an association case, the tenants obviously having a preexisting group
identity, 61 or as a case involving individual parallel claims to property; that
is, a "common question" type of case.
In City of London v. Perkins,62 the Mayor of London brought a bill
against an importer to collect a customs tax on cheese. Claiming an exemption as a freeman, the defendant refused to pay the duty. It was held without
much explanation that the defendant was bound by the decision in two earlier cases involving the same issue against similarly situated defendants.63
In 1737, the famous case of Mayor of York v. Pilkington64 was decided.
In behalf of the residents of York, the mayor claimed an exclusive right to
fish a local river. He sought a bill of peace and an accounting for fish already taken against five lords of nearby riparian manors. The defendants
demurred to the joinder of parties. They argued that, although bills of peace
had been allowed where "general rights" were asserted, the rights of each
defendant in this case were claimed on "distinct" grounds; hence, no issue
could be framed that would settle the rights of all parties. Translating this
objection into modem procedural rubric, the defendants argued that the
situation did not present a problem of necessary parties but only one of
permissive joinder of defendants. Since joinder of the absentees was unnecessary to adjudicate the interests of those already joined, a representative
65
suit was inappropriate. Citing City of London v. Perkins, Lord Hardwick
reasoned that the several nature of the rights claimed by defendants was irrelevant. Rather, the existence of numerous adverse claimants, and the consuits, was sufficient to establish equity jurisdicsequent danger of multiple
66
tion for the bill of peace.
Looking at these cases in modem analytic terms, one can see that most
of them involved prospective or ex-ante joinder problems concerning nu266, 267, 23 Eng. Rep. 460, 461 (Ch. 1684) (noting that in cases in which multiple suits were
brought a bill of peace was proper to prevent a multiplicity of suits).
61 See Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context, supra note 12, at 869-73 (asserting
that sixteenth- and seventeenth-century cases of group litigation involved members of rural
agricultural communities).
6' 3 Bro. P.C. 602, 602, 1 Eng. Rep. 1524, 1524 (Parl. 1734).
63 See id. at 606-07, 1 Eng. Rep. at 1527 (holding that the defendant should pay the duty
for all imported cheese).
64 West. T. Hard. 293, 296-97, 25 Eng. Rep. 946, 947-48 (Ch. 1737) (overruling the defendant's demurrer and noting that the main issue to be decided was the plaintiff's general
right upon which the defendants could each make their distinct defenses).
61 Perkins, 3 Bro. P.C. at 602, 1 Eng. Rep. at 1524.
66 See Pilkington, West T. Hard. at 296, 25 Eng. Rep. at 947 ("[B]ut because a great
number of actions may be brought, the Court suffers such bills, though defendants might
make distinct defences... I think, therefore this bill is proper.").
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merous parties; only one of them, City ofLondon v. Perkins,67 addressed res
judicata effects on absentees. Most if not all of the cases involved preexisting social groups, suggesting the point made by Professor Yeazell 68 that
these cases involve issues analogous to what in modem times is litigation
involving local or private government. 69 In this connection, it is noteworthy
that the contested substantive issue in each instance did not concern individual conduct, as such, but rather the legal standard by which such conduct
was commonly governed-the tithe, the right of fishery, and liability for
customs duty.
These early cases can fairly be read as procedural improvisations
whereby the court could treat groups-fellow tenants, fellow miners, fellow
merchants-as some kind of set or entity for procedural purposes. Such a
theme certainly seems implicit in most of the decisions. While it is risky to
interject modem analysis into pre-modem situations, it does appear that
Chancery in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries felt reasonably confident about the fairness of adjudicating rights of absentees where
the absentees belonged to a preexisting group and some members of the
group were before the court as litigants.
Equivocation and contradiction nevertheless persisted. A mideighteenth-century decision by Chancellor Hardwick held that all other tenants claiming a right claimed by the plaintiff were not necessary parties, but
also said that neither would they be bound by the decree. 70 Yet in a case
decided the same year, the Chancellor held that in a bill to account for fees,
all parties who wished to be bound had to appear before the court.71

67

3 Bro. P.C. at 605-07, 1 Eng. Rep. at 1526-27.

See Yeazell, GroupLitigation and Social Context, supra note 12, at 868-76 (discussing
the history of the class action lawsuit and focusing on the social position of group litigants
since the infancy of class action suits).
69 See id. at 892-93 (describing how the courts engaged in a legislative function due to
their position as an administrative arm of the Crown).
70 See Pawlet v. Bishop of Lincoln, 2 Atk. 296, 296, 26 Eng. Rep. 581, 581 (Ch. 1742)
(illustrating concepts regarding the use of compulsory joinder in early case law and standing
for the proposition that allowing joinder of parties was desirable and necessary).
71 See Poore v. Clark, 2 Atk. 515, 515-16, 26 Eng. Rep. 710, 710 (Ch. 1742) ("i[]f you
draw the jurisdiction out of a court of law, you must have all persons parties before this court,
who will be necessary to make the determination complete, and to quiet the question." (citing
Pawlet v. Bishop of Lincoln, 2 Atk. 296,296, 26 Eng. Rep. 581,581 (Ch. 1742))).
69
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2. Creditor and Legatee Bills
Toward the latter part of the eighteenth century, Chancery began to apply the Necessary Parties Rule with greater inflexibility. 72 In cases involving "numerous parties," a rigorously applied Necessary Parties Rule would
have made it practically impossible to bring a controversy to final judgment.
In those days, complicated equity suits could take decades to resolve,73 and
equity procedure required that, if a party died, the suit in effect had to be
commenced anew by a bill of revivor. This meant that a suit involving
many parties stood a good chance of never coming to decree. 74 To avoid
this difficulty, resort was had to the principle of representation adumbrated
in the bill of peace cases.
The cases that most clearly manifest this development are those of
creditor and legatee bills. The typical case of this type involved a bill in behalf of all creditors or all legatees for an accounting and for payment of
debts or legacies out of the estate of the debtor or decedent. 75 Both types of
bills involved an initial decree for an accounting by a master. Upon being
appointed, the master marshaled assets, advertised for creditors and legatees, listed and paid creditors and legatees who had appeared and proved
their claims, listed absent creditors and legatees who apparently had valid
claims but who had not appeared, and rendered his account to the chancelSee supra note 35 and accompanying text (tracing the historical developments of modem joinder law and illustrating them with examples of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
Chancery cases).
73 See, e.g., CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 1-9 (London, MacDonald & Sons n.d.)
(1853) (using Jardyce v. Jardyce to comment on the lengthy process of the English chancery
court system).
72

74 See JOSEPH STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS §§ 94-97, at 93-98 (2d

ed. 1840). A sense of the delay and frustration involved is conveyed in the jurisprudence under Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure before its amendments in 1961 and 1963.
See generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 1951-62 (1982).
73 Creditor bill cases include, for example, Weld v. Bonham, 2 S. & S. 91, 57 Eng. Rep.
280 (Ch. 1824), involving a bill to execute the trusts of a deed in payment of debts due to the
plaintiffs and Leigh v. Thomas, 2 Ves. Sen. 312, 28 Eng. Rep. 201 (Ch. 1751), involving a bill
for the account of prize money brought by two agents who were part of a ship's crew. Legatee cases include, for example, Manning v. Thesiger, 1 S. & S. 106, 57 Eng. Rep. 43 (Ch.
1822), involving a suit brought by plaintiffs in behalf of themselves and to their legatees under a will to discharge the appointed trustee and Crakerv. Parrott,2 Ch. Cas. 228, 22 Eng.
Rep. 921 (Ch. 1677), involving a bill brought by a widow to enforce the legacy left by her
husband. The legatee's bill had to be brought against the administrator or executive. See Peacock v. Monk, 1 Ves. Sen. 127, 131-33, 27 Eng. Rep. 934, 937-38 (Ch. 1748) (holding that it
was unnecessary to make persons other than the executor parties to the estate since he could
defend for himself, creditors, and legatees); Humphreys v. Humphreys, 3 P. Wms. 349, 350,
24 Eng. Rep. 1096, 1096-97 (Ch. 1734) (holding that to take account of a person's estate, his
executor or administrator must be made a party to the bill).
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lor. Thereafter, a final decree was issued.76 The final decree directed payment of creditors and, in the case of a legatee bill, directed payment to
legatees out of any residue. The decree operated as a discharge of the executor or administrator."
This type of representative suit evolved in significant part to avoid difficulties created by the Necessary Party Rule. 7 8 The creditor or legatee who
brought the suit could represent the creditors or legatees whose joinder was
impractical. Some of the decisions also reasoned that the purpose was to
avoid the cost to the decedent's estate that would result from defending numerous suits by individual creditors, a rationale derived from the bill of
peace type of representative proceeding. 79 Other cases made reference to
the need to prevent one creditor from gaining a preference over others,80 and
See David v. Frowd, I My. & K. 200, 208-11, 39 Eng. Rep. 657, 660-61 (M.R. 1833)
(reviewing extensively the practice for resolving creditor and legatee bills); Gillespie v. Alexander, 3 Russ. 130, 136-37, 38 Eng. Rep. 525, 528 (Ch. 1827) (same); see also Brooks v.
Reynolds, Dick. 603, 603, 21 Eng. Rep. 406, 406 (Ch. 1782) (explaining the procedures by
which account is taken and decrees issued); Douglas v. Clay, Dick. 393, 393-94, 21 Eng. Rep.
322, 322 (Ch. 1767) (same).
77 See Curre v. Bowyer, 3 Madd. 456, 456, 56 Eng. Rep. 572, 572 (V.C. 1818) (holding
that a creditor who proceeds at law against an executor after a decree has been issued is in
contempt of court). But see Angell v. Haddon, I Madd. 529, 530, 56 Eng. Rep. 194, 194
(V.C. 1816) (allowing a creditor to prove his debt under a decree of a creditor's bill even
though the funds in question had already been apportioned among other creditors); Farrell v.
Smith, 2 Ball & Beatty 337, 342 (Ir. H. Ct. 1813) ("Where this Court has taken the Management of Assets from the Executor into its own hands, it will not permit him to be charged, for
what has been done in pursuance of its Directions.").
71 See Weld, 2 S. & S. at 193, 57 Eng. Rep. at 281 ("[Ihe parties are much too numerous
to make it practicable to prosecute a suit, if they are all made parties."); Manning 1 S. & S. at
106, 57 Eng. Rep. at 43 (holding that when a bill is filed by many appointees, the court may
dispense of the rule requiring all to be named parties to the suit); Lloyd v. Loaring, 1 Ves. Jun.
Sup. 656, 657, 34 Eng. Rep. 966, 966 (Ch. 1802) (holding that the rule requiring all parties
interested in a suit to appear before a court may be dispensed with). But see Morse v. Sadler,
I Cox 352, 352, 29 Eng. Rep. 1199, 1199 (Ch. 1787) ("[L]egatees out of personal estate only,
need not be parties, but every person claiming an interest out of real estate must be before the
Court.").
79 Law v. Rigby, 4 Bro. C.C. 60, 63, 29 Eng. Rep. 779, 780 (Ch. 1792) ("It certainly
would not be right to load the estate with the expence of two causes ... ."); see also Pott v.
Gallini, 1 S. & S. 206, 209-10, 57 Eng. Rep. 83, 84 (V.C. 1823) (explaining that a defendant
incurs unnecessary expense when he must answer two complaints making a claim against the
same account).
so See Brooks v. Reynolds, I Bro. C.C. 183, 184, 28 Eng. Rep. 1070, 1071 (Ch. 1782)
(holding that a creditor's suit against an executor binds the other creditors such that creditors
suing subsequent to the original suit will be enjoined from suing) (citing Martin v. Martin, 1
Ves. Sen. 211, 27 Eng. Rep. 988 (Ch. 1748-49)); Douglas,Dick. at 394, 21 Eng. Rep. at 322
(granting an injunction against a creditor who brought suit against the plaintiff in an attempt to
gain a preference over other creditors). In fact, a creditor was virtually compelled to bring the
action for his debt in behalf of all creditors, to prevent preferences. See Attorney Gen. v.
Cornthwaite, 2 Cox 44, 45, 30 Eng. Rep. 21, 21 (Ch. 1788) (requiring that the Master account
76
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to minimize vexation of executors through multiple suits,8' which would
discourage acceptance of appointments as executors. These explanations all
imply that the absentees are bound by the decree.
The creditor bill cases certainly did not involve a preexisting group that
could be regarded in any sense as an association. Ordinarily, the only tie
among creditors would be their unpaid claims against the debtor or decedent-that is, their common victimization. As for legatees, no doubt they
usually had family ties, but they also must have had conflicts of interest
among themselves. Possibly for these reasons, the creditor and legatee
cases generated the first explicit consideration of what we now call "fairness" and "adequacy" of representation in "numerous parties" situations.
The clear premise of the creditor and legatee bills was that the plaintiff
had a representative status. Accordingly, it was held that inasmuch as the
bill was brought in behalf of all creditors, the decree was in the nature of a
judgment for all creditors. 82 For the same reason, a creditor's bill did not
abate upon the death of the plaintiff; any other creditor could renew the suit
by supplemental bill, rather than having to commence a new suit. 8 3 In
for a testator's other debts before payment of a debt to a single creditor); Bedford v. Leigh,
Dick. 707, 708, 21 Eng. Rep. 446, 446-47 (Ch. 1785) ("I ha[ve] never heard of a decree upon
a bill by a single creditor, not on behalf of himself and the rest, go to real assets.").
81See Fielden v. Fielden, I S. & S. 255, 257, 57 Eng. Rep. 102, 103 (V.C. 1822) (holding
that the court "should have protected the executor" from multiple creditors; Brooks, I Bro.
C.C. at 185, 28 Eng. Rep. at 1072 ("mhe reason why the injunction is granted is this, that this
Court, having taken the fund into its own hands, will not permit the executor to be pursued at
law."); Farrell,2 Ball & Beatty at 341-42 (rejecting the plaintiff's bill on the grounds that the
court had already administered the estate and on the grounds that no executor would be safe if
he were liable to answer in a case such as this).
82 See Lord v. Wormleighton, Jac. 148, 149-50, 37 Eng. Rep. 806, 806-07 (Ch. 1821)
(granting an executor's motion for an injunction against a creditor such that the creditor was
restrained from proceeding at law pending the administration of the estate); Terrewest v.
Featherby, 2 Mer. 480, 481, 35 Eng. Rep. 1024, 1024 (Ch. 1817) (refusing to grant the defendant's motion for an injunction against the plaintiff's suit on the grounds that delaying the
plaintiff's suit would be a disservice to him, and such a delay increased the chance that the
plaintiff would not be able to recover from the executor de bonis propriisfor a false plea of
plene administrauit);Paxton v. Douglas, 8 Ves. 520, 520, 32 Eng. Rep. 456, 456 (Ch. 1803)
("Nothing is better settled, than that, where this Court has made a decree for administration of
assets, that decree is in nature of a judgment for all creditors."). As stated in Handfordv. Stotie:
After a[n initial] decree [the plaintiff creditor] cannot, by his conduct, deprive
other persons of the same class of the benefit of the decree .... The reason of the
distinction is, that before decree no other person of the class is bound to rely upon
the diligence ofhim who has first instituted his suit ....
2 S. & S. 196, 198, 57 Eng. Rep. 320, 321 (V.C. 1825).
83 The court in Houlditch v. Donegallwas clear:
Where a bill is filed by a person on behalf of himself and a class of other persons
standing in the same circumstances, and the suit, after decree, abates by his death, or
is deserted by him or his representatives, it is almost a matter of course to permit an-
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working out the implications of the fact that the plaintiff was a representative, it was recognized that the representative had fiduciary obligations.
Thus, it was held that a mortgage creditor could not file a bill in behalf of
general creditors, 84 and that creditors were not allowed to use the bill to establish the priority of their claims as against other creditors. 85 Upon the
same principle, in legatee bills, a contingent remainderman defendant could
86
nor could a specific legatee bring a bill in
not bind other remaindermen,
87
legatees.
behalf of residuary
The procedural mechanics in these suits also reveal how absent parties
would be affected. It will be recalled that the creditor's bill proceeding involved two decrees-the initial decree directing an accounting and the appointment of the master, and the final decree directing payment of claims
and discharging the executor or administrator. After the initial decree, no
creditor or legatee could proceed by an action at law to collect his debt or
legacy; an attempt to do so would provoke an injunction against such an action. 88 The claimant was remitted to coming in under the initial decree and
other person reported by the Master to be one of that class, to take up the proceedings by a supplemental bill.
1 S. & S. 491, 494, 57 Eng. Rep. 194, 196 (V.C. 1823); see also Boddy v. Kent, I Mer. 361,
364-65, 35 Eng. Rep. 707, 708-09 (Ch. 1816) (indicating in dicta that the death of one creditor
does not cause an abatement because the representatives of the deceased creditor may "come
in under the Decree in common with the other creditors").
84 See Weld v. Bonham, 2 S. & S. 91, 93, 57 Eng. Rep. 280, 280 (V.C. 1824) ("If there be
special circumstances... which make it fit that the joint creditors ... should be more distinctly represented ... a proper application must be made.. . ."); Cockburn v. Thompson, 16
Ves. Jun. 321, 327-28, 33 Eng. Rep. 1005, 1008 (Ch. 1809) ("[A]nd I should upon principle
find the means, if not supplied by precedent, of giving a creditor... the opportunity of supporting his interest better than the Plaintiff could." (citations omitted)); see also Bedford v.
Leigh, Dick. 707, 708, 21 Eng. Rep. 446, 446-47 (Ch. 1785) ("I ha[ve] never heard of a decree upon a bill by a single creditor, not on behalf of himself and the rest, go to real assets.");
Burney v. Morgan, 1 S. & S. 358, 362,57 Eng. Rep. 144, 145 (V.C. 1823) ("A mortgagee has
no common interest with the creditors ... and cannot sue on their behalf.").
85 See Newton v. Egmont, 5 Sim. 130, 137, 58 Eng. Rep. 286, 289 (V.C. 1832) ("In this
case, where the question is priority of charge, the very nature of the question makes it necessary that all the creditors should be parties.').
86 See Pelham v. Gregory, I Eden. 518, 28 Eng. Rep. 786 (Ch. 1760). The court makes a
very interesting analysis in Pelham, in which it states: "It may be convenient in the present
case to the plaintiffs, but no complaisance should dwell within these walls; and when with one
eye I look upon the convenience of plaintiffs, I must with the other as steadily observe the
inconvenience of defendants." I Eden. at 521, 28 Eng. Rep. at 788.
87 See Atwood v. Hawkins, Rep. T. Finch 113, 113, 23 Eng. Rep. 62, 62 (Ch. 1673)
(granting the defendant's demurrer as to the plaintiff's motion demanding an account of the
surplus of their father's estate because, as residuary legatees, they were not parties to the suit).
88See Curre v. Bowyer, 3 Madd. 456, 456, 56 Eng. Rep. 572, 572 (V.C. 1818) (holding
that a creditor's attempt to proceed at law after notice of the decree was in the nature of a
contempt of court and indicating that upon a motion for an injunction, the Vice-Chancellor
would go so far as to refuse the creditor the costs of the further proceedings at law and the
costs of the application); Brooks v. Reynolds, I Bro. C.C. 183, 185, 28 Eng. Rep. 1070, 1072
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proving his debt before the master.89 This result, which obviously had great
practical utility, was justified in procedural terms by the propositions that
the creditor had an existing and efficient remedy in Chancery" and that, by
virtue of representation through the plaintiff, the absent parties were in a
sense before the court. It was but a small step to hold that these parties
precluded from proceeding against the executor after the final dewere also
92
cree.
(Ch. 1782) (granting an injunction to restrain a creditor from proceeding at law); Douglas v.
Clay, Dickens 393, 394, 21 Eng. Rep. 322, 322 (Ch. 1767) (enjoining a creditor from proceeding at law after the decree for satisfaction of the creditors); see also Rush v. Higgs, 4 Ves.
Jun. 638, 643, 31 Eng. Rep. 329, 331 (Ch. 1799) (stating that no injunction will issue against
an action at law until the initial decree for an accounting has actually been effected).
89 See Pott v. Gallini, 1 Sim. & St. 206, 209, 57 Eng. Rep. 83, 84 (V.C. 1823) ("Where
there is a prior decree, and a second suit for the same accounts, and no further relief that can
be had ... under the first suit, the proper course is ... that the proceedings

...

be stayed, and

that the Plaintiff may go before the Master in the first suit."); Law v. Rigby, 4 Bro. C.C. 60,
63, 29 Eng. Rep. 779, 780 (Ch. 1792) ("It certainly would not be right to load the estate with
the expense of two causes, if one is sufficient."); Brooks, I Bro. C.C. at 185, 28 Eng. Rep. at
1071-72 (granting an injunction because "the creditors here may come in before the Master
90 See Rigby, 4 Bro. C.C. at 63, 29 Eng. Rep. at 780 (overruling a demurrer in a second
suit because "the creditors must be content to come in under a decree [made in the initial]
cause"); see also Rush v. Higgs, 4 Ves. Jun. at 643, 31 Eng. Rep. at 331 ("I cannot stop a
creditor at law, unless there is a decree, under which he can go in."); Craker v. Parrott, 2
Chan. Cas. 228, 230, 22 Eng. Rep. 921, 922 (Ch. 1677) (holding that the decedent's issues
could come in before the master even though they were not party to the initial suit).
91See Cockbum v. Thompson, 16 Ves. Jun. 321, 325-30, 33 Eng. Rep. 1005, 1007-08
(Ch. 1809) (admitting the general rule that all persons with an interest in the suit ought to be
parties but holding that the plaintiffs inability to bring forward all persons with an interest in
the suit should not prevent the suit from proceeding); Adair v. New River Co., 11 Ves. Jun.
429, 443-44, 32 Eng. Rep. 1153, 1158-59 (Ch. 1805) ("[W]here it is impracticable [to bring
all parties having an interest in the case], the rule shall not be pressed."); see also Neve v.
Weston, 3 Atk. 557, 557, 26 Eng. Rep. 1121, 1121 (Ch. 1747) ("A man who comes in before
").
a Master under a decree, is quasi a party to that suit.
92 A few eighteenth-century cases involved absent parties attempting to bring suit after
the final decree, but these cases involved long lapses of time between the decree in the first
suit and the absentee's filing of the second action. Hence, they may rest on a principle of
laches rather than preclusion. See Pearson v. Belchier, 4 Ves. Jun. 627, 628, 31 Eng. Rep.
323, 323 (Ch. 1799) (final decree in the first suit in 1752; absentees' suit filed in 1781 and
heard in 1799); Farrell v. Smith, 2 Ball & Beatty 337, 342 (Ir. H. Ct. 1813) (final decree in
1803; absentees' suit filed in 1811 and heard in 1813). In this period it was often stated as
dictum that there could be no action against the administrator after a final decree. In the few
cases involving a creditor or legatee who had failed to claim under the original bill through no
fault of his own, and who was not guilty of laches in a second suit, the absentee was usually
held not to be precluded. That the preclusive effect in a legatee bill was unsettled as late as
1804 is illustrated by Lord Redesdale's remarks in Giffardv. Hort:
Under this impression therefore I think I ought to let the cause stand over ... to
the House of Lords. If the lord shall think [the absentee] not entitled to appeal from
that [earlier] decree, it must be because they think him not bound by it: and ... I
shall not consider myself bound by that [final] decree ....
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On the other hand, the courts carefully attempted to safeguard the rights
of absent parties. If an absent creditor or legatee appeared at any time before the final decree, a new account would be prepared that included the
latecomer's claim. 93 Also, at least in legatee cases, an absent party could
recover after a final decree if he appeared before actual distribution had
been completed.9 a
In 1833, in David v. Frowd,95 the court squarely faced the situation of
an absent next of kin who presented a claim after a final decree and completion of the distribution. Reviewing the practice in representative suits at
length, the court held that the absent legatee could be precluded. Notably,
the basis of preclusion was estoppel by laches, not res judicata. As the court
explained:
Upon the application of any person claiming to be interested, the Court refers it
to the Master to inquire who are creditors, and who are the next of kin ....
Such proceedings having been taken, the Court will protect the administrator
against any future claim. But it is obvious that the notice given by advertisements may, and must, in many cases, not reach the parties really entitled ....
[A]nd it would be the height of injustice that the proceedings of the Court,
wisely adopted with a view to general convenience, should have the absolute
effect of conclusively transferring the property of the true owner to one who
has no right to it.
It is for this reason that.., if a creditor does not happen to discover the
proceedings in the Court until after the distribution has been actually made by
the order of the Court amongst the parties having by the Master's report an apparent title, although the Court will protect the administrator who has acted
under the orders of the Court; yet, upon a bill filed by this creditor against the
parties to whom the property has been distributed, the Court will, upon proof
of no wilful default on the part of such creditor, and no want of reasonable
diligence on his part, compel the parties Defendants to restore to the creditor
that which of right belongs to him ....

It is argued also that the case is extremely hard upon the party who is to refund, for that he has full right to consider the money as his own, and may have
spent it, and that it would be against the policy of the law to recall money
which a party has obtained by the effect of a judgment upon a litigated title.
There is here no judgment upon a litigated title; the party, who now claims by
a paramount title, was absent from the Court, and all that is adjudged is, that
1Sch. & Lefr. 386, 409 (Ir. H. Ct. 1804).
93 See Angell v. Haddon, 1Madd. 529, 530, 56 Eng. Rep. 194, 194 (V.C. 1816) (allowing
a creditor to prove his debt after the apportionment of the property amongst the initial creditors on the condition that the creditor pay for the cost of his application and the cost in recasting the apportionment of the property among all the creditors).
94 See Gillespie v. Alexander, 3 Russ. 130, 136, 38 Eng. Rep. 525, 528 (Ch. 1827) (permitting a creditor to prove his debt "as long as there happens to be a residuary fund in court or
in the hands of the executor, and to pay him out of that residue").
" Id.200, 39 Eng. Rep. 657 (Ch. 1833).

1872

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 146:1849

upon an inquiry, in its nature imperfect, parties are found to have aprimafacie
The apparent title under
claim, subject to be defeated upon better information.
96
defeasible.
nature
its
in
is
report
Master's
the
As of this stage of development (about 1830), the English law regarding
creditor and legatee bills could fairly be summarized as follows: (1) the
plaintiff was a representative, with the result that the absentees were consid97
ered present before the court for purposes of the Necessary Party Rule; (2)
absentees could not proceed at law after a suit had been commenced in equity; (3) claimants who appeared before the master received the benefit of
the decree; 98 (4) the administrator of the debtor's or decedent's estate would
be protected from suits by absentees, in effect being treated as a legally immune conduit; and (5) after the final decree, an omitted creditor was not
barred from filing his own bill against distributees, but he would be subject
to the defense of laches.
A variation of the creditors' bill also made an appearance in the mideighteenth century. These were suits by a ship crew to recover prize money
from the owner or master of the vessel, wherein one or more but less than
all of the crew members brought the bill. In these cases, the first cycle of
doctrine, as in the creditors' bill cases, involved the necessary parties problem-whether the plaintiffs could proceed without joinder of the whole
Id. at 208-11, 39 Eng. Rep. at 660-61. The court's reference to the practical inefficacy
of advertisements to apprise absentees of the pending proceeding is remarkably similar to
Justice Jackson's observations on the same subject in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co.:
It would be idle to pretend that publication alone, as prescribed here, is a reliable
means of acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are before the
courts ....Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted inthe back pages of anewspaper....
339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
97 In modem procedural parlance, we would say that the court had worked out the idea of
a conditionally necessary party. That is, all the creditors or legatees were necessary parties
and should have been brought into the suit if doing so was feasible. Notice by advertisement
was given to this end. The presence of the nonappearing claimants, however, was not "indispensable." It was regarded as more expedient to proceed without the absentees than to refuse
to proceed on account of their absence. See FED. R.Civ. P. 19. See also, e.g., Provident
Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 125 (1968) ("Rule 19(b) ...is... a
valid statement of the criteria for determining whether to proceed or dismiss in the ...absence
of an interested person."). The risk that an absent claimant would later bring suit against the
distributees was rightly regarded as remote. Because the absentee could not be bound by the
decree, however, that risk was also unavoidable.
98 In modem procedural parlance, we would say that the absentees coming in after initial
decree had the benefit of one way intervention, see Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley,
300 F.2d 561, 569 (10th Cir. 1961), or offensive issue preclusion, see Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-33 (1979) ("mhe preferable approach... in the federal courts is
not to preclude the use of offensive collateral estoppel, but to grant trial courts broad discretion to determine when it should be applied.").
96
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crew. In Leigh v. Thomas,99 two seamen sought an accounting of prize
money in behalf of sixty-four of a total crew of eighty, pursuant to a written
power of attorney. The procedural problem apparently arose from the
plaintiffs' lack of express authority from the rest of their fellow crew members. This harkens to Brown v. Vermuden, 100 in which some of the miners
had represented the whole group. Like Brown v. Vermuden, the ship crew's
situation can be considered an association type of case rather than a creditors' bill. Not only did the crew have a preexisting group relationship, but
that relationship was the basis of the legal obligation that commonly affected them. In any event, the court in Leigh v. Thomas sustained a demurrer for failure to have brought the suit in behalf of the entire crew. 10' The
court reasoned that the suit must be in behalf of all the crew, because to hold
otherwise, the owners would have to account to the nonsignatory members
102
in separate bills and thereby would be subjected to a multiplicity of suits.
In Good v. Blewitt,10 the Master of the Rolls sustained a bill in behalf
of all crew members, holding that the rule requiring joinder of all necessary
parties would be excused where there was a large number of potential
plaintiffs, some being geographically dispersed, some dead, and some
whose identity could not be ascertained. In response to an objection that the
owners would face a multiplicity of suits and possible multiple liability, the
court held that the defendants would receive the same protection as an executor in a legatee suit. Presumably, this meant that a payment by the defendant in compliance with the decree would exonerate the defendant from
further obligation, though it might leave an unjoined claimant free to pursue
the distributees to get redress for unjust enrichment.
The question of the absent claimants' rights arose in another ship crew
case, Pearson v. Belchier.10 4 A bill for an account of prize money had culminated in a final decree in 1752. In 1781, several seamen who had neither
appeared in that proceeding nor been included in the distribution, filed a bill
99 2 Ves. Sen. 312, 312, 28 Eng. Rep. 201, 201 (Ch. 1751) (sustaining a demurrer for failure to include all parties in a suit).
10' I Chan. Cas. 272, 272, 22 Eng. Rep. 796, 797 (Ch. 1676) ("Four Persons were named
by the Miners to defend the suit for them .... ).
'o' 2 Ves. Sen. 312,28 Eng. Rep. 201 (Ch. 1751).
'02 See id. at 313, Eng. Rep. at 201 ("I]here is no instance of a bill by three or four to

have an account of the estate, without saying they bring it in behalf of themselves and the rest
of the creditors: otherwise the executor may account to all the other creditors in other bills.").
103 13 Ves. Jun. 397, 33 Eng. Rep. 343 (Ch. 1807). But see Moffatt v. Farquharson, 2
Bro. C.C. 338,338, 29 Eng. Rep. 189, 189 (M.R. 1788) (holding that all part-owners of a ship
must be joined as plaintiffs). The reporter of the decision observes in a note following the
case that "[t]he decision here is clearly wrong... and has been over-ruled repeatedly." Id
(emphasis omitted).
"" 4 Ves. Jun. 627, 31 Eng. Rep. 323 (Ch. 1799).
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to revive the original decree. The court held that the plaintiffs were precluded from suit against the owners, who had distributed the prize money
pursuant to the decree.1l 5 The ground of decision was that a presumption of
payment arose from the lapse of time between the prior decree and the present suit to collect. 10 6 Preclusion in that case, similar to the absent legatee
and creditor cases discussed earlier, was based again on laches and not res
judicata through representation.
3. Unincorporated Associations
The third line of cases involved suits by and against members of unincorporated associations. One of the earliest cases of this type, City of London v. Richmond,10 7 presented the necessary parties problem. The city filed
a bill for breach of a water lease contract against a few of the numerous
shareholders in the venture, but not the promoter or the original lessee. The
court held that the number of potential defendants was so great as to make
their joinder impracticable, and that joinder of the absentees was therefore
excused.108
In 1722, the court in Chancey v. May,10 9 applied the same principle to
joinder of numerous plaintiffs in a suit for an accounting in behalf of all
partners of a large partnership. The court held that the defendants would not
be subject to multiple suits because "all the rest [of the absent partners]
were in effect parties." 110 That proposition overcame the necessary party's
objection and may also have indicated that the absent partners, if they
wished to maintain the litigation, would be compelled to become parties to
the instant case rather than proceed separately, a principle which, as we
have seen, came to be applied in the creditors' bill cases. These decisions,
however, left open the question whether the absentees would be precluded
by the decree.
In 1781, a suit was allowed against the members of the executive committee of a voluntary association on their personal undertaking in behalf of
the association, without requiring joinder of all the association's mem-

105

See id. at 629-30, 31 Eng. Rep. at 324 ("Length of time cannot be pleaded in

barL,] ..,therefore the bill must be dismissed.").
106See id. at 629, 31 Eng. Rep. at 324 ("Defendants... relied on the length of time, as
affording a presumption of satisfaction.").
107 2 Vem. 421, 23 Eng. Rep. 870 (Ch. 1701).
los See id. at 422, 23 Eng. Rep. at 871 ("'he assignees by dividing of it into so many
shares, had made it impracticable to have them all before the court.").
109Prec. Ch.592, 24 Eng. Rep. 265 (Ch. 1722).
10Id. at 592, 24 Eng. Rep. at 265.
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bers."' In another case decided two decades later, members of a voluntary
association of freemasons were allowed to proceed as plaintiffs by 11repre2
sentative suit to quiet possession of books and uniforms of their lodge.
In the early nineteenth century, two other cases moved toward generalizing the concept of a representative suit in "association" situations. In
Adair v. New River Co.,n 3 a shareholder in an annuity arrangement filed a
bill for an accounting against several of a large number of other shareholders. The defendants' objection that the other shareholders were necessary
parties was overruled. In its decision, the court adverted to the proposition,
expressed in the creditors' bills cases, that in representative suits the absentees are "ina sense before the Court," 114 but principal reliance was placed
on comparison to the bill of peace:
[A]nd it is not necessary to bring all the individuals: why? Not, that it is inexpedient, but, that it is impracticable, to bring them all.
The Court therefore has
required so many, that it can be justly said, they will fairly and honestly try the
legal right between themselves, all other persons interested, and the Plaintiff;
and, when the legal right is so established at law, the remedy in equity is very
simple: merely a bill; stating, that the right has been established in such a proceeding; and upon that ground a Court of Equity will give the Plaintiff relief
against the Defendants in the second suit, only represented by those in the first.
I feel115
a strong inclination, that a decree of the same nature may be made in this
case.

The case actually deals only with the necessary parties problem; the
statements about the effect of the decree on absent shareholders are dicta.
The second case, Cockburn v. Thompson, 116 was a bill for an accounting
and dissolution of an annuity company. The suit was brought by several of
the company's proprietors in behalf of all of the proprietors, against the solicitor and bankers of the company. In holding that the suit could be maintained in this representative fashion, the court undertook a lengthy review of
many representative suit cases, struggling with limited success to put them
in coherent order. The court concluded that the responsible officers or managers of an unincorporated association could be taken as representing the
members of the association for purposes of litigation concerning its af-

11 See Cullen v. Queensberry, I Bro. C.C. 101, 101, 28 Eng. Rep. 1011, 1011 (Ch. 1781)
(holding it is "not necessary to include all the subscribers" when suing a voluntary society).
112 See Lloyd v. Loaring, 6 Ves. Jun. 773, 778-79, 31 Eng. Rep. 1302, 1304-05 (Ch.
1802) (allowing the plaintiffs to amend suit to sue as individuals with a joint interest in property because the voluntary society "must some way or other be permitted to sue").
"' 11 Ves. Jun. 429, 32 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ch. 1805).
114 Id. at 444, 32 Eng. Rep. at 1159.
115Id.
116

16 Ves. Jun. 321, 33 Eng. Rep. 1005 (Ch. 1809).
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fairs.' 17 After Cockburn, this line of doctrine was extended during the next
couple of decades into a fairly firm line of precedent under which unincorcould sue or be sued by the
porated associations, if not other groups,
118
mechanism of the representative suit.
4. Summary of English Law to 1830
Few English cases from the middle of the seventeenth century to the
beginning of the nineteenth century deal squarely with the effect of a decree
upon absent numerous parties whose joinder has been excused on the basis
of representation. In the bill of peace cases involving claims for land rents
against some, but less than all, of the obligors, absent parties seem not to
have been bound at all. The defendant's objection in such cases was that he
was being singled out for imposition of the rent charges when others were
also liable. In response to this objection, it was said that he could receive
contribution from the absentees. This analysis is alien to a theory of representation, however, in that it pits the class representative against the absent
class members. Assuming that the defendants could pursue such contribution, that proposition does not imply the decree would be binding in their
favor against those from whom contribution was subsequently sought. It
also does not imply that the plaintiffcould use the decree as a foundation for
imposing liability on the absentees. Of the bill of peace cases, only Brown
v. Vernuden 19 and Brown v. Booth120 provide a rationale for binding absent

117 See id. at 329-30, 32 Eng. Rep. at 1008 ("Though the Plaintiffs cannot bring forward
all the persons, who may be liable upon the result of the account, that is not an obstacle, that
should prevent the institution of this suit, if necessary to justice.").
11 See, e.g., Fenn v. Craig, 3 Y. & C. Ex. 216, 221-24, 160 Eng. Rep. 680, 682-83 (Ex.
1838) (allowing suit against the trustees of a company in behalf of all trustees and shareholders); Small v. Attwood, You. 407, 457-61, 159 Eng. Rep. 1051, 1072-73 (Ex. 1832) (allowing
a bill to rescind a contract to be filed by some partners within a company in behalf of all partners); Newton v. Egmont, 5 Sim. 130, 137-38, 58 Eng. Rep. 286, 289 (V.C. 1832) (allowing a
plaintiff to amend suit to include all creditors); Hichens v. Congreve, 4 Russ. 562, 575-77, 38
Eng. Rep. 917, 922-23 (Ch. 1828) (allowing suit by shareholders in behalf of themselves and
other shareholders); Ellison v. Bignold, 2 Jac. & W. 503, 510-12, 37 Eng. Rep. 720, 722-23
(Ch. 1821) (allowing suit by some directors of a voluntary society in behalf of themselves and
all members); Meux v. Maltby, 2 Swans. 277, 286-87, 36 Eng. Rep. 621, 624-25 (Ch. 1818)
(allowing suit against the treasurer as the representative of a joint stock company); Beaumont
v. Meredith, 3 V. & B. 180, 182, 35 Eng. Rep. 447, 448 (Ch. 1814) (allowing the plaintiffs to
sue in behalf of themselves and all other members of a particular Society). But see Long v.
Yonge, 2 Sim. 369, 385-87, 57 Eng. Rep. 827, 833-34 (V.C. 1830) (disallowing some members of a partnership, in behalf of themselves and others, to file a bill for dissolution of the
partnership because such a bill would deprive too many nonparties of their rights).
9 1 Chan. Cas. 271, 22 Eng. Rep. 796 (Ch. 1676).
120 2 Vern. 184,23 Eng. Rep. 720 (Ch. 1690).
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parties, and in those cases the absentees may be taken to have authorized the
representation by the parties actually joined.121
The creditor bill cases developed the concept of representation more
fully. When the problem of precluding absentees was directly confronted in
the Gillespie122 and David123 cases, it was held that absentees were not
bound by the decree. In the prize cases and the voluntary association cases,
there are dicta about binding absent parties, but no case has been found with
a square holding on the issue.
The preclusive effect of a representative suit in English Chancery practice thus stood unsettled in the early nineteenth century. If any principles
could be distilled from the English precedents as of about 1830, they were
as follows:
Where many claimants or obligors are involved:
(a) The Necessary Parties Rule will be relaxed so that the suit may go
forward by having some members represent the whole group. Questions of
the rights and duties of absentees are to be left to subsequent litigation, if
such litigation should actually eventuate.
(b) The absentees are affected by the decree as follows:
(1) The absentees are bound if the representatives appearing as parties
were expressly or impliedly authorized by the absentees to sue or defend in
their behalf. In litigation arising from activities of a preexisting group, such
as an association, such authority impliedly reposes in the members of the
group who present themselves as parties.
(2) Where one of several similarly situated claimants has been authorized by the court to sue to recover assets to pay claims, all known claimants
are entitled to share in the recovery and are limited to that remedy. Other
law they may have against
claimants are relegated to whatever remedies at
124
the obligor subject to the statutes of limitation.
This scheme obviously amounted to relatively little in the way of res
judicata doctrine. It achieved nominal compliance with the Necessary Parties Rule by treating the absentees as if they were parties for purposes of
joinder of parties. It obligated a creditor class to share proceeds realized
121See discussion

supra Part I.B.1.

"2 3 Russ. 130,38 Eng. Rep. 525 (Ch. 1827).
'2 1 My. & K. 200,39 Eng. Rep. 657 (Ch. 1833).
124The only case that appears to contradict this formulation is City ofLondon v. Perkins,
3 Bro. P.C. 602, 1 Eng. Rep. 1524 (H.L. 1734), discussed at supra note 65 and accompanying
text. That case may simply be a sport in the law. Certainly it is difficult to fit within the law
of the time, but it may be an application of the doctrine of stare decisis. See Yeazell, From
GroupLitigation, supranote 12, at 539-44 (tracing cases of stare decisis involving group litigation).
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from the debtor, which simply gives effect to the maxim that he who seeks
equity must do equity. Beyond that, it made the decree binding only on
those absentees who had, prior to the litigation, some connection with the
representative concerning the matter in litigation.
II. AMERICAN DOCTRINE BEFORE 1853

A. Justice Story's Treatise
Justice Joseph Story's Commentaries on Equity Pleadings,12 in a clear
but indirect way, virtually created the American law of class suits. Story
considered the representative suit, not as a principal subject, but as an exception to the rule governing joinder of necessary parties. His thoughts
about representative suits were incompletely formed, tentative, and ambivalent. Nevertheless, he devised a classification of class suits that has descended into modem times. Story's concepts became the basis of Professor
J.W. Moore's treatment of class suits in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938126 and are still embedded in Rule 23 as amended in 1966.127
That Story approached the class suit as an exception to the Necessary
Parties Rule appears from the fact that he dealt with the problem under the
heading of "Proper Parties to Bills.' ' 128 Under that heading, Story stated the
general rule that "all persons materially interested in the subject-matter [of
the suit] ought to be [joined],"' 129 with exceptions that joinder will be excused in situations in which it is impracticable, 130 and when "as to parties. . where they are exceedingly numerous, and it would be impracticable to join them without almost interminable delays and other
STORY, supra note 74.
See James Wm.Moore & Marcus Cohn, Federal ClassActions, 32 ILL. L. REv. 307,
308, 3 10-11 n.25 (1937) [hereinafter Moore & Cohn, Federal ClassActions] ("And in large
measure Story's analysis has been the basis for the federal rule."); James Wm.Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the PreliminaryDraft, 25 GEO. L.J.
551, 570-76 (1937) (explaining class action suits as exceptions to the Necessary Parties Rule).
127 See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work ofthe Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of
the FederalRules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARv. L. REv. 356, 376-94, 377 n.72 (1967)
(explaining Moore's view as derivative of Story's, and further expounding on Moore's treatment of class suits).
128 STORY, supra note 74, §§ 72-238, at 74.
129 Id. § 76.a, at 77.
120See id. § 78, at 79-80 (describing situations where joinder is excused due to impracti125
126

cability). Illustrations of the "impracticability" exception are given in the immediately following sections as follows: "party in interest" out of the jurisdiction, see id. § 80, at 80-81;
suit involving a decedent's estate and in which the personal representative has not been constituted, see id. § 91, at 91; and proper or necessary parties unknown to plaintiff, see id. § 92,
at 92.
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inconveniences .... In such cases, the Court... will dispense with
them... if it can be done without injury to the persons not actually before
the Court."13 '
But Story then made exceptions to the exceptions:
And even in the cases, in which the Court will thus administer relief [i.e.,
where the court proceeds in the absence of "interested" persons to decide the
case before it], so solicitous is [the Court] to attain the purposes of substantial
justice, that it will generally require the Bill to be filed, not only in behalf of
the plaintiff, but also in behalf of all other persons interested, who are not directly made parties (although in a sense they are thus made so), so that they
may come in under the decree, and take the benefit of it, or show it to be erroneous, or entitle themselves to a rehearing. The Court will go further, and in
such cases, it will entertain a Bill or Petition, which shall bring the rights and
if there is any
interests of the absent parties more distinctly before the Court,
132
certainty, or even any danger of injury or injustice to them.

Story found the cases excusing joinder of numerous parties to be in
three categories: where the question is of "common or general" interest,
where a voluntary association is involved, and where the parties are so numerous that, without regard to any other criterion, it is impracticable to join
them. 133 In the first category, that of cases involving a question of "common or general" interest, Story included the creditor, legatee bill, and prize
cases.

134

With respect to the second category, voluntary associations, Story
stated:
[T]hose, who sue or defend, may fairly be presumed to represent the rights and
interests of the whole .... [T]he persons interested are commonly numerous ....

[A]s there is a privity of interest, the Court will allow a Bill to be

brought by some of the parties on behalf of themselves and all the others

Story did not define the term "privity." The absentees in the cases to
which he referred, however, had some kind of associational tie that existed
of the litigation, and this seems to have been to
before the commencement
136
what he was referring.
131Id. § 94,

at 93-94.
Id. § 96, at 95-97 (footnotes omitted).
'3 See id. § 97, at 97-98 (listing these three types of cases in which the courts have excused thejoinder of parties).
134See id. §§ 98-106, at 98-112 (discussing the reasons why the courts have excused nonjoinder in the creditor, legatee bill, and prize cases).
"' Id. § 107, at 113 (footnote omitted).
136 See id. §§ 108-19, at 113-20 (discussing absent persons of interest and how they must
be related to parties at suit). Sections 108-19 of Story's work dealt with partnerships, joint
132
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Later in his discussion, after a description of bill of peace cases, Story
returned to "association" cases. 137 His discussion at this point concerned
decisions in which some members were not allowed to proceed in the absence of the rest. 138 He struggled for a rationale to explain these decisions,
which of course contradicted the general principles he previously had expounded. Citing Beaumont v. Meredith,139 for example, Story stated that a
suit to dissolve a voluntary association cannot be maintained by representatives because all members had an "equal interest to be heard.' 140 Story then
suggested that the representative suit may not be used when the absentees
"have a substantial interest in the very question of right, on which the decree
must hinge."' 41 In making this suggestion, Story cited cases in which conflict of interest within the group precluded a representative suit, particularly
conflict of priority among classes of creditors. 142 Story seems thus to have
realized that the tie of membership in an association might be an insufficient
basis for permitting some members of a group to represent all members
where the litigation concerns intra-association conflicts. Hence, Story may
have perceived but not quite articulated the point that there could be a conflict of interest among members of a class, even a tightly-knit association.
are in faThere could be such conflict, for example, between members who1 43
association.
the
of
dissolution
to
opposed
are
who
those
vor of and
Story's third category of permissible representative suits is peculiar. As
Story described those cases, the defining characteristic was that they involved numerous persons. Numerousness, however, was also a characterisstock companies, churches, social clubs, and annuity funds. Story explains some of the cases

on the basis that the suit is for a "common benefit." Id. § 115.a, at 118. Other cases are explained on the basis that the suit is "against some, being proprietors," id. § 111, at 115, or that
the defendants "may be considered as representing the company," id. § 117, at 118 (quoting
Meux v. Maltby, 2 Swans. 277, 284, 36 Eng. Rep. 621, 624 (Ch. 1818)). Story uses the terms
"common interest," Story, supra note 74, at. §§ 112-13, 115-16; "interests ... of a common
character," id. § 116, at 118; and "common right," id. § 109, at 114. An annuity association
case is analyzed as one where a representative suit "virtually brought" absentees before the
court. Id. § I10, at 114.
137See Story, supra note 74, §§ 127-34, at 126-33 (describing cases in which suits were
allowed to continue despite the fact that not all members of a group were parties, as well as
cases in which the lack of all parties meant dismissal).
' See id. §§ 130-34, at 129-33 (discussing "association" cases in which the courts decided that all members must be made parties to sustain the action).
1393 V. & B. 180, 180, 35 Eng. Rep. 447,447 (Ch. 1814) (holding that all members of an
"account" must be parties to a suit alleging wrongful dissolution against the trustees).
140 STORY, supra note 74, § 131, at 129.

141Id. § 132, at 130.
141See id. § 133, at 132 (discussing the class of cases in which all creditors must be made
parties because the court's decision could affect the rights of missing parties).
143Story observed that "[tihere is not a little difficulty in this whole doctrine." Id. § 131,
at 130 n.1. That statement of course remains very true.
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tic of the classes in his first two categories. His problem, therefore, is to deduce the additional characteristic of the members of this third type of class
beyond their being numerous. Story stated:
iT]here is usually a privity of interest between the parties; but such a privity is
not the foundation of the exception. On the contrary, it is sustained in some
cases, where no such privity exists. However, in all of them there always exists a common interest or a common right... or a general claim
144 or privilege,
take away.
which [the bill] seeks to establish, or to narrow, or

The cases that Story put in this category are what have been previously
described as the bill of peace cases, including the "manorial" cases and the
tithe cases like Brown v. Vermuden.145 Story concluded that even though
there may be no "privity" between the representative and the absentees, the
suit may proceed where there is either a "general right" claimed by the
right claimed "affected the defendants and all othplaintiff,146 or where the
147
ers in the same way."'

At least some of the cases to which Story was referring concerned res
judicata-the binding effect on absentees-as distinct from the problem of
joinder under the Necessary Parties Rule. Story stated, "[i]ndeed, in most, if
not in all, cases of this sort, the decree obtained upon such a Bill will ordinarily be held binding upon all other persons standing in the same predicament ....,,148

Thus, Story's treatment of the binding effect of a class suit decree is
tentative and indeed puzzling. His analytical system consists of categories
that overlap, or, in terminology now fashionable, are "overinclusive." As
noted above, cases involving "associations" (his second category) also involve questions of "common or general interest" (his first category), and
typically involve "parties too numerous" to be joined (his third category).
Questions of "common or general interest" (his first category) often involve
"parties too numerous" (his third category). Furthermore, "parties too numerous" can be distinguished from mankind at large only by reference to
some kind of interest or question that is "common or general" to them but
not to others. In any event, Story clearly did not assert that, within his system of classification, the type of suit determined the res judicata effects of
'4

Id. § 120, at 120 (footnote omitted).

145I Chan. Cas. 272, 22 Eng. Rep. 796 (Ch. 1676).
146 STORY, supra note 74, § 124, at 123 ("But Bills have also been allowed to be brought

[called bills of peace] where there has been a general right claimed ... yet no privity existed
141Id. § 124, at 124.

141
Id. § 120, at 120. Story illustrated this quotation with the example of a miller possessing a monopoly that requires all inhabitants of a district to use his mill. The miller may
sue a few inhabitants to establish his rights against all inhabitants. See id. § 123, at 123.
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the judgment. The best he could make of the precedents was that judgments
involving members of associations were sometimes binding on absentees,
and that the same was true of creditors' bills and bills of peace.
It is appropriate to step back from procedural doctrine and for a moment
take note of the substance of the social conflicts that these representative
suits were trying to address. These included disputes over inheritance (the
legatees' bills), between debtor and creditor and among creditors unsatisfied
in their just debts (the creditors' bills), the governance of private business
and eleemosynary associations (the "association" cases), and the legitimacy
of measures taken by local government (the tithe and manorial cases).
These social conflicts are, in human affairs, perennial and fundamental conflicts made more complicated because they involve not two sides, but three
or more sides. The ex-ante question is whether all members of a group
should be regarded as participating in litigation. The ex-post question is
whether all members will subsequently be required to hold their peace. Yet,
any member of any group would have to wonder what he was getting into
ex-ante. A member would also wonder why he should later be precluded
from asserting his rights for simply having remained a passive bystander to
another's litigation. He would wonder, in short, why it was not right to
have stayed out of litigation over inheritance, bad debts, mismanagement of
enterprises, and squabbles in local government, and to pursue his rights by
litigation only if it later seemed worthwhile to do so.
B. FederalDecisionsBefore Smith v. Swormstedt
There are few federal cases dealing with any aspect of representative
suits from 1789, when the federal court system was created, until 1853,
when Smith v. Swormstedt149 was decided. Of the handful of cases, all dealt
with class suits in the context of the necessary parties problem. That problem was especially acute in federal law because federal jurisdiction at the
time was primarily diversity jurisdiction, and it had been held earlier that
diversity must be "complete": all properly joined plaintiffs must be diverse
in their citizenship from all properly joined defendants. 50 The representa149 57 U.S. 288, 16 How. 307 (1853) (involving a situation in which a few individuals
represented a larger class's interest).
1SO
See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 3 Cranch 159 (1806) (holding that federal ju-

risdiction could not be supported where all plaintiffs and all but one defendant were citizens
of the same state). The classic formulation of the Necessary Parties Rule in federal practice is
in Elmendorfv. Taylor, 23 U.S. 152, 10 Wheat. 67 (1825). In Elmendorf,one of several tenants in common brought an action to compel conveyance of the property. The respondents
objected to the failure to join the plaintiff's co-tenants, which would have been impossible
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tive suit, where only the citizenship of the representative counted in determining party citizenship, was an avenue of escape from the "complete diversity" requirement. Hence, in the context ofjoinder of parties in diversity
litigation, the representative suit had considerable doctrinal significance and
appeal. But no representative suit cases in that period squarely dealt with
the preclusive effect on absentees of ajudgment in such a case.
Most of the cases involved creditors' bills. The earliest appears to be
Joy v. Wirtz, in which the Circuit Court said:
Where the creditors are to be paid out of a particular fund, or are united in the
same transaction, so as to produce a privity between them, all are to join ....
The object of this bill, is to set aside this release ....The court cannot set it
aside... unless all were parties either by name, or as being represented by a
.ll
part, suing in the names of

In another creditors' bill case, which reached the Supreme Court, Chief
Justice Marshall said:

under the "complete diversity" rule. The Court stated that the rule requiring all equitable parties to be brought before the court
is not, like the description of parties, an inflexible rule, a failure to observe which
turns the party out of court, because it has no jurisdiction over his cause; but being
introduced by the court itself, for the purposes ofjustice, is susceptible of modification, for the promotion of those purposes.
Id. at 165, 10 Wheat. at 80. A remarkable number of early cases involved this conjunction of
the Necessary Parties Rule and the complete diversity requirement. See Mallow v. Hinde, 25
U.S. 193, 12 Wheat. 123 (1827) (discussing the flexibility needed in the federal courts when
deciding who are necessary parties so as not to sacrifice jurisdiction); Harding v. Handy, 24
U.S. 103, 11 Wheat. 46 (1826) (involving an objection to missing parties who were heirs to an
estate but who might have destroyed diversity jurisdiction); Wormley v. Wormley, 21 U.S.
421, 8 Wheat. 186 (1823) (stating that rather than sacrifice jurisdiction, the court will proceed
without the missing parties if possible); Kerr v. Watts, 19 U.S. 550, 6 Wheat. 246 (1821)
(stating that "[n]o one need be made a party complainant in whom there exists no interest, and
no one party defendant from whom nothing is demanded"); Marshall v. Beverley, 18 U.S.
313, 5 Wheat. 42 (1820) (standing for the proposition that an injunction could not be issued
until all parties in interest are brought before the court); Simms v. Guthrie, 13 U.S. 18, 9
Cranch 144 (1815) (dismissing an objection to lack of proper parties where the inclusion of
the missing parties would destroy diversity jurisdiction and the suit was not an original bill,
but was based on a judgment rendered in federal court and so required to be brought there);
Milligan v. Milledge, 7 U.S. 220, 3 Cranch 133 (1805) (holding that the lack of all necessary
parties is not a valid plea if those missing parties are not within the court's jurisdiction); cf
Mandeville v. Riggs, 27 U.S. 482, 2 Pet. 311 (1829) (stating that all parties liable for contribution should be included but admitting that there may be exceptions, such as when the party
would destroy jurisdiction and is not indispensable).
...13 F. Cas. 1172 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806) (No. 7553); Russell v. Clark's Executors, 11 U.S.
69, 98, 7 Cranch 44, 62 (1812) (finding error in the lower court's recovery of "sundry bills of
exchange," since "the assignees... are so essential to the merits of the question, and may be
so much affected by the decree, that the Court cannot proceed to a final decision of the cause
till they are parties").
32 Wirtz, 13 F. Cas. at 1172.
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It is true, that the creditors might have been made parties defendants, but we do
not think them parties who may not be dispensed with. So much of the fund as
yet remains may be brought into Court, and may be distributed according to
for it.
the rights of those who may apply
Justice Story himself had a couple of related cases on circuit. One of
them, West v. Randall,15 4 was a suit for an accounting brought by one of
several legatees against an executor. Story reviewed the entire English law
of representative suits in disposing of an objection of lack of necessary par-

ties, that is, the other legatees. Observing that there were exceptions to the
necessary party doctrine, he said:
Nor are these the only cases; for where the parties are very numerous, and the
court perceives, that it will be almost impossible to bring them all before the
court; or where the question is of general interest, and a few may sue for the
benefit of the whole; or where the parties form a part of a voluntary association
for public or private purposes, and may be fairly supposed to represent the
rights and interests of the whole; in these and analogous cases, if the bill purports to be not merely in behalf of the plaintiffs, but of all others interested, the
plea of the want of parties will be repelled .... Yet, in these cases, so solicitous is the court to attain substantial justice, that it will permit the other parties
to come in under the decree, and take the benefit of it, or to show it to be erroneous, and award a re-hearing; or will entertain a bill or petition, which shall
155
....
bring the rights of such parties more distinctly before the court
The second of Story's cases on circuit was Wood v. Dummer,"' decided
in 1824. This litigation presented Story with a peculiar variant of the necessary parties problem. A bank had issued a promissory note and later ceased
doing business. The present suit was brought on the note against several of
the bank's shareholders. The plaintiff's theory was that the defendant
shareholders had been paid dividends in violation of statute, thus wrongfully
causing the bank's insolvency, and ought personally to restore the deficiency of assets. Defendants objected that all shareholders were necessary
party defendants. Story, relying on West v. Randall, said:
In respect to the exception [to the Necessary Party Rule] on account of the numerousness of parties, the question has been.., acted upon in many
cases .... The result.., is, that where the parties are so numerous, that it is
inconvenient or impracticable to bring all before the court, the rule.., shall
not be applied .... 157

153 Potter

v. Gardner, 25 U.S. 498, 501, 12 Wheat. 317, 319 (1827).

i14 29 F. Cas. 718 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 17,424).
155 Id. at 722.

Story added that the represented absentees were "quasiparties." Id. at 723.

15630 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944).
157 Id. at 439

(citations omitted).
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He added:
Now, no case could afford a stronger illustration for the application of the
principle .... There is no complaint, that the defendants now before the court
do not represent effectually the interests adverse to the plaintiffs, or... that the
other stockholders have means of affording a more 15effectual
defence to the de8
fendants in respect to their own particular interests.

Story concluded that the plaintiff could recover from the named defendants only a pro rata allocation of the loss. This plainly makes the case one
of excusing nonjoinder of absentees while not binding them to the decree.
Apparently, the only other federal case involving a representative suit
prior to Smith v. Swormstedt15 9 was an "association" case in 1829, Beatty v.
Kurtz. In Beatty, several parishioners of the German Lutheran Church in
Georgetown (part of the District of Columbia) filed suit in behalf of themselves and all parishioners to be quieted in possession against a person who
was interfering with property used as a cemetery. Story held there was no
necessary parties problem because "we think it one of those cases, in which
certain persons, belonging to a voluntary society... may sue in behalf of
themselves and others having the like interest, as161
part of the same society,
all.
to
beneficial
and
all,
to
common
for purposes
These developments are consistent with the formulation we have tendered of class suit doctrine as it was received from English law. 62 That is,
there was still no "rule" of res judicata in class suits.
C. Developments in the State Courts 63
1. New York Decisions
The state court cases decided in the first half of the nineteenth century
reflect essentially the pattern described above. Again, the salient problem
was joinder of parties, 164 particularly as it arose in creditor and legatee

158id.

57 U.S. 288, 16 How. 307 (1853).
'6o 27 U.S. 565,2 Pet. 362 (1829).
161 Id. at 585, 2 Pet. at 374.
162 See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing English case law that establishes the exception to requiring joinder of all necessary parties).
163 The focus in this section is upon cases in New York, which was the first state to deal
extensively with representative suits.
164 See, e.g., Wiser v. Blachly, 1 Johns. Ch. 437, 438 (N.Y. Ch. 1815) ("[Y]ou must have
before the court all parties whose interests the decree may touch .... But the general rule is
not of universal application .... [C]ases have created... exceptions to the general rule.!).
159
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bills.165 The representative character of these proceedings, in addition to
satisfying the imperative of the Necessary Parties Rule, was said to protect
the administrator or executor from defending numerous suits; 166 to preserve
the fund from depletion by the expense of defending numerous suits; 167 to
ensure equality of treatment among creditors; 16 to prevent inconsistent results; 169 and to protect or effectuate equity jurisdiction.17 The pleading rule
evolved that representative suits had to be brought "on behalf of' interested
parties, so that absentees could "come in under the decree." 17 1 The required
similarity of interest between representative and absentee was also articulated. A secured creditor, for example, could not represent general credinot represent specific legatees or legators, 172 and a residuary legatee could
173
class.
different
a
in
otherwise
tees
Regarding the binding effect of a decree, hesitation and uncertainty
continued:
[E]quity is satisfied with having so many parties before it as may be supposed
to represent the claim fairly, to contest it honestly in behalf of the whole, and
therefore in a sense to bind it.... Of course the principle always presupposes

165 See, e.g., Ross v. Crary, I Paige Ch. 416, 417 (N.Y. Ch. 1829) (directing an accounting in one legatee suit to be conclusive for all who came in under that decree while staying
proceedings in other suits or the same cause of action); Brown v. Ricketts, 3 Johns. Ch. 553,
555-56 (N.Y. Ch. 1818) (holding that bills by creditors and nonresiduary legatees are exceptions to the general rule requiring all parties); Hendricks v. Robinson, 2 Johns. Ch. 283, 29697 (N.Y. Ch. 1817) (declining to dismiss a creditor's bill upon demurrer for failure to join
other judgment creditors).
166 See Fish v. Howland, 1 Paige Ch. 20, 23 (N.Y. Ch. 1828) (stating that when parties are
able to come in under a decree yet neglect to do so, "the court will not subject the defendants
to the expense ofrelitigating... in another action").
167 See Ross, I Paige Ch. at 417-18 (stating that when the fund is insufficient to pay all
the claims against it, the court will stay all but one proceeding and direct an accounting in that
one case).
168 See Egberts v. Wood, 3 Paige Ch. 517 (N.Y. Ch. 1832) (stating that a representative
suit was necessary and proper to "enforc[e] the principle of equity among creditors").
169 See Kettle v. Crary, I Paige Ch. 417 (N.Y. Ch. n.d.). This unreported case is reprinted
in full in a footnote to Ross v. Crary, 1 Paige Ch. at 417 note a.
170 See Thompson v. Brown, 4 Johns. Ch. 619, 643-45 (N.Y. Ch. 1820) (stating that the
fidelity of a decree approving a distribution was necessary to preserve chancery jurisdiction).
171Brown v. Ricketts, 3 Johns. Ch. 553, 555 (N.Y. Ch. 1818).
172 See Palmer v. Foote, 7 Paige Ch. 437, 438 (N.Y. Ch. 1839) (stating that other creditors
"would have some cause to complain" if a secured creditor used its status to seize property to
which they had rights).
173 See, e.g., Davoue v. Fanning, 4 Johns. Ch. 199, 202 (N.Y. Ch. 1819) (holding that a
residuary legatee cannot maintain a bill without joining all the other residuary legatees); Ricketts, 3 Johns. Ch. at 555-56 (discussing defendants' objection that all the legatees concerned
ought to have been made parties).
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that the decree can be fitly made between
the parties before the court, without
74
substantial injury to third persons.

A quite different approach to the problem of preclusion, however, was adumbrated in two New York cases. These led to a decree that would be
binding on the absentees in some types of suits.
The first of these cases was a necessary parties case decided in 1829,
Hallett v. Hallett.17 The suit was a legatees' bill by two of several legatees
to compel the devisee to pay their legacies from the estate. The defendant
objected to the failure to join all the legatees, arguing that otherwise he
might be subject to multiple claims. The court recognized that the necessary parties doctrine aimed at a decree "which will bind the rights of all, and
prevent a useless multiplication of suits., 17 6 At the same time, the court
recognized that the decree ordering distribution from the assets of the estate
would not bind absentees who were not joined in some way, for example, if
they "came in and made themselves parties to the suit."1 77 But in the course
of its discussion, the court made 1an
interesting observation: "In all these
78
cases the proceedings are in rem."
As far as we are able to determine, this is the first suggestion that a
legatees' or creditors' bill type of representative suit is in rem. 179 To conceptualize the proceeding as in rem of course opens the possibility of
sweeping away all problems ofjoinder and all problems of res judicata. If a
suit is in rem, the basis of the court's authority is shifted from party participation, or representation through another party, to the 'existence of a "res"
before the court. If there is a res under the court's control, it can be said that
all parties are before the court to the extent of any interest they might have
in the res. By the same token, it can be said that all parties are bound by the

174Conro v. Port Henry Iron Co., 12 Barb. 27,59-60 (N.Y. App. Div. 1851).
1752 Paige Ch. 15 (N.Y. Ch. 1829).
176 Id. at

18.

'77
Id. at 22.
178Id.

179It is a remarkable fact, perhaps a coincidence, that in almost the same year that Hallett
v. Hallett suggested a creditors' or legatees' bill could be regarded as an in rem proceeding,
Justice Story had articulated the in rem concept of admiralty proceedings in The Nestor, 18 F.
Cas. 9 (C.C.D. Me. 1831) (No. 10,126), echoing a concept whose origin seems no earlier than
United States v. Little Charles, 26 F. Cas. 979, 982 (C.C.D. Va. 1818) (No. 15,612), holding
that a court of admiralty does not lose its jurisdiction to condemn the vessel by losing possession of it. See GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, LAW OF ADMIRALTY 591-94 (2d ed.
1975) (describing how "[t]hree cases of forfeiture of vessels for engaging in illegal activity
seem to have introduced the personification idea into American law"); Edward F. Ryan, Admiralty Jurisdictionand the Maritime Lien: An HistoricalPerspective, 7 W. ONT. L. REV.
173, 199-200 (1968) (describing Justice Story's application of a "maritime lien" in The Nestor).
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decree to that extent as well. Indeed, that later became the theory of in rem
and quasi in rem jurisdiction that prevailed down to Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank.180 This same concept is apparently181the antecedent of what
suit.
later is called the "common fund" type of class
The in rem concept articulated in Hallett v. Hallett was extended by degrees. In Wilder v. Keeler18 2 a dictum cast doubt on whether a creditor
83
could come in "after the master has made his report,"' that is, after notice
and proof of claims but before final distribution. The master's report redefines the debtor's various assets and the creditors' various claims into an
integrated schedule that is the equivalent of a fund. In Egberts v. Wood, the
5
debtor's assets are described as a "fund. ' 184 Brooks v. Gibbons,1 a few
years later, involved a creditors' bill that had gone to the first decree ordering claimants to submit their claims and in which the time for submitting
claims had expired. The present plaintiff in Brooks alleged that he had no
knowledge of the earlier suit, and sought to enforce his claim against those
in possession of the debtor's assets. The court held that the plaintiffs
proper remedy was to petition to come in under the decree in the original
proceeding, not to bring a new suit. 16 The court then said: "Whether a
creditor can, in any case, institute an entirely new suit after a final decree in
a former cause, under which he had a right to come in is at least doubt88
ful.",187 In Innes v. Lansing,1 involving a statute governing insolvency of
limited partnerships, the court described the "principle of the statute" as
after insolvency, as a trust
"treating the property of the limited partnership,
18 9
fund for the benefit of all the creditors."'

339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950) (stating that "[e]xceptions in the name of necessity do not
sweep away the rule that within the limits of practicability notice must be such as is reasonably calculated to reach interested parties").
...See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) (providing for a class action suit when individual adjudications of class members' claims would "as a practical matter" dispose of or interfere with
other class members' interests). The "common fund" concept of a class suit was explicit in
Rule 23(a)(2) before the comprehensive revision of Rule 23 in 1966. See Moore & Cohn,
FederalClass Actions, supra note 126, at 317 (explaining that a class action suit under Rule
23(a)(2) required both a common question of fact and "the presence of property which calls
for distribution or management'.
182 3 Paige Ch. 164 (N.Y. Ch. 1832).
183 Id. at 166.
1843 Paige Ch. 517, 520 (N.Y. Ch. 1832).
4 Paige Ch. 374 (N.Y. Ch. 1834).
48s
186 See id.at 377-78.
187Id. at 377.
188 7 Paige Ch.583 (N.Y. Ch. 1839).
89 Id. at 586.
180
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The conceptualization of a creditors' or legatees' bill as an in rem proceeding is quite novel. It does not appear to have been adopted previously
in either creditors' bills or representative suits. Indeed, the in rem concept
contradicted the then-existing precedents in creditors' and legatees' bill
cases. Those precedents established that payment from the estate discharged the estate's administratoror executor, who by transferring the
funds had performed his duty.19 The concept of the in rem proceeding extends even further: it signifies that the absentees could be precluded from
pursuit of the distributeesfor contribution. Since the proceeding concerned
the fund, distribution of the fund as such would be a conclusive adjudication
of all of the absent claimants' rights of recovery. Hallett, therefore, marks
the appearance of an entirely new conceptual basis for preclusion in at least
some kinds of class suits.
The other interesting innovation in New York during this period was
the representative suit brought by municipal taxpayers. Salient in this line
of cases is DeBaun v. Mayor of New York.191 The case involved a suit by a
municipal taxpayer in behalf of all taxpayers seeking to restrain a public official from entering into an allegedly unlawful construction contract, where
the effect of the expenditure on the contract would be an increase in taxes.
The decision in DeBaun sustained the suit partly on the basis of analogy to
corporation and unincorporated business association cases. 192 The defendant argued that allowing a single taxpayer to bring such a suit would permit any taxpayer to do the same, thus resulting in a multiplicity of suits.
The court replied in dictum that the plaintiffs could not sue merely in their
own behalf, but rather in behalf of all taxpayers in the city. The court stated
that the effect of such a limitation would be that "[n]o other independent
suit... would be necessary or be permitted.' 93
Here we encounter in embryonic form two concepts that later emerged
as developed doctrine. One is that the shareholders of a corporation or
members of an unincorporated association can represent the entity in bringing suit, benefiting the other shareholders or members via a judgment in fa194
vor of the entity. This, of course, is the essence of the derivative suit.

190
See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (listing creditor and legatee cases with
this holding).
'9'16 Barb. 392 (N.Y. App. Div. 1853).
t92See id. at 395, 399 (drawing a parallel between the rights to sue private corporations
and public corporations).

'9'
Id. at 40 1.

194See FED. R.Civ. P. 23.1 (providing for an action by a shareholder or member of an

unincorporated association to enforce a right possessed by the entity); see also AMERICAN
LAW INsTrTUTE, ALI'S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1994) (providing an overview of modem corporate law); ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 671 (1986) (de-
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The other idea is that the plaintiff taxpayers represent all other taxpayers,
which is the essence of a class suit. 195 The derivative suit and the class suit
both involve representation, although not the same "constituency." It is not
clear, therefore, whether the plaintiff taxpayers or stockholders represent the
corporate entity, as opposed to the corporate directors and officers who ordinarily represent it, or purport to represent all the other taxpayers or stockholders. Moreover, it is unclear whether all taxpayers as members of the
municipal community have the same interest as those who brought suit.
Clearly members of such a group could have divergent interests. In DeBaun, the underlying divergence of interest was between the city's citizentaxpayers opposed to the project for which the contract had been entered
and those in favor of the project. 196 Some of the city's residents must have
favored the project or the contract would not have been made. In previous
association cases, this kind of intra-group conflict had been recognized as
confounding and perhaps prohibitive of representative suits.197 The court in
that all taxpayers
DeBaun nevertheless stated, although only in dictum,
198
few.
a
by
only
brought
suit
the
by
would be bound
2. The Fund Concept
As noted above, Hallett v. Hallett suggests that at least some kinds of
class suits can be conceived as in rem proceedings. 199 Specifically, Hallett
suggests that creditors' bills and legatees' bills can be conceived on the
ground that they involve claims against a fund. It may be helpful at this
point to take a closer look at the "fund" concept.
The practical task to be accomplished in both the creditor bill and the
legatee bill involves compiling and then integrating two separate accounts.
The first account is the schedule of claims by the creditors or legatees. The
second account is the schedule of assets from which the claims are to be realized. Integration is effected by comparing the total of the two sums and
proportionately reducing the claims in the event of insufficient assets. The
schedule of claims in the creditors' bill is usually the more complicated of
the two. This complexity is a product of conflicts that may arise both
fining derivative suits as "actions against officers that are by or in the right of the corporation").
195See DeBaun, 16 Barb. at 401 (explaining that the plaintiff does not bring suit merely
in his own behalf but in behalf of all those similarly situated).
196 See id.at 395.
197See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text (discussing Story's explanation for
court decisions in "association" cases).
...
See DeBaun, 16 Barb. at 401.
199 2 Paige Ch. 15; see also supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text (containing a description of the suit).
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among the creditors as well as between the creditors and the debtor during
the determination of the validity and amount of each of the claims. Among
the creditors there is, of course, conflict between the secured and unsecured
creditors, a conflict which the courts earlier held would prevent a single representation from acting for both.200 There is also conflict, however, among
creditors, whether secured or unsecured, regarding any claim that is false,
exaggerated, time-barred, defensible on the merits, or otherwise avoidable.
If such a claim can be defeated, each other creditor gets a larger share of the
debtor's assets.
Despite differences regarding the ultimate division of the assets, the
creditors have a common interest in ferreting out the debtor's assets.
Moreover, it ordinarily may be supposed, as the courts seem to have done,
that most of the creditors are reasonably honest people whose claims are
valid. Although there are conflicts of interest among creditors, there are
also common interests, and these common interests predominate in the usual
case. This configuration of interests permits and justifies a representative
action aimed at collecting the assets and regulating their distribution. The
representative has interests as against the debtor that create incentives to
prosecute the suit effectively, even if he has interests hostile to his fellow
creditors concerning division of the proceeds. Essentially the same analysis
applies to the legatee bills.
We therefore must recognize that there is potential conflict within the
group of creditors, specifically concerning the relative size and standing of
their respective individual claims. These conflicts are not mitigated by conceptualizing the proceeding as involving a fund or as being in rem. To so
conceive the proceeding simply restates the terms of the conflict. What before were parallel and conflicting in personam claims among the members
of the group now become competing claims to the debtor's available assets.
To say that the case involves a fund, and, on that basis, to say that a representative proceeding is appropriate, is only to say that there is enough common interest among the claimants to allow some of them to represent the
remainder for the limited purpose of collecting the debtor's assets and
thereby creating the fund. This can be said even if it is anticipated that, at
the stage of dividing those assets, the group may dissolve into warring factions. That circumstance-that the group members have potentially conflicting interests as well as common ones-does not, however, vitiate the
utility of common action for the common purpose. The concept of justice
underlying the recognition that creditors have not only common but also

200See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (discussing the use of a supplemental
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to that expressed in the modem
potentially conflicting interests is equivalent
20 1
preference.
illegal
of
doctrine
bankruptcy
A more fundamental point emerges on further reflection-the creditors'
bill proceeding has to recognize and be able to resolve the conflicts within
the creditor group to allow the group's common interest to be given practical effect. If the conflicts within the group are not recognized, and a procedure established to resolve them, the debtor would have an unanswerable
objection to parting with his property at the suit of any creditor. The objection would be that the distribution to any one creditor could prejudice other
creditors, either if the debtor's assets are inadequate to pay all claims or if
any one of the creditors' claims is both invalid and so large as to preempt
other claims. In the creditors' bill proceedings, this point was given effect
in the rule that the plaintiff creditor must sue for the benefit of all, including
a conflict of interest as to
those fellow creditors with whom he might have
20 2
the size or validity of their respective claims.
Thus, it is possible to say in the creditors' bill cases that there is a group
with a "common" interest only by simultaneously assessing two legal relationships: first, the claims of the claimants as against the debtor taken as a
whole, and, second, the claims of the claimants against each other. Assessing the claims of the claimants as a whole permits at least a tentative conclusion as to whether the claims exceed the assets and, therefore, whether
the claimants have a common interest in getting unified control of these assets. It also is necessary, however, to assess the strength of the bond of
common interest among the creditors.
The second relationship, the potential conflict among the creditors, appears most obviously where there are both secured and unsecured creditors
involved. It is familiar in insolvency proceedings that these two classes of
creditors may have conflicting interests; indeed, the debtor and the secured
creditors may have common interests against the unsecured creditors in preserving the assets against unsecured claims. A similar conflict is possible
among unsecured creditors, for example, where large creditors want a "work
out" while small creditors want payment immediately, even if it requires a
distress liquidation. The point is simply that in the creditors' bill cases, the
201 See DAvID G. EPsTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 6-3 (1993) ("Bankruptcy law aims to
distribute the bankruptcy estate to the debtor's creditors in an order that corresponds to a prescribed hierarchy of classes of creditors."); Elizabeth A. Orelup, Note, Avoidance of Preferential Transfers Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 65 IowA L. REv. 209, 209 (1979)
("The preference-a transfer of the debtor's property on the eve of bankruptcy to satisfy an
old debt-is condemned by bankruptcy law because it thwarts the goal of equality of distribution of assets among all creditors.").
202See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (providing an explanation for the rule
that absentees are bound by the court's decree).
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existence of a plaintiff group with a common interest does not preexist the
dispute of the debtor-the group's identity is a function of the dispute.
Whether the group has identity depends on the relationship of common and
conflicting interests among the various creditors and the debtor.
The underlying relationship in creditors' and legatees' cases, therefore,
is threefold, with at least two contours of common and conflicting interest.
Moreover, the shapes of these contours are interdependent and may be indeterminate until the litigation has progressed to the point of division of assets at the final decree. To say that there is a group with common interests
who can be represented by one of its members is to speculate as to the configuration of interest. Often there may be a high degree of confidence that
the speculation will be accurate, but not always so. Provision, therefore, has
to be made that the speculation may eventually prove to be wrong. When
the speculation is wrong, subgroups and separate representation sooner or
later may have to be established. There also must be controls against selfserving opportunism on the part of the representative.20 3
These considerations do not necessarily foreclose the possibility of a
representative form of proceeding in a "fund" situation. They do indicate,
however, that the "fund" concept does not provide escape from the fact that
the representative mechanism entails inherent risk of conflict within the represented group. In any event, no analytic gain is achieved by thinking of the
dispute as involving a fund and the proceeding as being in rem. Indeed, that
conceptualization can easily obscure the true complexity of the problem of
conflicts.
3. The Taxpayers' Suit
The foregoing analysis concerning conflict and concert of interest in the
creditors' bill representative suit is equally applicable to the taxpayers' suit.
Analytically, or at least metaphorically, a taxpayers' suit also can be considered to involve a fund analogous to the creditors' bill. In the taxpayers' suit,
the plaintiff is the representative either of all the individual taxpayers as a
class or of the city in a derivative capacity. DeBaun v. Mayor of New

203

In the historic doctrine we have reviewed, the control against opportunism on the part

of the representative in creditors' bill proceedings was expressed in the rule that the plaintiff
had to sue for the benefit of all and in the mechanism of the master's supervision of the accounting. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text (explaining the historical steps which
resulted in the rule that absentee parties are bound by the court's decree). The modem counterpart is the rule holding the representative to fiduciary responsibilities and the mechanism of
court supervision of the representative's conduct of the litigation. See FED. P, Crv. P. 23
(stating the rules applicable to class actions).
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York 204
is a prototype of the taxpayers' suit, a model that is still valid to05

day.

2

In such a suit the relief sought is an injunction against expenditure. In
substance, what is being protected is a pool of money collected or to be
collected by the city from the taxpayers. To the extent that expenditure
from the pool is reduced, the taxpayers enjoy what amounts to a rebate of
taxation. Such a rebate is economically equivalent to the payment to creditors that results from a creditors' bill against a debtor. This underlying economic relationship also exists where the relief sought by the taxpayer is
nonmonetary, for example, an injunction requiring the city to engage in
certain conduct or to refrain from doing so. A course of conduct by the city
entails costs or risks of liability which affect the city's balance sheet, which,
in turn, affects the taxpayers' balance sheet of civic benefits and civic liabilities. This elementary economic leaming is encapsulated in the pleading
that taxpayers are in jeopardy of
formula in the taxpayers' suit which2alleges
6
having their tax payments misspent. 0
If the political character of the disputed course of action is more important than its economic consequences, then there are positive or negative
effects on the community's political balance sheet. The analysis of political
effects essentially parallels an economic analysis.
Whether the interests are calculated as economic or political, however,
the taxpayers or citizens as a whole are never unanimous in their opinion
about transactions that become the subject of a taxpayers' or citizen's suit.
If they were unanimous, there would be no suit. The plaintiff alleges that he
sues in behalf of all the taxpayers, but that is pure fiction. 20 7 There is inherent conflict within the taxpayer group, just as there is inherent conflict
within a creditor group. City expenditures or courses of action of even the
most wasteful or illegal kind benefit someone; that is the reason they are
undertaken. The serious question is not whether the taxpayers have an unconflicted common interest in enjoining the city from the apprehended
course of action. The serious questions are whether one or more taxpayers
should be allowed to contest the city's course of conduct in the courts, and
if so, under what controls, and whether other taxpayers who support the
204
205

16 Barb. 392 (N.Y. App. Div. 1853).
See, e.g., Harman v. City & County of San Francisco, 496 P.2d 1248 (1972) (stating

that taxpayers had standing in a representative capacity to sue the city and county concerning
the disposition of vacated city streets).
206 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923) ("mhis plaintiff alleges ... that the effect of the appropriations complained of will be to increase the burden of
future taxation and thereby take her property without due process of law.").
207 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (referring to "the city of Pawtucket"
as if it were populated by a homogenous group).
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of conduct will be adequately represenied by the city or othercity's course
2 08
wise.
In the taxpayers' suit, as in the creditors' bill, it is therefore possible but
not very helpful to think of the suit as involving a fund. It is likewise possible but positively misleading to think of the taxpayers as necessarily having
a common interest, and therefore positively misleading to think of the taxpayers as a group. Rather, as in the creditors' bill, clarity of analysis requires that the taxpayers be considered as comprising two groups, and possibly more-those who are for the city's course of conduct and those who
are against it to one extent or another. It is also positively misleading to
think that the groups involved have an identity that is independent of the
dispute. Rather, the terms of the dispute itself ultimately define the identity
of the groups involved in the dispute.
None of this is changed by regarding the suit as derivative in behalf of
the city. Conceiving of the suit as derivative may be a useful legal vehicle
for accomplishing certain incidental purposes. The derivative suit concept,
for example, may be a basis for insisting that the taxpayers all be treated
equally in the final resolution, or for justifying payment of the plaintiff's
attorneys fees out of public funds. 20 9 The more substantial justification for
allowing such a proceeding is that taxpayers are entitled to assurance that
the city's public choices are in accordance with law emanating from higher
public authority, such as the state or Federal Constitution. The taxpayers'
suit, thus, is a mechanism for providing judicial review of decisions by municipal officials.
It is again perhaps appropriate to step back from procedural law and to
consider the taxpayers' suit in a broader legal context. The taxpayers' suit,
exemplified in DeBaun v. Mayor of New York,2 10 helped establish what has
203 See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-69 (1989) (holding that city employees were

not precluded from challenging city employment decisions arising pursuant to consent decrees
entered by the city in a separate cause of action). In modem municipal law, it is now taken for
granted that any taxpayer has standing to sue in a challenge to the legal validity of city action.
See, e.g., Harman,496 P.2d at 1254 ("[P]laintiff's interest as a taxpayer in the outcome of the
instant case establishes her standing to seek both equitable and legal relief against the city's
allegedly wrongful disposition of its assets."). The problematic character of the alleged common interest being asserted by such a plaintiff, however, is filly revealed where the standing
question is not taken for granted. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508-10 (1975) (denying standing to taxpayers in their action against the town because the alleged injury of an
increased tax burden was conjectural and lacked a causal connection to the town's actions and
because taxpayers could not show a personal right to bring the claim).
209 See Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1309 (Cal. 1977) (affirming an award of attorneys fees to public interest law firms, because, in part, the benefits of the adjudications were
widely enjoyed by the state's citizens).
210 16 Barb. 392 (N.Y. Ch. 1853).
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become a uniquely American constitutional arrangement: the right of individual citizens to challenge actions of governmental agencies before the
courts on grounds that the action was unconstitutional, ultra vires, or based
on misinterpretation of the law or "arbitrary and capricious" decisionmaking. The taxpayers' suit and analogous proceedings may now be maintained not only against cities but also against state or federal governments.
Correlatively, the exercise of reviewing authority by the courts has become
virtually routine in disputes over governmental policy. The class suit, or
something like it, is thus the procedural vehicle by which the American judiciary has come to function, in comparison with other modem democracies, such as a third house of Parliament.
The taxpayers' suit can be compared not only with the creditors' bill but
also with the association cases. The association cases, it will be recalled,
are those in which some members of an unincorporated association sue or
are sued in behalf of the whole membership. 2 11 These suits can be considered as being prosecuted or defended "by" all the members of the association through one of their members as a representative. They can also be
conceived of as being "on behalf of' the association as an entity by such a
representative, as in a corporate or taxpayers' derivative suit. 2 12 Of course,
to consider the association suit as a derivative suit in the right of the association is to presume that the association is a legal entity, but that would
contradict legal doctrine as it stood in the nineteenth century.213 That, however, is a subsidiary point. Whatever legal doctrine might be, insofar as
members of an association have continuing underlying interests, an association is an entity no less than a business corporation or a municipal corporation. Correlatively, insofar as members of an association have conflicting
interests, an association is not a group but a set of groups which are in dispute with each other, just as in a dissident shareholder's derivative suit
against incumbents in the corporate setting. Accordingly, a representative
suit purportedly by or against an association entails the same problems of
dealing with conflicting as well as common interests as are encountered in
the creditors' bill and the taxpayers' suit.
That association situations could present problems of intragroup conflict, as well as conflict between the group and a third party, occasionally

211See supranotes 104-18 and accompanying text (discussing an individual's authority to
sue in behalf of a related group).
212 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61 (1982) (stating that if an unincorporated association is not treated separately from its members, a 'Judgment in a section by or
on behalf of the members of the association is binding on the members").
213See supranotes 139-42 and accompanying text (discussing circumstances under which

designated representatives are not qualified to represent a certain group).
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was recognized in the early cases we have examined. The problem of intragroup conflict revealed itself dramatically in the14most important of all nineteenth-century class suits, Smith v. Swormstedt.
D. Smith v. Swormstedt
Smith v. Swormstedt stemmed from a controversy between the northern
and southern wings of the Methodist Episcopal Church. 215 The controversy
had its roots in the slavery question, particularly the ownership of slaves by
ministers of the church. The case echoed, if it did not directly address, the
most complex and social issue with which American society has contended.
In 1844, the governing body of the national Methodist Episcopal
Church authorized its Southern Annual Conference to depart, separating the
church into northern and southern branches. At the time of the separation
there existed a publishing business, the Book Concern, which published Bibles. The profits of the Book Concern funded pensions for "travelling and
worn out preachers." 216 The northern branch asserted that in departing, the
southern branch forfeited all rights to the Book Concern and its profits. To
resist this assertion, a suit was filed by several members of the southern
branch "by the authority, and under the direction of the General and Annual
Conferences of the Church South, and for the benefit of the same, and for
themselves,2 17and... all other ministers and persons having an interest in the
property."
The defendants named in the suit were Swormstedt, Finley, and Power,
who were in charge of the Book Concern, and the travelling preacher section of the northern branch of the Church. The suit sought an accounting
and an equitable8 apportionment of the Book Concern's property between the
two branches.

21

The Plaintiffs' theory was that the Methodist Episcopal Church had legally divided into northern and southern branches and that, as a consequence of this legal separation, members of each branch were entitled to a
distributive share of all property held by the Church before the division,
using the number of travelling preachers in the church north and south as
the basis upon which to make the partition.2 19 The defendants' position was
U.S. 288, 16 How. 307 (1853).
16 How. at 307.
216Id. at 298, 16 How. at 317.
217 Id. at 300, 16 How. at 319.
211 See id. at 288, 16 How. at 307 (detailing the history of the dispute between the divided

214 57

215 See id. at 288,

Church over the Book Concern).
219 See id. at 299, 16 How. at 307. The position of plaintiffs-appellants was summarized
in their brief as follows:
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that the Methodist Episcopal Church had retained its identity when the
southern branch seceded, "and submit[ted] that the separation and voluntary
withdrawal from this church of a portion of the bishops, ministers, and
members, and organization into a church south, was an unauthorized separation; and that they have thereby renounced and forfeited all claim.., to
any portion of the property in question. 2
The procedural issue concerned the designation of parties. This issue
apparently was raised for the first time before the Supreme Court, when the
defendants-appellees objected that the plaintiffs were not proper parties.22 '
Although we do not have the complete briefs, nor a complete record of the
argument, apparently the defendants took the position that the plaintiffs had
no right to a distributive share either in their own right or in behalf of the
absentee beneficiaries whom they represented.222

We claim, in the first place, that the division of the church was a valid act, and
thereby the original church was divided into two churches equally legitimate, and
that the members and beneficiaries in each have equal rights to their distributive
share of all the property and funds.
Secondly. That if there was no valid division of the original church, but only a
separation of the southern portion from the original church, yet, under the circumstances in which it was made, the beneficiaries of this charity have not lost that character by adhering to the church south, because the separation was authorized by the
highest official and legislative authority of the church, and the beneficiaries living in
the south had no choice or alternative but adherence to that church or the total loss of
all church membership and privileges.
Id. at 288-89, 16 How. at 307-08.
20 Id. at 300-01, 16 How. at 319-20. The abstract of defendants'-appellees' brief describes their position as follows:
From 1844 to the present time, the same Methodist Episcopal Church has continued to exist identical in name, organization, discipline, and doctrine, and under a
regular succession of the same officers: some conferences in the slave-holding
States have withdrawn from it; it has lost and gained individual members; and the
United States' possessions on the Pacific have been received into its connection; but
these changes have not affected its organization or destroyed its identity.
Id. at 292-93, 16 How. at 311-12.
With respect to the property called the "Book Concern," appellees' counsel asserted:
I take it then as clear, by proof and by concession, that a Methodist Episcopal
Church, having a regular and well known organization, existed prior to 1844, and
that the property now in controversy was held by trustees, in trust for the church so
organized, and for certain specified beneficiaries in it, and that it was only through
its organization, in a mode pointed out by its organic law, that any individual was or
could be entitled to any portion of the fund.
Id. at 292-93.
22 See id. at 301, 17 How. at 320 ("An objection was taken, on the argument, to the bill
for want of proper parties to maintain the suit.").
222The defendants'-appellees' brief on this point is summarized as follows:
Do the individuals who join in this bill show any right to a distributive share of
this fund?
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The Supreme Court concluded that both plaintiff and defendant classes
were properly represented by the respective parties before the court. The
Court said, in language that still echoes:
[W]here the parties interested are numerous, and the suit is for an object common to them all, some of the body may maintain a bill on behalf of themselves
and of the others; and a bill may also be maintained against22a3 portion of a nuinterest.
merous body of defendants, representing a common

This was a holding as to the plaintiffs and dictum as to the defendants.
In dealing with the problem, the Court drew largely upon Justice
Story's Commentarieson Equity Pleadings.22a The Court, however, took no

note of the qualifications and uncertainties that Story expressed in his treatise. 225 The Court referred to Story's three categories of class suits, including the third in which the interests of the class members are "separate and
distinct."226 Without addressing Story's hesitancies concerning the problem
of the binding effect of the judgment, the Court asserted that when a class
suit was permitted as an exception to the Necessary Party Rule, the decree
was binding on the absentees so long as those present as parties fairly represented the absentees' interests: "The legal and equitable rights and liabilities of all being before the court by representation, and especially where the

They show that they "are preachers-Kelley and Allen are supernumerary, and
Tevis superannuated preachers-of the Methodist Episcopal Church South, and that
as such they have a personal interest in the real estate, personal property, debts, and
funds now holden by the Methodist Episcopal Church through said defendants, as
agents and trustees appointed by the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal
Church." So much for themselves.
As to those whom they choose to represent, they say, "[t]hat there are about fifteen hundred preachers belonging to the travelling connection of the Methodist Episcopal Church South, each of whom has a direct personal interest in the same right as
your complainants to the said property,"
They say they are members of the church south, preachers belonging to the travelling connection of that church, and on that ground, and that alone, they set up this
claim. They do not aver that they, or any one of them, or any one for whom they appear, ever belonged to the Methodist Episcopal Church, and acquired rights in its
connection; but they simply claim that, by virtue of their connection with the Methodist Episcopal Church South, they are entitled to a distributive share of the property
of the Methodist Episcopal Church. The case is certainly no better by making these
persons complainants. If the church south be not entitled, as an organized body, on
some ground shown in the bill, these persons are not entitled because they are members of its organization.
Id. at 295-96, 16 How. at 314-15.
223 Id. at 301-02, 16 How. at 320-21.
224See STORY supra note 74, at 74 and accompanying text ("Persons materially interested... in the subject-matter of a suit are to be made parties to it.").
225See id. at 74-204 and accompanying text (discussing the proper parties to a bill).
226 Swormstedt, 57 U.S. at 302, 16 How. at 322.
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subject-matter of the suit is common to all, there can be very little danger
but that the interest of all will be properly protected and maintained. 227
It is not clear what the Court meant by these words about the conditions
under which a class suit would be binding on members of a class. Whatever
it said was dictum, because the question at issue was one of proper parties
and not the effect of the judgment. In any event, the Court was apparently
of the view that the conditions required for the class suit device included
"numerousness" of interested parties and the existence of a common question in which the class members had consistent rather than conflicting interests. 228 The implication of the Court's discussion is that the decree would
be binding whether or not the class might have other characteristics, such as
the fact that its members belonged to an association, or that a "fund" was
involved. Hence, we have a clear statement that a class suit decree is, at
least under certain circumstances, binding on absentee members of the class.
If we are correct in our historical research, Smith v. Swormstedt is indeed
the first unequivocal statement to that effect about a class suit.
The statement in Swormstedt that a class suit decree is binding on absentees was made in a case where the relevant group could be defined according to any one of the categories by which class suit doctrine had been
formulated. The classes involved in Swormstedt also can be analyzed via
229
Swormstedt can be
the concepts now found in Federal Rules 23 and 23.2.
association (the
an
of
representatives
with
case,
considered an association
southern branch) as plaintiffs and representatives of another association (the
northern branch) as defendants, acting in behalf of all members of the respective associations. Swormstedt can be equally well regarded as a derivative suit by constituents of the organization contending that the management
had been mismanaging the affairs of the organization. In addition, Swormstedt can be considered a "fund" case, in which the Book Concern and its
stream of profits was a res over which the Court had control and of which it
could make a division among the group of claimants. It also can be considered a "common question" situation that, in the words of Federal Rule
23(b)(2), occurs when "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to
act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the

22'Id. at 303, 16 How. at 323.
22'See id. at 302, 16 How. at 322 ("The rule is well-established that where the parties

interested are numerous and the suit is for an object common to them all, some of the body
may maintain a bill on behalf of themselves and of the others.").
22'See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 ("Class Actions"); FED. R. Civ. P. 23.2. ("Actions Relating To
Unincorporated Associations").
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class as a whole." 230 It, of course, also can be considered a situation in
which the key is simply the "numerousness" of the parties and the similarity
of their legal situations.
In any event, the statement in Smith v. Swormstedt that "the decree
binds all of them the same as if all were before the court" 231 completely
overlooked an important development in the rules governing absentee
members of a class-the revision of the Federal Rules of Practice for the
Court of Equity, particularly Rules 47 and 48, which the Supreme Court had
promulgated in 1842.232
E. Rule 48 of the Equity Rules of 1842
Rule 47 of the Equity Rules of 1842 dealt generally with the problem of
necessary parties. Rule 48 dealt with situations "[w]here the parties on either side are very numerous." 233 The two rules addressed the effect on unjoined parties in slightly different language. The formulation in Rule 48,
however, stated that "the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and
claims of all the absent parties. 234
That Smith v. Swormstedt makes no mention of Equity Rule 48 is an
astonishing fact. But a fact it is.
As of 1854, therefore, the leading decision by the Supreme Court said
that absentees in a representative suit were bound, apparently without regard
230 FED. R.Civ. P. 23(b)(2); cf.FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) (providing for class status when

"the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of... inconsistent or varying adjudications... or [conflicting adjudications]").
2, Swormstedt, 57 U.S. at 302, 16 How. at 322.
232 Rule 47 provided:

In all cases where it shall appear to the Court that persons, who might otherwise
be deemed necessary or proper to parties to suit, can not be made parties by reason
of their being out of the jurisdiction of the court, or incapable otherwise of being
made parties, or because their joinder would oust the jurisdiction of the court as to
the parties before the court, the Court may, in their discretion, proceed in the cause
without making such persons parties; and in such cases the decree shall be without
prejudice to the right of the absent parties.
Rule 48 provided:
Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and can not, without manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought before it, the
Court in its discretion may dispense with making all of them parties, and may proceed in the suit, having sufficient parties before it to represent all the adverse interest
of the plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit properly before it. But, in such cases,
the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all the absent parties.
42 U.S. (I How.) Iv,lvi (1842), reprinted in JAMES LOvE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL
EQUrY RULES 103-05 (W.H. Anderson Co. 1913).
233 Id. at 104.
234Id. at 105.
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to the type of class, while the Equity Rules it had promulgated only a decade earlier said that absentees were not bound, again apparently without regard to the type of class. From that point at least until 1912, when the Equity Rules were further revised, 235 Rule 48 and Swormstedt coexisted in
peaceful contradiction. The courts progressed case by case, almost never
referring to both Rule 48 and Swormstedt in the same decision and never
confronting the inconsistency.
In the process, the courts invoked a term on which Story relied to make
sense of the earlier decisional law. This was the phrase "a common interest
or a common right., 236 This phrase had been appropriated in Smith v.
Swormstedt, in the Court's statement that a representative action may be
maintained "where the parties are very numerous, and though they have or
may have separate and distinct interests .... [T]hough the rights of the
several persons may be separate and distinct, yet there must be a common
or enforce." 237
interest or a common right, which the bill seeks to establish
"Common right" thus came to be employed as the formula, or as an additional formula, to identify a representative suit that would have binding
effects.
III. SMITH V. SWORMSTEDTTO BEN-HUR v. CAUBLE

A. FederalCases 1854-1912
After Smith v. Swormstedt in 1854, there were few reported class suit
cases in the federal courts until the 1880s. The two we have been able to
identify involved the question of initial joinder rather than the question of
res judicata. Both interpreted the "common interest" requirement narrowly.
In Ayres v. Carver,23 decided very shortly after Swormstedt, the plaintiff brought an action against approximately 200 defendants. The plaintiff
alleged that he had made an offer to buy land from the government at a
statutorily established price, but that the offer had been refused by the defendant register of the Government land office. The plaintiff further alleged
that the other defendants had later purchased the same land with knowledge
of the plaintiff's prior right to purchase. The plaintiff sought to set aside the

25 Rule 38 of the revised Equity Rules of 1912 provided: "When the question is one of
common or general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the
whole." 226 U.S. 649, 659 (1912).
236 STORY, supra note 74, at 120.
237Swormstedt, 57 U.S. at 302, 16 How. at 322.

'3' 58 U.S. 591, 17 How. 620 (1854).
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39
purchases of the parcels of the land that had been sold to the defendants.
The district court appointed several of the defendants to represent the class.
Citing Swormstedt, the Supreme Court in dictum stated that:

[I]t is difficult to see any interest or estate in common among these several defendants, that would authorize the rights of the absent parties to be represented
in the litigation by those upon whom process has been served .... Their title
to the land ... is separate and independent, without any thing in common
240

The Court seems not to have considered that there was a common issue
as to whether plaintiff's offer to buy was wrongfully refused, even though
there was also the separate issue of whether each individual defendant had
been aware of the plaintiffs claim at the time he bought his parcel.
In a district court case, Cutting v. Gilbert,24 1 the common interest requirement was given even more restrictive effect. In that case, several New
York brokerage firms sued in behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated who might join the suit and contribute to its expenses. The suit
sought to enjoin the collection of a tax under the Internal Revenue Act of
1864. The court dismissed for improperjoinder of parties.242 The plaintiffs
could not represent the absent parties, the court said, because the parties
must have a common interest, 243
not merely in "the question" at issue, but in
"the subject matter of the suit.
This reasoning was invoked by the Supreme Court toward the end of
the nineteenth century in Scott v. Donald,244 a case involving a South Carolina law regulating importation of alcoholic beverages. In Scott, the plaintiff, a liquor importer, sued for himself and for all other persons in the state,
attacking the regulation as unconstitutional and asking for an injunction to
restrain state officials from enforcing it. The Supreme Court held that the
law was unconstitutional but modified the injunction24to
enjoin only the
5
named officials and to protect only the plaintiff himself.

239 See id. at 592 ("The complaint then prays ... that the several entries and purchases
made by the defendants be set aside... .
240 Id. at 594.
2416 F. Cas. 1079 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1865) (No. 3519), affd sub nom. United States v. Cut-

ting, 70 U.S. 441 (1866).
242 See id. at 1080 ("[This bill cannot be sustained, on account of the joinder of improper
parties as plaintiffs.").
243 Id.
244 165 U.S. 107 (1897).
245 See id.at 117 (pronouncing that "certain provisions of the act in question [are] unconstitutional," but directing that "[t]he decree of the court below... be amended by being restricted to the parties named as plaintiff and defendants in the bill").
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Other cases also dealt with the ex-ante problem of joinder rather than
the ex-post problem of res judicata. Thus, there were cases in which a third
party sought intervention to assert claims in creditors' bills and similar proceedings. 246 It was indicated that when a party intervened in such a suit, he
became an actual party; if he did not intervene, then the suit could be
deemed not to have been brought in his behalf. This ambiguity permitted
the courts to regard such suits as representative for purposes of the rules regarding necessary parties, but not for precluding the absentees from subsequently initiating a suit in their own right.247
Another doctrinal compromise involved resuscitation of the old concept
of "quasi parties." This approach was taken in Terry v. Bank of Cape
Fear.248 Following the insolvency of the Bank of Cape Fear, the plaintiff
sued in behalf of himself and all other creditors to impose individual liability on the bank's shareholders in accordance with state law that imposed
such liability on shareholders in banks. Twenty-five shareholders were
named to represent the defendant shareholder class. Judgment was given
for the plaintiffs, and a commissioner was appointed to ascertain the
249 The court
amounts due to each creditor and owed by each shareholder.
characterized both the absent shareholders and the absent creditors as quasiparties,25 meaning that a quasi-party plaintiff could receive the benefits251of
by it.
the decree but that a quasi-party defendant could not be prejudiced
See, e.g., Bacon v. Robertson, 59 U.S. 480, 489, 18 How. 40, 41 (1855) (allowing a
suit by a stockholder representing the interests of all stockholders in bank assets); Compton v.
Jesup, 68 F. 263, 285-86 (6th Cir. 1895) (finding that a lien holder on foreclosed property was
not estopped from asserting the lien by judgment in a suit brought by other bondholders generally when the lien holder did not join that suit).
247 See Wabash RR. v. Adelbert College of the W. Reserve Univ., 208 U.S. 38, 58-59
(1908) (finding that ajudgment in a suit brought in behalf of stockholders was not binding on
stockholders who could have, but did not, join the suit); United States v. Old Settlers, 148
U.S. 427, 479-81 (1893) (holding that the general liability of the United States was established
in a suit brought by three commissioners in behalf of the Western Cherokee Nation, but individual claimants must come in and prove their right to share in the fund); Compton v. Jesup,
68 F. at 285-86, discussed supra note 246.
248 20 F. 777 (C.C.W.D.N.C. 1884) (explaining that a "decree was made, declaring and
adjudging the right of the plaintiffs.., to recover their debts," and that a commissioner was
directed to "assess each defendant with the amount of his proportionate liability").
249 See id.at 778.
250 See id.at 780-81 (declaring that the stockholders were quasi parties who could not "be
246

compelled to pay their proportionate amount... as they were not actual parties," and asserting
that the absent plaintiffs were "deemed quasi parties, and have an inchoate interest in the
suit").
251 Other cases held that a creditor who did not come in and prove his claim before the
master could not thereafter bring a separate suit in his own right. See, e.g., Leadville Coal Co.
v. McCreery, 141 U.S. 475, 478 (1891) (holding that a person who was assumed to be a
creditor, but who did not come forward to present his claim, was not entitled to a recovery);
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The cases in this period dealing directly with res judicata became entangled in an underlying social conflict that has long been difficult, perhaps
intractable: Can individual members of a labor union be punished for contempt of court for continuing a strike in the face of an injunction prohibiting
the strike that has been obtained against the union and its officers? The
problem has many layers: the immediate labor-management conflict; the
class conflict inherent in industrial labor relationships, not only between
workers and proprietors, but between workers and the educated class that
includes lawyers and judges; the conflicting loyalties of union members as
citizens and as union members; the conflicting purposes of union leadership;
and the uncertainty of cohesion within the membership.
The immediate question in these cases was whether union members
neither named as parties nor served with process were obliged to refrain
from picketing on the basis of an injunction against the union and its officers. In re Lennon,252 decided by the Supreme Court in 1897, provides that
such an injunction imposed an obligation to refrain from picketing on an
employee who had not been an actual party to the suit: "To render a person
amenable to an injunction it is neither necessary that he should have been a
party to the suit in which the injunction was issued, nor to have been actually served
with a copy of it, so long as he appears to have had actual no253
tice."
In 1898, in the case of American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers' &
Die Makers' Unions Nos. 1 & 3,254 this obligation was described in terms
that suggested it was based on res judicata:
[I]t
is one of the features of an interlocutory injunction that it reaches all who
are parties, whether they have been served with process of subpoena or not,
whether they have appeared or not, whether they have answered
255 or not, and it
binds all who have notice of it, whether they are parties or not.

This proposition clearly suggests a res judicata effect on absentees.
Hence, it was consistent with the proposition in Swormstedt that a class suit
decree is binding on members of the class who are not actual parties to the
suit. The proposition was, of course, inconsistent with Equity Rule 48
adopted in 1842, which was then still in force. 2 56 However, there is an inRichmond v. Irons, 121 U.S. 27, 66 (1887) (same); cf supra notes 88-94 and accompanying
text (discussing how a creditor could collect his debt by joining a representative creditors' suit
once an initial decree in that suit had been issued, and noting that creditors who joined the
representative suit later were accommodated until the final decree was issued).
252166 U.S. 548 (1897).
213Id. at 554.
21490 F. 598 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1898).
25 Id. at 604.
256 See supra note 232.
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dependent basis for an obligation to respect an injunction by one who is not
bound as a party, or as represented by a party, but who has notice of the
court order. The obligation results not from res judicata but from refraining
of justice. The Eighth Circuit recognized this distinction
from obstruction
25 7
case.
in a later
The fact nevertheless remains that the court in American Steel & Wire
Co. analyzed the problem as one involving the preclusive effects on absentee members of a class. 258 The court evidently had great difficulty grappling
with this issue, saying on the one hand that the decree binds absentees if
"the persons brought on the record fairly represent the interest or right involved,, 259 but on the other hand that "all absent parties [would be] protected by ... the reservation of equity rule 48.,,260 This is one of the few
cases in the period following Swormstedt that refers to Equity Rule 48.
Another case relying on Equity Rule 48 was Coann v. Atlanta Cotton
Factory Co.,261 which held that absentees were not bound by the decree in a
representative creditors suit. In Coann, the creditors' representative foreclosed on land that was the subject of certain trust deeds, obtaining a decree
under which the land was sold. Afterwards, another creditor sought to have
the decree set aside. The court held that absent creditors were not bound:
The equity rules that allow suits to be brought by some complainants for the
benefit of all, expressly reserve the rights of absent parties. See Equity Rules
47 and 48. The absent bondholders are not quasi parties .... It follows that,
as the absent bondholders
262 are not bound by the decree, they may inaugurate
new proceedings ....

But there were also holdings that bound absentees, an important instance being Wallace v. Adams.263 This case arose under special legislation

that created a court to determine Native American citizenship claims-another deep underlying social conflict to which the class suit device has been
put to use. The Supreme Court held that the defendant was bound by a de-

257 See In re Reese, 107 F. 942, 945-46 (8th Cir. 1901) (asserting that a party, although
not a named party to an injunction, may be punished for knowingly aiding in the violation of
the injunction); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 63 (1982) (discussing the
duty not to obstruct compliance with a judgment).
258 See 90 F. at 605 (discussing whether an injunction can "bind persons not formally
parties to the bill").
259 Id. at 607.
260 Id. at 606.
261 14 F. 4 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1882).
262 Id. at 8.
263204 U.S. 415 (1907).
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264
cree in an earlier representative action to which he had not been a party.
The Supreme Court pointed out that the defendant had not availed himself
of a legislative provision allowing claimants to make their claims individually, but described this provision as an "extra precaution," 265 thus implying
that the defendant would have been bound even without opportunity to be
heard individually:

[lIt is undoubtedly within the power of a court of equity to name as defendants
a few individuals who are in fact representatives of a large class having a
not
common interest or a common right... and make the decree effective 266
merely upon those individuals, but also upon the class represented by them.

Earlier, in Hawkins v. Glenn,267 the Court held that a decree against a
corporation, requiring an assessment of its shareholders, bound shareholders
who had not participated in the suit, even though the corporation had been
represented only by a court-appointed trustee rather than a member of the
class. 268 The Court in Swan Land & Cattle Co. v. Frank 69 ruled, however,
that creditors could not sue shareholders as representatives of the corporajudgment could not bind
tion to collect on corporate obligations because 27the
0
either the corporation or the other shareholders.
In all of the cases thus far cited, the question of binding the absentees
was framed in terms of formal characteristics of the representative relation264

See id. at 425-26 (asserting that "it is undoubtedly within the power of a court of eq-

uity to name as defendants a few individuals who are in fact representatives of a large class
having a common interest... and make the decree effective.., upon the class represented by
them," and therefore affirming the decision of the lower court).
265 Id. at 425.
266 Id. Perhaps it need not be added that the Court gave no attention to Equity Rule 48 in
reaching its conclusion. See also McIntosh v. City of Pittsburgh, 112 F. 705, 707-09
(C.C.W.D. Pa. 1901) (finding a prior state court proceeding preclusive in a subsequent federal
suit); Gamble v. City of San Diego, 79 F. 487, 500 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1897) (noting that a pending federal representative suit precludes initiation of a second such suit).
267 131 U.S. 319 (1889).
268 See id. at 329 (declaring that "the stockholder is bound by a decree of a court of equity
against the corporation in enforcement of a corporate duty, although not a party as an individual, but only through representation by the company"); see also Beals v. Illinois, Mo.& Tex.
RR., 133 U.S. 290, 295 (1890) (considering bondholders filly represented and bound by a
decision in a suit in which the trustee was a party); Kerrison v. Stewart, 93 U.S. 155, 160
(1876) (finding that beneficiaries of a trust are bound by judgment in a suit in which the trustee was a party and acting in their behalf); San Francisco Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of S.F., 164
F. 884, 886 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1908) (finding an injunction properly applicable to unnamed parties when named parties are in a representative or trust relation to them); Campbell v. Railroad
Co., 4 F. Cas. 1178, 1181 (C.C.E.D. Tex. 1871) (No. 2366) (same).
269 148 U.S. 603 (1893).
270 See id. at 610 (asserting that corporations "are indispensable parties to a bill which
affects corporate rights or liabilities," and that unless a corporation were made a party to the
proceeding, neither it nor its other stockholders would be bound by the decree).

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

1908

[Vol. 146:1849

ship-"common interest" and similar concepts. The opinions sometimes
referred to "identity of interest" and the propriety of a representative standing for absentees. What we now call "adequacy of representation" was not
part of the analysis.
The first recognition of the concept of adequacy of representation in
terms even approximating the modem conception seems to be McArthur v.
Scott, 271 decided in 1885. That case involved an absentee who was formally but inadequately represented. The facts were as follows. Duncan
McArthur died in 1839, leaving a will that gave the income from certain
properties to his children for their lives and then directed that, when the
children had all died and the youngest grandchild had attained the age of
twenty-one, the properties were to be distributed to his grandchildren. One
of McArthur's sons contested the will, alleging that the will was impossible
to carry out, that it was in violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities, and
that McArthur had lacked testamentary capacity.272 McArthur's other children and grandchildren were named as defendants in that suit. In that earlier
suit, the court appointed the parents of several grandchildren to act as
guardians ad litem for the latter. None of the defendants contested the allegations, and the will was found invalid. 73 The estate was then distributed
by intestacy to McArthur's children, and portions of the property were subsequently sold. In 1875, after McArthur's youngest grandchild reached the
age of twenty-one, he and his sisters sued the other grandchildren and the
transferees of the property, claiming that the will was valid and therefore
that title to the property should devolve to them. After an unfavorable decision in the district court, these grandchildren appealed to the Supreme
2 74

Court.

An unborn grandchild plainly could not have been made an actual party
to the original will contest proceeding. The question, therefore, was
whether his interests had been represented by other parties in that proceeding. In answering this question, the Court focused on two factors. First, it
noted that the interests of the parties to the earlier proceeding had been inconsistent with those of the present plaintiffs because the earlier defendants
as heirs stood to take a larger interest through intestate succession than they

271 113 U.S. 340 (1885).
272See id.at 348 (recounting the allegations in the bill filed by McArthur's eldest son).

273See id. at 350 (noting that the defendants "stated that they would neither admit nor
deny the allegations of the bill," and that a jury subsequently found that "the instrument is not

the valid last will and testament of the said Duncan McArthur deceased").
274See id. (dismissing the bill filed by the grandchildren), rev'g McArthur v. Allen, 3 F.
313, 324 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1880).
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would take under the will. 275 Hence, in the original proceeding, it had not
been in their interest to defend the validity of the will. Second, the Court
found that the representation had, in fact, been deficient since the contest276
ants' allegations had not even been controverted, let alone adjudicated.
On this basis, the present plaintiffs had not been fairly represented and, accordingly, were not bound by the decree. But the ambivalence in the
Court's language is remarkable:
In suits affecting the rights of residuary legatees... the general rule is that all
the members of the class must be made parties .... Where they are numerous,
and only some of them ... are made parties, the court, upon being satisfied
that it has a sufficient number before it to secure a fair trial of the question at
issue, may hear the cause .... But it would seem that the decree must be
made parties ....
without prejudice to the rights of those who are not

As far as we have been able to ascertain, this is the first case in which
adequacy of representation as such was advanced as the decisive criterion in
determining the binding effect of a class suit.
B. The State Cases: 1860-1940
While the federal courts struggled to articulate a theory of preclusion in
representative suits, the states, suffering complications from the contradiction between Smith v. Swormstedt and Equity Rule 48, dealt with the same
problem with perhaps less doctrinal confusion. The apparent clarity in doctrine may have resulted in part from the fact that the lines of state cases
tended to stay in case-types-taxpayer cases, creditors' bills cases, and so
on-among which there was less tendency to generalize. This compartmentalization avoided the internal contradictions in the generalizations being uttered in the federal decisions, but only by ignoring the contradictions
between the categorical compartments in state law.

...See Scott, 113 U.S. at 359 ("Representation by an adverse interest is an absurdity
which the law does not contemplate.").
276 See id. at 394-95 (stating that the interests of the unborn grandchildren and greatgrandchildren were not represented in the original suit since the heirs at law, whose interest
was to set aside the will, in fact controlled both sides of the controversy). The failure to contest in the first litigation concerning the property suggests that the former proceeding was
collusive. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1940), discussed infra at note 428 and
accompanying text (noting that the Court was bound by the Illinois Supreme Court's finding
that the suit was not collusive); see also Scott, 113 U.S. at 394 (finding that the verdict and
decree could not be applied to the then unborn parties since they were "entered without any
contest").
277 Scott, 113 U.S. at 395.
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There is another curious fact-a high fraction of the state cases were
from Illinois, including Hansberryv. Lee 278 which came before the Supreme
Court in 1940. The cases in this period can be grouped into four categories:
"virtual representation" of remaindermen in intergenerational property
transfers,279 taxpayer suits, creditors' bills, and bills of peace.
Cases involving remaindermen typically arose when a will or trust instrument created several classes of beneficiaries, one of which consisted of
unborn contingent remaindermen. If the testamentary disposition later was
contested, the necessary parties doctrine created a serious problem. Under
the Necessary Parties Rule, the action could not proceed without all "interested" parties, including contingent remalndermen. 280 At the same time,
where such remainderrnen were as yet unborn, it was literally impossible to
join them. Some device or explanation for permitting the action to proceed
had to be created to permit authoritative adjudications of rights in the decedent's property.
Permitting the action to be tried in the absence of necessary parties was,
of course, only the first problem-that of the ex-ante joinder procedure.
The second problem was whether, under the rules of res judicata, members
of the unborn class would be bound by the judgment. Practical utility required some conceptual device for binding the absentees. Otherwise, a
trustee or living beneficiary would have great difficulty selling property or
investing in development of the property from the trust corpus because title
would not be marketable if the absent remaindermen were not bound by a
judgment determining the remaindermen's interests.
The doctrine that evolved, specifically associated from the remaindermen cases, was that of "virtual representation." The rule was that living
remaindermen "virtually represented" the whole category of remaindermen,
at least where their interests did not conflict. The leading case was Hale v.
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311 U.S. 32 (1940).

of a "virtual representation" type of case is McArthur v. Scott, 113 U.S.
340, discussed supra at notes 271-77 and accompanying text. The cases involving virtual representation generally are representative suits but not necessarily class suits. They are representative in structure and in theory, because unborn remaindermen could be considered as
parties only through some concept of representation. They are not necessarily class suits be279 An illustration

cause the unborn remaindermen were not always thought of as "numerous." It is imaginable
that a set of children could procreate grandchildren at a rate that would qualify for numerousness. For purposes of a theory of representation, however, it makes little difference how many
are in the set of absentees. The crucial fact is that the absentees are absent.
280 See Scott, 113 U.S. at 391-92 ("The general rule in equity, in accordance with the fundamental principles of justice, is that all persons interested in the object of a suit, and whose
rights will be directly affected by the decree, must be made parties to the suit.").
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Hale.28 ' Drawing extensively upon English and American cases, as well as

upon Story and other treatise writers, the court in Hale held that representation both circumvented the Necessary Parties Rule and resulted in preclu282
The rule was stated as follows: "Thus,
sion of absent class members.
where it appears that a particular party, though not before the court in perand effison, is so far represented by others that his interests receive actual
him." 28 3
cient protection, the decree may be held to be binding upon
Other cases of the same era in Illinois and elsewhere had similar resuits.2 84 Subsequently, there was increasing emphasis on the adequacy of
representation, as distinct from formal identity of interest. 2 8 5 Nevertheless,
the inference is inescapable that many of the cases were friendly proceed1893); see also McCampbell v. Mason, 38 N.E. 672, 674 (il1. 1894)
33 N.E. 858 (ill.
(holding that a foreclosure decree is binding on those whose interest in a contingent remainder
is of the same class as the parties actually present before the court).
282 See Hale, 33 N.E. at 867-68 ("If persons in being are before the court who have the
21

same interest and are equally certain to bring forward the entire merits of the question... convenience and justice require that there should be a complete decree.").
213 Id. at 867.
284 See Elmore v. Galligher, 87 So. 349, 351 (Ala. 1921) (holding that the property rights
of unborn contingent remaindermen may be extinguished by judicial decree where the remaindermen have been virtually represented under strict standards); Wolf v. Uhlemann, 156
1927) (holding that remaindermen not in esse were sufficiently represented
N.E. 334, 340 (Ill.
by living members of the same class in a compromise family settlement); Easton v. Hall, 154
N.E. 216, 225 (ll. 1926) (holding that the equity rule which states that parties not before a
court are not bound by its decrees may be excepted where parties are represented and their
1921) (holding
interests are adequately protected); Weberpals v. Jenny, 133 N.E. 62, 66 (ill.
that the unborn remaindermen of a will were not bound by court decree because their interests
had not been adequately protected as to satisfy the equity doctrine of representation); Longworth v. Duff, 130 N.E. 690, 691-92 (Ill. 1921) (holding that a decree regarding the contingent interests of remaindermen not before the court was binding if the full merits of these interests had been brought forward by persons of the same interest); Kent v. Church of St.
Michael, 32 N.E. 704, 705 (N.Y. 1892) (holding that a court judgment in accordance with a
deed was binding on grandchildren not in esse and that the deed therefore conveyed perfect
title); New York Life v. Conkling, 144 N.Y.S. 638, 641 (App. Div. 1913) (holding the two
grandchildren not in esse at the time of the agreement to be bound to the judgment of compromise since their interests in the trust estate were "precisely similar" to those of the grandchildren who were parties to the suit); Faber v. Faber, 56 S.E. 677, 679 (S.C. 1907) (holding
that where an issue is of general interest to many persons and it is impractical or impossible to
bring all of them before a court, one party may be made a representative defendant in the
case).
285 See Mortimore v. Bashore, 148 N.E. 317, 319 (Ill. 1925) (holding that a decree granting fee title against the interests of the unborn was invalid because the interests of the unborn
parties were not adequately represented by the parties before the court); Thompson v. Humphrey, 101 S.E. 738, 746 (N.C. 1919) (holding that the grandchildren of a testator were not
represented by the testator's children as they were two distinct classes with hostile interests);
Chambers v. Preston, 193 S.W. 109, 112 (Tenn. 1917) (holding that, in partition suits in
which the actual appearance of minor children could have been enforced, the doctrine of virtual representation does not apply).
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ings designed to yield judicial authorization of a sale of estate property that
was required by some exigency in the management of a testator's estate.
One can only speculate how adequately the unborn generally were protected. Courts were wary, however, when faced with a claim of preclusion
through a representative that had sought some advantage for himself. In
such circumstances, when the motive, inducement, or actual position of the
representative did not fully protect the absentees' interest, some courts held
that the absentees were not bound. 286 Other cases held more simply that
where the representative had a conflict of interest there could be no bona
fide contest that would bind absent class members.28 7
In a few of the remaindermen cases, the concept of an in rem proceeding was reintroduced. A few courts thus accepted the idea that the absentee
remaindermen were bound because the proceeding bound "all the world"
pursuant to service by publication. Application of the in rem concept to the
claims of unborn remalndermen is a work of art in high Victorian legal
doctrine. There is a certain weird consistency in the thought that nonexistent remaindermen would be adequately notified by summons of the kind
published in a legal newspaper. Perhaps needless to say, treating the suit as
an in rem proceeding and notice by publication as sufficient to summon an

Ussery v. Darrow, 188 So. 885, 890 (Ala. 1939) (following precedent indicating
that virtual representation is binding unless the representative's interests are adverse to or conflicting with those of the unborn remaindermen); Swoope v. Darrow, 188 So. 879, 882 (Ala.
1939) (holding that a judgment regarding a will was not binding on nonparty descendants of
the testator unless the doctrine of "virtual representation" applied); Fallon v. Superior Court,
90 P.2d 858, 859 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939) (holding that the sufficiency of representation in a
class suit so as to bind the members depends on the good faith of the representative and the
nature of the judgment's effect on those represented).
287 See Los Angeles County v. Winans, 109 P. 640, 647 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1910) (holding that the rule as to unborn remaindermen is not applicable unless the interests of the representative and those represented are identical); Adami v. Gercken, 150 N.Y.S. 8, 11-12 (App.
Div. 1914) (holding that a property judgment was not binding on plaintiffs whose sole representation of their contingent interests was by those with interests hostile to their own), aff'd,
116 N.E. 1032 (N.Y. 1917); see also Goodloe v. Woods, 80 S.E. 108, 112 (Va. 1913) (holding
that a husband could not represent his wife's minor children in a proceeding because the husband's and children's interests were not identical).
Such was the situation in McArthur v. Scott, 113 U.S. 340 (1885), discussed supra note
notes 271-77 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court had observed:
The only parties... who were of age and capable of representing themselves,
The guardian ad litem, apwere the heirs at law, interested to set aside the will ....
pointed to represent the opposing interest... was ... interested as an heir at
law ....Each of the persons so appointed confessed.., the allegations of the bill,
and in his answer as guardian neither admitted nor denied those allegations ....All
the appointments[,] ... all the answersL] ... and the issue to the jury [were] ordered... on one and the same day, within a week before the verdict and final decree.
Id. at 394.
286 See
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absentee obviates any question of representation of the absentees, let alone
any question of adequacy of representation.
The second group of state court cases consisted of the taxpayer suits.
These exhibit the contradictions found in the New York cases of an earlier
period. 288 Many held that taxpayer suits could be maintained as representative proceedings and that they would bind all taxpayers in the community,
but many others reached the opposite conclusion on both questions. Some
decisions simply held without analysis that all taxpayers are bound by the
judgment in a taxpayers' suit. 2 89 Some used the analogy to virtual repreinvolved the public interest or
sentation. 290 29Others reasoned that if the issue
public right, ' common interest of citizens, 292 or general interest,293 all taxSee supra notes 164-74 and accompanying text (discussing the earlier New York taxpayers' suits which bound all taxpayers to the suit brought by some, despite the real possibility that some members of the represented group held divergent interests).
289 See Rigsby v. Ruraldale Consol. Sch. Dist., 20 S.W.2d 624, 625 (Ark. 1929) (holding
288

that a suit to enjoin school district officers was res judicata because all citizens of a school
district were bound by previous decision involving the issue presented); People ex rel. Lewis
v. Whittaker, 98 N.E. 967, 969 (II. 1912) (holding that a final judgment in quo warranto
ousting a district's commissioners barred subsequent in quo warranto proceedings); Stone v.
Winn, 176 S.W. 933, 940 (Ky. 1915) (holding that county taxpayers are bound by res judicata
decisions against the county since a municipal corporation stands as a trustee for its citizens in
suits of general interest); Green County v. Lewis, 163 S.W. 489, 492 (Ky. 1914) (holding that
attorneys were entitled to percentages of unpaid bonds as previous high court ruling declaring
bonds void was a binding precedent on the issue); State ex rel. Wilson v. Rainey, 74 Mo. 229,
235 (1881) (holding that a judgment against a county regarding the levy and collection of a
tax is a matter of general interest and therefore binding on the entire community); City of El
Reno v. Cleveland-Trinidad Paving Co., 107 P. 163, 166 (Okla. 1910) (holding that a taxpayer
may bring suit in behalf of all those "similarly situated," and thus the issue before the court
was res judicata); Gallaher v. City of Moundsville, 12 S.E. 859, 860 (W. Va. 1891) (holding
that there was sufficient identity of parties in a taxpayer suit to obtain an injunction against the
collection of taxes to allow a defense of res judicata).
290 See McCarroll v. Farrar, 134 S.W.2d 561, 563-64 (Ark. 1939) (holding that the issue
of a consumer tax on liquor, beer, and wines was res judicata, reasoning that all citizens had
been virtually represented in previous suit); Crain v. St. Francis Levee Dist., 74 S.W.2d 970,
971 (Ark. 1934) (holding that a previously unnamed intervening taxpayer could join a suit as
if he had been named, since the original plaintiff carried out the suit in behalf of all taxpayers
as their representative); Howard-Sevier Road Imp. Dist. No. 1 v. Hunt, 265 S.W. 517, 519-20
(Ark. 1924) (holding that a taxpayer suit challenging the assessment of benefits was res judicata and that the taxpayers had already been represented in a previous case involving the same
cause of action and same subject matter "of common or general interest to many persons").
291 See Cannon v. Nelson, 48 N.W. 1033, 1034 (Iowa 1891) (holding that a ruling against
a county in a matter of public interest was binding on all county inhabitants and that the inhabitant of the county in question was estopped from contesting the sale of a parcel of land);
McEntire v. Williamson, 65 P. 244, 246 (Kan. 1901) (holding that the plaintiff, as a city taxpayer, was in privity with the city officers, and therefore any "litigation, decision, and judgment" was binding on that taxpayer); Hovey v. Shepherd, 147 S.W. 224, 225 (Tex. 1912)
(holding that if the matter adjudicated was in the "interest of the public" then all citizens were
bound by the decision).
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Some held
citizens, 292 or general interest,293 all taxpayers would be bound. 294
that absent taxpayers were bound because such suits were in rem.
Other cases, however, held that the legal rights of taxpayers were "individual" or "several," so that a representative suit was impermissible. For
example, a taxpayer who sought to restrain all tax foreclosure sales in his
school district, on the ground that the tax deficiencies were procured by
fraud and forgery, was refused a representative suit on the ground that taxpayer property was owned "in severalty," and therefore the rights involved
were separate and distinct.29 A suit to void a general levy to aid construction of a railroad was held to involve "several" rights and therefore to be
improper on similar grounds. 296 It is hard to see how the plaintiffs' situations in these cases are any different from ones in which taxpayer suits had
been allowed. Disallowance of a taxpayers' suit, of course, pretermitted the
question of whether such a suit would be binding in a subsequent suit seeking similar relief. In any event, the results of these cases are not an exception to the general rule in taxpayers' suits, but a contradiction of it.
The state decisions, however, increasingly came to allow citizens' and
taxpayers' suits and to address the preclusion problem specifically in terms
of the alignment of interests and adequacy of representation. A leading case
in this vein was Lightle v. Kirby.297 In the original action, Mrs. Lightle, an
292 See People ex rel. Chilcoat v. Harrison, 97 N.E. 1092, 1093 (Ill. 1912) (holding that in
a suit to enforce a public right, all those citizens who constitute the public are bound by a
court's ruling in the suit).
293 See Clark v. Wolf, 29 Iowa 197, 202-04 (1870) (holding that a judgment against a
county is binding by virtue of "common interest" on all citizens thereof, even if they were
never named as defendants in the suit). It should be noted that the court in Adami v. Gercken,
150 N.Y.S. 8, 11 (App. Div. 1914), rejected the notion that absentees are bound in virtue of
the fact that the action is denominated as being in rem.
294 See Greenberg v. City of Chicago, 99 N.E. 1039, 1040-41 (Ill. 1912) (holding that a
previous decision in a suit brought by taxpayers seeking to enforce a public right was binding
on all taxpayers generally, with the question ofjurisdiction "in some respects rest[ing] on the
principles of a proceeding in rem").
295 Newcomb v. Horton, 18 Wis. 566, 569 (1864); see also Barnes v. City of Beloit, 19
Wis. 93, 95 (1865) (holding that multiple lot owners in a city with no common pecuniary interest cannot unite in an action to bar the sale of lots owned by them severally for illegally
assessed taxes). The formula relied on in these decisions is the same as that in Ayres v.
Carver, 58 U.S. 591, 594 (1854), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 238-40, and
finding that the absent parties were not represented by the defendants present because there
was no "interest [n]or estate in common among these several defendants."
296 See Fleming v. Mershon, 36 Iowa 413, 419 (1873) ("Persons charged severally with a
tax have no such common or general interest in resisting its collection as will authorize one to
sue for all."); see also Haese v. Heitzeg, 114 P. 816, 817 (Cal. 1911) (upholding the general
principle that, if a suit is brought by a plaintiff "on behalf of himself and others similarly situated," the judgment is binding only on those of the class who accept representation and join
the suit).
297 108 S.W.2d 896 (Ark. 1937).
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owner of property abutting a state highway within a municipal improvement
district, sued the commissioners of the district to require that state aid be
used to reduce assessments on properties like her own that abut the highway. The suit was brought under a statute providing for tax relief in such
circumstances. A later taxpayer action sought to apply the same state monies to reduce assessments on all lots that were in the same improvement
district.298 Mrs. Lightle intervened in this subsequent action and cited the
earlier decree in her favor to prevent judgment for the larger group of taxpayers in the improvement district. The court held that the taxpayer in the
second action was not bound by the judgment in the first:
There was no community of interests. On the contrary, the interests of the
parties were highly antagonistic. The controversy was between two groups of
property owners, and the relief prayed and granted in the first decree was to the
effect that one group of property owners should be favored and the other exrepcluded. This was not a case in which one group of property owners 2could
99
resent all, because their interests were antagonistic and irreconcilable.

Creditors' bills, as we have seen, were among the longest established
types of representative suits. 30 0 A leading case at the beginning of the
twentieth century was Guffanti v. National Surety Co.3 11 This decision explained that when a debtor's assets were less than the total of the creditors'
claims, a binding class action was not only permitted but was required; otherwise some creditors (the parties) would be paid and others (the absentees)
would not. Some decisions added that a binding decree was also necessary
to protect the defendant debtor from numerous lawsuits. 30 2 Many cases
30 3
used the term "common interest" to describe the position of the creditors.
298

See id. at 896 (explaining that after Mrs. Lightle brought suit against the commission-

ers of the district, other property owners who were not parties brought their own suit against
the commissioners).
299

Id. at 897.

300

See supranotes 72-91 and accompanying text (discussing creditor and legatee bills).

301 90 N.E. 174 (N.Y. 1909); see also Marshall v. Sherman, 42 N.E. 419, 422 (N.Y. 1895)

(holding that a creditor's right of action against the stockholders of a corporation can only be a
suit in equity or by or in behalf of all the creditors against all the stockholders); Schuehle v.
Reiman, 86 N.Y. 270, 273 (1881) (holding that, where creditors' actions pending in two separate tribunals to accomplish the same goal are brought in behalf of others having an interest in
the fund, the proceedings may be consolidated).
302 See, e.g., Kerr v. Blodgett, 48 N.Y. 62, 67 (1871) (explaining that, in suits with numerous plaintiff creditors, "when an order or decree for an accounting is once made... it operates as an interlocutory judgment, in favor of each and every creditor... as effectually as if
he had been named and had appeared as a party"), superceded by statute as stated in In re
Currier, 8 Daiy 119, 120-21 (N.Y. Ct. Com. Pl. 1878).
303 See, e.g., Bouton v. Van Buren, 127 N.E. 477, 478 (N.Y. 1920) (explaining that a
complaint for an accounting against stockholders can only be maintained if the plaintiff is a
representative of a "common or general interest" of the others); Guffanti, 90 N.E. at 176, dis-
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But the court used opposite characterization where the representatives had
not been "fairly selected" 30 4 and where absent class members might not receive "actual and efficient protection." 305 The same analysis was also applied when the question arose after the court rendered a class action judgment, where it appeared that the relief injured absentees while favoring the
representatives. 306 The relationship described as "common interest" may
have come dimly to be recognized as a surrogate for adequacy of represen30 7
tation rather than as a characteristic having independent significance.

cussed supra note 301 and accompanying text (discussing the "community of interest" among
the represented plaintiffs).
304 Leviness v. Consolidated Gas, Elec., Light & Power Co., 80 A. 304, 308 (Md. 1911)
(holding that a preferred stockholder's lien is dischargeable under a court decree passed in a
proceeding in which "fairly selected representatives of that class are made parties"); see also
Hollifield v. Wrightsville & T.R. Co., 27 S.E. 715, 717 (Ga. 1896) (holding that a petition
filed by a stockholder of a company to restrain the company from allowing votes from a second company-to whom the first company allegedly issued some of its capital stock illegaily-cannot be maintained when neither the second company nor its receiver is a named
defendant).
305New York State Rys. v. Security Trust Co., 238 N.Y.S. 354, 361 (Sup. Ct. 1929),
affd, 238 N.Y.S. 887 (App. Div. 1930); see also City of Detroit v. Detroit United Rys., 197
N.W. 697, 703 (Mich. 1924) (explaining that class members "are supposed to... have one
common right or one common interest, the operation and protection of which will be for the
common benefit of all" (citation omitted)); cf Davis v. Peabody, 49 N.E. 750, 751 (Mass.
1898) (holding that, if stockholders with like interests are too numerous to join, then enough
of them to have the class's interests represented should be made parties).
306 See Cody Trust Co. v. Hotel Clayton Co., 12 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ill. App. Ct. 1937) (finding it sufficient to make properly represented absentees parties to a suit for partial foreclosure
of a trust deed and holding that joinder was not necessary); Wiggins v. Wagley, 190 S.W. 736,
738 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916, no writ) (holding that ajunior lienholder was not bound by foreclosure to which he was not a party); cf Sherman v. International Life Ins. Co., 236 S.W. 634,
641 (Mo. 1921) (en banc), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 346 (1923) (holding that, when reorganization certificate holders asked the lower court to approve their plan for rehabilitating the company, and only acted in their own self interest, other non-consenting certificate holders were
not represented).
307See, e.g., Groves v. Farmers State Bank, 12 N.E.2d 618, 624 (Ill. 1938) (holding that,
where a complainant has the right to represent his class, other class members who have
"common rights" are bound by the results of the case); Southern Ornamental Iron Works v.
Morrow, 101 S.W.2d 336, 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937, no writ) (holding that a complete and
final judgment by the district court, that subscribers to an association were liable to the receiver, was not subject to a collateral attack); Dewey v. Saint Albans Trust Co., 12 A. 224,
229 (Vt. 1888) (holding that a court's decision as to whether many depositors get preference
over other creditors from an insolvent bank binds the whole class).
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C. Attempts ofSynthesis
The concept of a representative suit, particularly its effects on absen308
tees, thus remained for a century about as uncertain as Story had found it.
Was the representative suit merely a contrivance to evade the rigors of the
Necessary Party Rule, whereby it was pretended that all "numerous parties"
were before the court through a representative, but wherein the judgment
actually determined only the rights of those who appeared? Was the representative suit something more than this, a device for allowing supplemental
joinder of additional claimants after liability had been determined-where
the absentees could "come in under the decree" 3 09 -achieving results that
later became possible with abolition of the "mutuality rule"?3 10 Or did the
representative suit also bind absentees when the judgment was adverse to
the class, at least in some types of cases?
Whatever answers might be given to these questions, they can all be
supported by many decisions and even more dicta. But how can the cases
be reconciled?
Two leading commentators, Pomeroy writing in 1881 and Street writing
in 1909, made attempts at synthesis. Pomeroy, in his Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence,stated the problem in terms of the conditions required for exercise of equity jurisdiction in bills of peace. 1 Thinking of representative
suits in terms of bills of peace was the most general way of formulating the
problem, for the predicate of a bill of peace is simply that "numerous bod-

303 See supra notes 125-48 and accompanying text (discussing Story's creation of class
suits in his Commentarieson EquityPleadings,and his approach to class suits as an exception
to the Necessary Parties Rule).
309STORY, supranote 74, at 96.
310 The "mutuality rule" permitted a litigant to claim the benefit of preclusion by judgment only if, had the judgment gone the other way, he would have suffered the burden of an
adverse judgment. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of lll. Found., 402 U.S. 313,
317-50 (1971) (providing an historical analysis of the mutuality rule since its adoption in Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936), then overruling that case to the extent that it precluded
an estoppel plea by a patent infringement defendant). When the mutuality rule does not stand
in the way, ajudgment in favor of one litigant can be used by another as a basis for precluding
the losing party from relitigating issues resolved in the first suit. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332-33 (1979) (holding that, where a party had a "'full and fair'
opportunity to litigate [its] claims in the [previous] action, the contemporary law of collateral
estoppel leads inescapably to the conclusion that [the party is] collaterally estopped from relitigating the [issue]"). Upon abrogation of the mutuality rule, any case in which one of several
claimants litigates successfully, is in effect potentially a representative suit as to the common
issues. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS §§ 28, 29 (1982) (listing exceptions in
which the relitigation of an issue in a subsequent action is not precluded).
311 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 255, 267-69,
292-95 (San Francisco, A.L. Bancroft & Co. 1881).
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ies" are involved who otherwise may generate multiple litigation. 312 The
bill of peace requires only that there be "numerous bodies" involved in
similar issues, without regard to whatever might be the connections between
the parties or the relative homogeneity of their interests. Thus, if bills of
peace would lie simply where there are "numerous bodies" having controversies that involved substantial common issues, and if the decree in such a
case bound absentees, then the scope of the binding representative suit was
broad indeed.3 13
Pomeroy argued that, while early English cases seeking "technical bills
of peace" may have required "privity," as of his time:
[T]he weight of authority is simply overwhelming that the jurisdiction may and
should be exercised either on behalf of a numerous body of separate claimants
against a single party, or on behalf of a single party against such a numerous
body, although there is no "common title," nor "community of right," or of
"interest in the subject-matter"... but where there is and because there is
merely a community of interest among them in the 3 1uestions of law and
fact... or in the kind and form of relief demanded ....
Concerning a suit by a plaintiff class, Pomeroy stated that such a suit
could properly be framed where "a number of persons have separate and
distinct interests, but still united by some common tie, against one deterbe enforced... by one suing
mined party, and these interests may perhaps
315
others."
the
all
and
himself
on behalf of
A defendant class suit could properly be framed where "[o]ne determined party has a general right against a number of persons, common to all
in some of its features, but still affecting each individually and only with re-

312

Id. §268, at 292.

a detailed description of the controversy about bills of peace, see ZECHARIAH
170-98 (1953), providing an historical review of "the
war which has raged for the past half century between the advocates of the liberal
view ...and the restricted view (of multiplicity]" and identifying Pomeroy with the former,
and the followers of the Tribette case with the latter.
314 POMEROY, supra note 311, § 269, at 293. Pomeroy continues in even more emphatic
terms: "In a majority of the decided cases, this community of interest... has originated from
the fact that the separate claims ... arose by means of the same unauthorized, unlawful, or
illegal act or proceeding. Even this external feature of unity, however, has not always existed,
and is not deemed essential." Id. It should be remembered that Pomeroy had strong support
for such a broad and simple definition of a class suit. The typical Code provision read as follows: "[ ]hen the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when
the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or
more may sue or defend for the benefit of all." CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 382 (Deering 1931)
(originally enacted Mar. 11, 1872).
315 POMEROY, supra note 311, § 255, at 267.
313 For

CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY
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spect to his separate, distinct interests. 316 Pomeroy described as follows
the analytic problem posed by the relevant cases:
Is it necessary that the common bond, element, or feature should inhere in the
very rights, interests, or claims themselves which subsist between the body of
persons on the one side, and the single party on the other, and should affect the
nature and form of those rights... to such an extent that they create some
positive and recognized existing legal relation or privity between the individual
members of the group... ? Or, is it enough that the common bond or element
consists solely in the fact that all the rights.., have arisen from the same
source... event, or... transaction, and in the fact that they all involve and
of law... ?
depend upon similar questions of fact, and the same questions
317
This question lies at the foundation of the whole discussion.
Pomeroy answered the question posed by affirming the second of these
alternatives. Thus, he would have allowed and contended that the decisions
numerous parties where
permitted a class suit in all situations involving
318
modem procedure authorized permissive joinder.
Notably, in the foregoing discussion from his treatise on equity jurisprudence, Pomeroy was addressing the problem of joinder rather than res
judicata. He made no mention of Equity Rule 48, with its reservation of the
rights of absentees, and does not appear to have addressed the res judicata
effect of the judgment in a class action. Moreover, his discussion in another
treatise shows that Pomeroy evidently contemplated that the absent parties
ordinarily would come in or be brought in as parties before judgment.319
At any rate, only in this latter treatise did Pomeroy address the problem
of preclusion of absentees. There he said that the problem could arise in
two contexts. The first was where the absentee sought the benefit of a decree in favor of the class:
[T]he question may be, whether this individual, as against the defendants in the
action, and perhaps as against those who were the original plaintiffs, or who
of the recovery, to
made themselves such, is entitled to the immediate benefits
3
a share in the relief granted by the court in its decree. 20

Id. at 268.
IId. at 268-69.
31 See FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a) ("A party asserting a claim to relief as an original
316

claim... may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims.., as the
party has against an opposing party.").
319 See JOHN NORTON POMEROY, REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS BY THE CIVIL
ACTION ACCORDING TO THE REFORMED AMERICAN PROCEDURE 460 (John Norton Pomeroy,
Jr. ed., 3d ed., Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1894) ("It is optional with [members of the represented class] whether they will become parties or not...
320 Id. at461.
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Pomeroy concluded that some affirmative act may be necessary for the
absentee to take advantage of the decree, that the absentee must also be
willing to contribute to the expenses of the suit, and that it will often be necessary for each absentee to join as a party.321 The cases upon which
Pomeroy draws make clear that he is referring to practice in creditors'
bills.322
The second context addressed by Pomeroy involved preclusion of absentees by a decree adverse to the class: "[T]he question may be whether
the specified individual who is one of those represented by the actual plaintiff, is concluded and bound by the judgment rendered in the action. 323
Pomeroy addressed this problem only in a cursory fashion, ignoring the
confusion in the precedents, while evidently convinced that an absentee
could not be bound. He concluded:
Of course he is not bound unless he was practically a party to the proceeding;
the plainest principles of common justice refuse to hold a man concluded if he

has not had "a day in court."... If the subsequent proceeding is a hostile one
against the person, the former adjudication cannot be relied upon as an estoppel or as conclusive, unless he had affirmatively taken the steps which made
him an actual party... or unless, after having had notice, and an opportunity
do so.324
of coming in... he had refused or neglected to

This conclusion obviously ignored cases such as Smith v. Swormstedt,
holding or strongly stating that absentees were bound under some circumstances. 325 To ignore such cases was at least one way, perhaps the only
way, to cope with the contradictions in the decisions.
The other prominent commentator addressing the subject was Thomas
Atkins Street in his 1909 treatise, Federal Equity Practice.32 6 Street's
analysis is not as well documented as Pomeroy's, and for that matter, not as
well documented as Story's. Nevertheless, his approach is more analytic
and certainly more candid so far as the waverings of doctrine are concerned.
321 See id.

322See id. at 460 n.3, 463 n.1, the latter stating:

See, on this subject, Story's Eq. P1. §§ 99, 196; David v. Frowd, I Myl. & K.
200 [39 Eng. Rep. 657 (Ch. 1833)]; Gillespie v. Alexander, 3 Russ. 130 [38 Eng.
Rep. 525 (Ch. 1827)]; Farrell v. Smith, 2 Ball & B. 337 [(Ir. H. Ct. 1813)].. ..The
equity practice in this class of cases is, upon rendering the interlocutory decree, to
advertise for all the represented persons to appear before a master... and establish
their claims ....
323 Id. at 461-62.
324 Id. at 462.
325See supra text accompanying notes 223, 226-28, 237-38 (discussing the holding in
Smith v. Swormstedt that when a class suit is allowed as an exception to the Necessary Parties
Rule, the decree is binding on all absentees).
326 1 THOMAs ATKINS STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY PRACTICE 336-54 (1909).
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Street's attempt to establish a critical and logical structure added a further
conceptual distinction to those laid down by Story. This distinction was
later absorbed in the formulation of Federal Rule 23.327
In Street's treatise we find the first articulation of a distinction between
"true" class suits and "spurious" class suits. Under the sectional heading
"True Class Suit Concerns Property," Street says the following:
[S]uits brought by or against numerous defendants are of two radically different types. In the first type, which is that of the true class suit, it will be found
or poperty over which the court can
that the subject-matter of the suit is a fund....
jurisdiction
effective
an
acquire
and does

says that "Smith v. Swormstedt is a
In a footnote to this statement, Street 329
good illustration of this class of cases."

In the immediately following section entitled "Spurious Class Suit
Founded on Personal Liability," Street says:
In the other type of cases, the suit is not concerned with a fund or property at
all, but with a personal liability. Here the suit is not a class suit in any proper
sense. We may call it a spurious class suit. Illustrations of this
type.., are.., suits by or against involuntary associations.., or against numerous defendants to enjoin a threatened injury. Suits for injunction against
330
strikes... fall within this class ....

In a footnote to this statement, Street cites American Steel & Wire Co. v.
& Die Makers' Unions Nos. 1 & 3 and a case that relied on
Wire Drawers'
33 1

that decision.

Having said this, Street goes on to deal with the binding effect of the
decree in a class suit. Under the heading "Effect of Decree in Class Suits
under English Practice" he says:
It has always been understood in the English chancery, and apparently in
the equity courts of this country, that the decree in class suits is binding on all
the persons in interest ....The true class suit in fact supplies an instance of
virtual representation. When the court once gets jurisdiction over the subjectmatter, it will proceed to clean up every element of the controversy ....
Those who are represented are concluded in the same
332 degree and to the same
extent as are those who are actually before the court.

321FED. R
328

329
330

Civ. P. 23.

Id. § 547, at 342.
Id. § 547, at 342 n.7 (citation omitted).
Id. § 548, at 342-43.

...
90 F. 598 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1898), discussed supra at notes 254, 258-60 and accompanying text, and relied upon in Evenson v. Spaulding, 150 F. 517 (9th Cir. 1907).
332 STREET, supra note 326, § 549, at 343.
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Although Street is not entirely clear as to whether this binding effect obtains
only in "true" class suits, this is distinctly the implication. If so, he is to be
taken as saying that there are "true" class suits and "spurious" class suits;
that "true" class suits involve numerous claimants to a fund; and that the decree in such cases, and only in such cases, is binding upon the absentees.
All other so-called representative suits are "spurious."
That this is his meaning is quite clear from his further discussion.
Turning to Equity Rule 48, Street says:
The final clause in equity rule 48 is to the effect that "the decree shall be
without prejudice to the rights and claims of all the absent parties." Just what
may be the meaning of this language is not very clear ....

But... taken333literally, this closing reservation is inconsistent with the

English practice.

He asks, "But what have the federal courts, and especially the supreme
court, done with this reservation or proviso in equity rule 48?' 334 He then
responds:
[Tihe supreme court has done the only thing that could properly be
done,. . . namely, it has, in true class suits, ignored the reservation ....
It results then that, as regards true class suits, the reservation in equity rule
48 cannot be given literal effect ....
But... the reservation of the equity rule is applicable in its full and literal

sense... [in] the spurious class suit, the
335suit brought by or against numerous

parties in respect of a personal liability.

Considering the distinctions between in rem and in personam proceedings that have grown up in other areas of the law, 336 and considering that it
had come to be held that absentee creditors were bound by the distribution
decree in a creditors' bill, 337 it is not surprising that Street's formulation of
the preclusion rule in class actions was based upon the concept of a "fund."
It is surprising, however, that he thought preclusion arose only in "fund"
cases, a category that excludes some of the "association" cases.338 Of all the
types of class suits, those involving the relationship of "association" had the

133Id. § 550,

at 344.

334Id. § 551, at 344.
331Id. §§ 551-52, at 344-45.

See, e.g., Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry., 130 U.S. 559, 563-64 (1889) (holding that in an
in rem proceeding where a railroad condemned the land owned by a nonresident, publication
of the condemnation, although not actual notice, is sufficient).
337See In re Reese, 107 F. 942, 945-46 (8th Cir. 1901) (holding parties liable for willfully
violating an injunction though they had not been party to the injunction at its creation).
338 See sources cited supra notes 49, 111-16, 222-32 and accompanying text.
336
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firmest basis for binding absent members, 39as is demonstrated notably by the
aforementioned statement in Swormstedt.
Be that as it may, Street's analysis attempted to link the preclusive effect of a class suit decree to a typology he sought to impose on the cases.
On one hand, according to Street, the type of class suit involving a "fund"
was a "true" class suit in which the decree bound absentees. On the other
hand, a class suit not involving a "fund" was a "spurious" class suit in
which the decree did not bind absentees. This synthesis ignored the fact that
in some leading cases which could be said to involve a fund, the decree had
been held not binding on absentees, 34 and that the decree had been held
binding in some leading cases that did not involve a fund.341
Beyond relying on his typology of class suits to differentiate binding effects of the decree, Street attempted to explain class suit preclusion under
"English Practice" on the basis of adequacy of representation:
It is obvious that the court, before proceeding against parties who are such by
representation only, will take care to see that all are properly and fairly represented. This has always been fully insisted on .... The jurisdiction of the
court... enables the court to determine the rights of3 all
42 persons ... provided
court.
only they are sufficiently represented before the

If we juxtapose Pomeroy and Street, we see that both had difficulty
with the problem of preclusion, and that each endeavored to establish criteria for class suit preclusion in terms of the type of case. In terms of representative and preclusive actions, Street invented the terms "true" and "spurious," which those already familiar with the subject know came to have a
later life in class suit doctrine. 343 But neither Pomeroy nor Street could satisfactorily explain the cases.
D. The 1912 Revision of the FederalEquity Rules
In 1912, the Federal Equity Rules were revised. The revision, which
also renumbered the Rules, provided for class actions in Rule 38 as follows:
"9 57 U.S. 288, 302 (1853) (establishing that suits can be filed against representatives of
associations in behalf of the associations themselves "without requiring joinder of all the association's members").
340 See, e.g., McArthur v. Scott, 113 U.S. 340, 394-95 (1885) (stating that a "decree must
be without prejudice to the rights of those who are not made parties, and who do not come in
before the decree").
341 See, e.g., In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548, 554 (1897) (asserting that actual notice of the
injunction is insufficient to bind absentees who were not served with process, subpoena, or the
injunction itself).
342 STREET, supra note 326, § 549, at 343.
343 See FED. R CiV. P. 23 (as adopted in 1938); see also 2 JAMES WM. MOORE & JOSEPH
FRiEDMAN, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.07 (1938).
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"When the question is one of common or general interest to many persons
constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them
all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole."3 44 This
language substantially tracked old Rule 48 with one crucial change-the
reservation of absentees' rights in old Equity Rule 48 was excised in the
new version.
There appears to be very little legislative history of this revision. The
only legislative history we have found explains that the new rule was based
on the then New York Code of Civil Procedure Section 448, which was essentially the same as the original provision.345 That section permitted class
suits on the basis of a "common question." 346 In a monograph by Hopkins
concerning the 1912 revision, it was explained that the reservation of the
rights of absent class members had been deleted from old Equity Rule 48
because "inevery true 'class suit' the decree is necessarily binding upon all
parties included in the decree. ' 347 Hopkins cited the recommendation of the
Bar Committee of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit, along
with the decisions in Coann348 and American Steel & Wire Co.,3 49 as
authority for his interpretation of the history of the revision embodied in
Rule 38.350
If reliance was placed on Coann and American Steel & Wire in the revision of Rule 38, the revised rule poses interesting problems of interpretation. The court in Coann flatly held that absentees were not precluded,
while the court in American Steel & Wire held that the reservation in old
Equity Rule 48 prevented preclusion of absent class members unless they
were joined in supplemental proceedings. Reference to these cases by the
revisers drafting the 1912 Rules thus appears to imply that the language of
old Equity Rule 48 of itself did not prevent preclusion of absent class members. This could be responsive to the fact that Smith v. Swormstedt stood for
the proposition that absentees could be bound notwithstanding the language
344RULES OF PRACTICE FOR THE COURTS OF EQUITY OF THE UNITED STATES Rule 38, at
11, reprintedin 226 U.S. 627, 659 (1912) (repealed 1938).
341See N.Y. CODE Civ. PROC. § 448 (Gilbert's ed. 1910).
And where the question is one of a common or general interest of many persons;
or where the persons, who might be made parties are very numerous, and it may be
impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for
the benefit of all.
Id.
346 Compare the substantially similar California version, quoted supra at note 314.
347JAMES LOvE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 240 (Byron F. Babbitt ed.,
8th ed. 1933) (citation omitted).
34114 F. 4 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1882).
349 90 F. 598 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1898).
350 HOPKINS, supra note 347, at 240.
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of the Equity Rule. 351 This in turn implies a supposition by the revisers that
the binding effect of a class suit decree depends on something outside the
Equity Rule, and this could be the thought underlying the 1912 revision.
Such a resolution of the language of the rule, however, did not address the
rest of the problem-while new Equity Rule 38 no longer prevented preclusion of absentees, did the 1912 revision permit the decree in a class suit to
be binding on absentees in every case? If so, why? If not, what was the
distinction between suits in which absentees were bound and those in which
they were not? Some kind of answer was yet to be worked out.
IV. FROM BEN-HUR TO HANSBERRY
353
352
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble and Hansberry v. Lee toclass suit,
gether are taken to stand for the proposition that a judgment in a 354
Hansclass.
the
of
members
whether favorable or adverse, binds absent
berry states the added requirement that the class be adequately represented
and that it cannot be adequately represented by spokespersons who have
interests in conflict with those whom they purport to represent. The proposition that absentees can be bound is presupposed, however, in both decisions. The doctrinal significance of these two cases derives from their
breadth of language, not from their facts or their analyses. Hansberryon its
facts did not concern a prior class suit as conventionally defined. In any
event, the Court in Hansberryheld that the prior adverse judgment, alleged
to be binding, lacked conclusive effect because the absentees' rights had not
been adequately represented. Thus, it is not a holding that a class suit can
bind absentees. Ben-Hur indeed meant that absentee members of a class
were bound by a prior judgment, but the issue before the Court was one of

351 57 U.S. 288, 302 (1853) (asserting that the decree in a class suit was binding on ab-

sentee parties as long as the representatives fairly represented the interests of the absentee
parties).
312 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
313 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
'm See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS § 41, at 393 (1982) (stating that a person
represented by a party to an action is bound by the judgment as though he were a party to the
action himself); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 16.8, at 756 (1985)
(stating that "if all the requirements and prerequisites for a class action have been satisfied, the
resulting decree will be binding on all class members whether they actually participated in the
case or not"); see also Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 261-62 (1917)
(underscoring the importance of the 1912 revision). In Hitchman, the Supreme Court held
that an absentee class member could not be bound inasmuch as the case had been decided under the old Equity Rule 48. Cf Arthur John Keeffe et al., Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL
L.Q. 327, 337-39 (1948) (arguing that after Hansberryv. Lee, it is not clear that judgments in
a class suit bind absent members of the class and recommending a requirement that notice be
given to all members of the class for judgments to bind absent members).
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jurisdiction rather than res judicata. The fact that Ben-Hur involved a jurisdictional issue may explain why the Court held that the earlier decree was
binding but failed to give attention to the character of the relationships
among the members of the class before it.355 In any event, the opinion in
Ben-Hur only hints at a rationale for binding the absentees and, indeed, alludes to several different rationales.
A. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble
The Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur was a fraternal benefit association, a
distinctive kind of mutual life insurance company, organized under the laws
of Indiana. The facts of the case are presented in the Supreme Court's
356
opinion as follows.
The Tribe had been formed years before with the purpose of providing
death benefits to beneficiaries from a fund of assessments paid by members.
Over time, the membership grew older, and assessments accelerated while
membership stagnated-young potential members were unwilling to join
only to pay benefits to widows of their elders. In 1908 the Tribe, claiming
imminent bankruptcy, divided its membership into two classes, thereby cre35 7
ating a new class of membership amounting to a distinct association.
Present members of the Tribe would continue as Class A, but all future
members would belong to Class B. The two classes would pay for their life
insurance at different rates, their "mortuary funds" would be kept separate,
and benefits to members of each class would be paid only out of the funds
of that class. Members of Class A were authorized to transfer to Class B,
but only if they agreed to pay the Class B rate of assessments.358
In 1913, five years after the reorganization was effected, George Balme,
a citizen of Kentucky, and 523 other plaintiffs who lived outside of Indiana-all of them being members of the association or their beneficiariesbrought a class action suit under federal diversity jurisdiction in the United
States District Court for Indiana. Balme's class suit, in behalf of the mem35 See FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 567 (3d ed.
1985) (noting the Court's inattention to the character of the relationship between class members in Ben-Hur, and placing the case's holding in historical context).
356 See Ben-Hur, 255 U.S. at 357-63. The details of the reorganization, as described in

another suit attacking the reorganization, are slightly different. See Case v. Supreme Tribe of
Ben Hur, 184 N.W. 75,76-77 (Neb. 1921) (noting that members transferring from Class A to
Class B were not required to pass medical examinations as if they were new members). The
discrepancies, however, appear unimportant.

317 See Ben-Hur, 255 U.S. at 358 (stating that the lower court established the Tribe's right
to create a new class of benefit holders with a "seperate [sic] and distinct" mortuary find).
358 See id. (establishing that the lower court affirmed the right of the Tribe to authorize
members of Class A to transfer to Class B).
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bers remaining in Class A, challenged the Tribe's reorganization on the
ground that it was ultra vires and in violation of vested contract rights. The
decree in the ensuing litigation sustained the reorganization, that is, was adverse to the plaintiff class. Thereafter, in 1919, Aurelia Cauble and certain
other members of Class A, this time all citizens of Indiana, brought another
class suit in Indiana state courts, again challenging the same reorganization.
Appreciation of the distinctive character of fraternal benefit associations
reveals what the lawsuits were about and what Ben-Hur does-and does
not-have to say about the res judicata effects of class suits generally. Fraternal benefits were different from conventional life insurance companies, in
that by statute they were "required to make sufficient assessments at the
rates named in their certificates to meet death losses as they occur[red]," but
they were not required to accumulate funds beyond those required to pay
current losses, and "such associations [would] not be considered insolvent
unless the mortuary funds in the hands of the supreme officers [were] less
359 They were
than the death claims outstanding against the association."
meant to be "the poor man's life insurance companies, [furnishing] a cheap
and simple substitute for life insurance. ' 360 The problem was that fraternal
benefit associations furnished insurance too cheaply, for they failed to calculate their costs of insurance correctly.3 61 It did not seem important for
them to do so, because it simply was assumed that their memberships would
continue to regenerate-as present members grew older, younger members
would join, leaving the average age and the average rate of mortality unchanged.362 If death losses were higher than expected, then assessments
would be increased to meet them.

359 IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5043, 5044 (Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1908).
360 1 FREDERICK H. BACON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LIFE AND ACCIDENT
INSURANCE § 12 (4th ed. 1917).

Benefits and assessments are not mentioned in Ben-Hur. Another litigation concerning the Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur, Case v. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur, 184 N.W. 75, 75-76
(Neb. 1921), explains the problem. When Benjamin Case joined the Tribe in 1901 at age 54,
he obtained a $500 benefit certificate and was assessed one dollar each month (or $12 each
year). If he lived to age 75 he would have paid in only $252, half the value of his certificate.
For the same one dollar a month, someone joining the Tribe in 1901 between the ages of 18
and 25 received a $1500 benefit certificate. By the time such a person reached 75, he would
have paid in between $600 and $684, or 40 to 45% of the value of the certificate. Since the
assessments were used to pay current death losses, interest did not accrue on them. See id.
The resemblance to the financing of our federal social security system may be noted.
362 See, e.g., Tusant v. Grand Lodge AOUV, 163 N.W. 690, 697 (Iowa 1917) (holding
that a statutory fraternal mutual benefit association possessed no power, after its organization,
incorporation, and receipt of members, to change the nature of its insurance without consent
of those members adversely affected, voiding a later by-law that created two classes of membership as legally unreasonable).
361
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Every mutual benefit association was thus a kind of Ponzi scheme that
could continue in apparent financial health only so long as sufficient numbers of new members continued to join. When the associations stopped
adding new members the hard fact of arithmetic confronted them:
If one hundred men mutually agree to pay each other $1,000 at death, the
$100,000 must be gathered from the promisors if all are to be paid. Adding a
member to the one hundred does not change the situation, for with each additional member there comes an additional obligation to pay $1,000 to his beneficiaries. While the one hundred and first man mutually agrees to help pay the
death losses of the one hundred, each of the one hundred has his obligations
increased by the addition of such new member, and if there be not contributed
enough to pay all, it but postpones the evil day to add to the membership. The
theory for so many years adopted by fraternal benefit associations, that the society would continue solvent indefinitely by the addition of new blood, is as
fallacious as that of the merchant who thought 363
he could succeed by selling
goods below cost if he only sold enough of them.
In undertaking the 1908 reorganization, the officers of the Supreme

Tribe of Ben-Hur had confronted this fact. The reorganization isolated the
existing members in Class A. Insurance for this group ceased to be inexpensive because it would no longer be subsidized by new members who
were put in Class B. The lawsuits by Balme and Cauble-the litigants
whose relationship was in issue in the Ben-Hur case before the Supreme

Court-were only two in a flood of such suits against various fraternal
benefit associations. These suits typically challenged the right of the asso-

ciations to raise assessments to pay death benefits as their memberships
grew older and to cancel certificates when members failed to pay the increased assessments. The apparent unfairness of the increases, together
with the sheer numbers of members involved, virtually assured courts that
the same issues would be litigated and relitigated. As a result, courts were
obliged to decide whether a prior judgment in a class suit barred a later suit
by someone not actually a party to the judgment.
This was the issue in Ben-Hur-whether the prior decree sustaining the
reorganization was binding on members who had not participated, by intervention or otherwise, in the litigation leading to that decree. The Court in
The essential principle upon which [such] associations ... [are] based is that
there will be a constant invigoration of the association by the accession of new
members; ... and that every member of the association will be given the benefit of
the average mortality of the entire membership in force at the last death prior to an
assessment, resulting from this constant addition of new members.
Id. at 697 (quoting Benjamin v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 79 P. 517, 520 (Cal. 1905)).
The Supreme Court of Iowa was unable to see why an association operating on that principle
"should not have prospered indefinitely." Id.at 695.
363 Jenkins v. Talbot, 170 N.E. 735, 745-46 (Il1. 1930), appeal dismissed sub nom.
McKissick v. Talbot, 283 U.S. 782 (1931).
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Ben-Hur announced that "the decree when rendered must bind all of the
,364
In its analysis, the Court cited Smith v.
class properly represented."
Swormstedt, which, we have seen, was a joinder case and not a res judicata

'64 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921). In its description of the original proceedings, the Supreme
Court stated that the ancillary bill alleged that the questions decided in the original decree determined the following:
(1) The right of the Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur to create a new class of benefit
certificate holders known as Class B. (The membership in such society up to July 1,
1908, having been in the class thereafter to be designated as Class A.) (2) The right
of the society to determine that all benefit certificates issued after July 1, 1908,
should be Class B certificates, and that no Class A certificates should be issued after
that date, and no new members taken into Class A, from that time. (3) The right of
the Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur to require members of Class B to pay different rates
for their insurance from members of Class A. (4) The right of the Supreme Tribe of
Ben-Hur to require that the mortuary funds of the two classes be kept separate and
distinct, and that the death losses occurring therein, should be paid out of the funds
of each class respectively. (5) The right of the Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur to
authorize members of Class A to transfer, upon a written application therefor to
Class B, and to take with them into Class B their interest in the mortuary, and other
funds, of the society, created, or arising prior to July 1, 1908, and requiring the Class
B members to pay a monthly payment and rate in excess of that paid by Class A
members. (6) The right of the Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur to require members remaining in Class A, and not transferring to Class B, to pay a sufficient number of
monthly payments, or assessments, to meet the death losses in Class A. (7) The
right of the Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur to use the expense fund of the society for the
purpose of creating Class B, and induce Class A members to transfer to Class B, and
to secure new members in Class B. (8) Whether the Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur had
used the expense fund in a manner justified by its constitutional by-laws and a general examination of expenditures which had been made by that society, out of its expense fund, and the purpose for which these expenditures had been made, and
whether any of them were made in violation of the rights of Class A members. (9)
The right of the Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur to use its expense fund, including all
questions as to whether payments made out of it were equitable and just, or inequitable, wrongful and unlawful; and the question of whether the maintenance of a general expense fund, and the payments of the entire expenses of the society therefrom,
was fair, just and legal. (10) Whether the Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur had wrongfully, or unlawfully inaugurated a campaign to persuade and induce the members of
the society belonging to Class A to give up their certificates in Class A, and to apply
for and procure membership and certificates in Class B; or whether the action of the
society, and its officer in that connection, was rightful, just and equitable. (11) The
question of whether the rates in Class A, in effect prior to July 1, 1908, were adequate, or inadequate, or whether they were sufficient to provide for the current death
losses in Class A, and the expenses of the society; or whether it was necessary, in
order to prevent the insolvency of the Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur, to create a new
class, and induce the members of the old class, in so far as it was possible to induce
them, to transfer to the new class, and the right of the society to take all action necessary for this purpose.
Id. at 358-59.
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366
case.365 The Ben-Hur Court also cited a leading creditors' bill decision,
in which the claiming creditors had intervened. The difference is notable
because intervention involves actual participation, not vicarious representation, and hence the case did not present the question of preclusion against
absentees in its discussion of equity jurisdiction. In this discussion, the BenHur Court cited Street's treatise on federal equity practice. 367 Finally, the
Court cited two decisions that involved the preclusive effects of class suit
decrees in fraternal benefit cases-Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum
v. Green368 and Hart(ordLife Ins. Co. v. !bs,36 9 both decided six years earlier. In these cases, the Supreme Court indeed held squarely that absent
members of the class were bound by an adverse judgment in a prior class
3 70
The Court did so, however, on grounds intimately dependent on, if
suit.
not peculiar to, the relationships involved in fraternal benefit associations.
The facts of Green and lbs did not support the expansive language of the
Court's opinion in Ben-Hur.
In Green, the certificate of a member of a fraternal benefit association
was canceled when he refused to pay increased assessments levied against
him because of an increase in death losses. He sued the association, claiming that the increased assessments had been unwarranted and the cancellation invalid.3 7' lbs involved a similar situation, except that the plaintiff was
the beneficiary under a canceled certificate, and the defendant was a life insurance company with a "mutual assessment plan" rather than, strictly
speaking, a fraternal benefit association. 372 In both cases, defendants answered that the increased assessments had been upheld in earlier class suits
filed in their respective states of incorporation and that plaintiffs were

365

See id. at 363 (citing Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 302, 16 How. 307, 322

(1853)) (relying on Smith v. Swormstedt for the proposition that "[c]lass suits have long been
recognized in federal jurisprudence").
366See id. at 365 (citing Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61, 64 (1885)) (holding that the
intervention of the co-complainants who were creditors from the same state as the defendants
did not oust the jurisdiction of the federal court).
367 See id. at 366 (citing STREET, supra note 326, § 549, at 343, discussed supra notes
326-30, 332-35 and accompanying text) (explaining Street's distinction between "true" and
"spurious" class suits and his implication that prior class suit judgments should have a binding
effect on absentees only in the "true" class suit situations).
36' 237 U.S. 531 (1915).
369 237 U.S. 662 (1915).
"0 See Ibs, 237 U.S. at 672 ("The decree in such a suit [one with absent class members
joined by a common interest] would be binding upon all [the members of the class]."); Green,
237 U.S. at 543-44 (explaining that the same doctrines that bind absent stockholders under a
decree against a corporation bind the class members at issue in this case).
171See Green, 237 U.S. at 537 ("Green ...commenced... assailing the validity of the
increase in the rate of assessment.").
372 See Ibs, 237 U.S. at 665.
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bound by those judgments. The plaintiffs insisted that they could not be
bound because they had not been parties to the earlier suits. The Supreme
Court373disagreed in both cases, holding that the prior judgments were conclusive.
The crucial point in Green appeared to be that the members of a fraternal benefit association authorized the association's officers to determine the
rates at which members would be assessed, and thus, the members were
bound to pay whatever assessments were levied so long as the assessments
did not exceed the power of the association. The Court, applying conventional corporate law doctrine, held that only a court of the state in which the
organization was incorporated could decide internal management issues
such as the validity of the challenged assessments. 374 A decree in such a
suit bound all of the corporation's members by virtue of375the corporation's
right to stand in judgment for its members on such issues.
The Court's application of traditional corporation law to fraternal benefit associations obscured a crucial difference between the two kinds of organizations. The typical corporation case involved a conflict between
creditors, on the one hand, and the corporation on the other. In the typical
fraternal benefit case, by contrast, members of the corporation were contesting actions of their own officers. To hold that the corporation could represent its members in the latter situation was to elevate form over substance
and required an almost willful denial of the serious problems of intragroup
conflicts of interests.
In Ibs, the members of the company's mutual assessment plan were not
actually members of the corporation, so the Court was obliged to go further
to impose preclusion. It was clear to the Court that, as in Green, the law of
the state in which the company was incorporated should govern the dis373See Ibs, 237 U.S. at 672-73 (holding that a prior decree in an insurance company case
was conclusive in a subsequent proceeding); Green, 237 U.S. at 543-44 (holding that similar
prior judgments would be conclusive in the context of corporation law, that if corporate law
doctrine was applicable it would be conclusive in this case, and that the corporate law doctrine
was applicable).
374The Court argued that to hold otherwise would risk the destruction of fraternal benefit
associations, because "an assessment which was one thing in one State and another in another,
and a fund which was distributed by one rule in one State and by a different rule somewhere
else, would in practical effect amount to no assessment and no substantial sum to be distributed.' Green, 237 U.S. at 542; cf.Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S.
586, 625 (1947) (holding that the Constitution required a state to give full faith and credit to
the public acts of another state under which a fraternal benefit society was incorporated and to
respect the constraints of the society's constitution within the state of incorporation).
311See Green, 237 U.S. at 543-44 ("[A] decree against the corporation... binds the
stockholder although he be not a party in a personal sense, because by virtue of his subscription to stock there was conferred on the corporation the authority to stand in judgment for the
subscriber as to... general questions.").
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pute,3 76 but a different analysis was required on the issue of the prior judgment's preclusive effect. The lbs Court, citing Swormstedt, held that the
plaintiff was bound by the prior class suit judgment because the class representatives "had an interest that was, in fact, similar to that of the other
members of the377class, and that it was impracticable for all concerned to be
made parties."
Aside from the fact that Swormstedt was a joinder and a res judicata
case, the assumption of common interest among the class members was
much more plausible in Swormstedt than in lbs. In Swormstedt, there were
two classes with clearly conflicting interests, each of which constituted a
378
In Tbs, there was a preexisting association, but it
preexisting association.
was clear that its members did not have common interests in the disputed
matter. Otherwise, there would have been no lawsuit. The Court never
considered the possibility that there were, in fact, two classes among the
members of the mutual assessment plan-those who supported the plaintiffs
and those who did not. In Ibs itself, that probably did not matter, because
the insurance company in effect represented the interests of those members
who approved of the changes. In failing to recognize that this fact alone
made its reliance on Swormstedt's language plausible, the Court set the
stage for the sweeping use to which that language was put in Ben-Hur.3 79
As noted earlier, the narrow issue for decision in Ben-Hur was jurisdictional. Aurelia Cauble argued that, whatever binding effect Balme's earlier
class suit might have had on non-Indiana residents, she was not bound because her Indiana citizenship would have defeated the federal court's diversity jurisdiction had she been an actual party to the suit. To decide the issue, the Court first had to hold that the class suit by Balme was a proper
one, that, apart from the diversity problem, could bind absentees. The Court
found that issue easy: "That a class suit of this nature might have been
maintained in a state court, and would have been binding on all of the class,
The lbs Court reasoned that the members of the mutual assessment plan were "analogous to... shareholders... or beneficiaries ... of trust property in the hands of the Company, as Trustee, in the State of Connecticut," the state in which the company was incorporated. lbs, 237 U.S. at 671. Their status thus was for the courts of Connecticut to decide,
because Connecticut courts had jurisdiction to decide all questions concerning the internal
affairs of the corporation. The Court also emphasized, as it had in Green, the havoc that
would result from permitting different sets of rules to govern the rights and obligations of plan
members in different states. See id. at 670-71 (explaining that such treatment "would have
been destructive of [plan members'] rights in the plan").
377 Id. at 672 (citing Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303 (1853)).
378See Swormstedt, 57 U.S. at 299-300, 16 How. at 319-20.
379 See Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 363 (1921) (quoting and relying upon the language of Swormstedt for the proposition that "[c]lass suits have long been recognized in federal jurisprudence").
376
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we can have no doubt."380 As the only two authorities cited for this proposition were Green and lbs, the "nature" of the class suit to which the Court
referred was not simply representative, but it involved a fraternal benefit association. Apparently because of the distinctive nature of these class suits,
the Court confidently asserted that the "rights [of Mrs. Cauble and her class]
were duly represented by those before the [federal] court .... Being thus
represented, we think it must necessarily
follow that their rights were con381
cluded by the original decree."
This decision represents a significant shift from the analysis in Green.
As the Court saw things in Ben-Hur, Aurelia Cauble and her class were rep382
resented by George Balme and his class, not by the officers of the Tribe.
This avoided the implausible assumption that the association's officers
could represent the interests of all absent members in a dispute over the legality of action taken by the officers themselves. This analysis, however,
avoided the problem of adequacy of representation rather than addressing it.
Just as it had in Ibs, the Ben-Hur Court ignored the possibility 3that there
38
were conflicts of interest among the members of the association.
These problems of preclusion were obscured by the fact that the binding
effect of the previous class suit was merely a preliminary matter to the main
issue in the case, the jurisdictional problem. The Supreme Tribe had sought
an injunction from the federal court in Indiana to restrain Aurelia Cauble's
state court action on.the ground that she was precluded by the earlier decree.
The federal trial judge denied the injunction, ruling that Mrs. Cauble and her
class were not bound by the prior decree because diversity would have been
destroyed if she had been a party to the earlier suit.384 In ruling this way,
the trial judge was trying to resolve an anomaly in the 1912 revisions to the

380

Id. at 366.

381id.

382 See id. at 367 ("The parties bringing the suit [George Balme and his class] truly represented the interested class.").
383 See Keeffe et al., supra note 354, at 338.
Is it conceivable that every one of the 70,000 Class A members ... desired to
have the Tribe's officers enjoined from proceeding with the planned reorganization?
It would seem more than likely that some of the class wished the Tribe's finances to
be on a sound basis even if it might cost them some loss of benefits or standing relative to other classes of membership of the Tribe. At any rate, it seems fallacious to
assume without inquiry that 70,000 people agreed, even in general, with the representatives who brought the suit.

Id.

314 See Ben-Hur, 255 U.S. at 364 ("mhe District Court held that the Indiana citizens
were out of the jurisdiction of the federal court. . . and that their joinder would have ousted
the jurisdiction of the court, although that fact would not prevent the court from proceeding ... without prejudice to their rights.").
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Federal Equity Rules. As noted earlier, 85 the 1912 revisions deleted from
new Rule 38 the provision in old Rule 48 that preserved the rights of absentees in class suits. The Necessary Parties Rule, as reformulated in new
Rule 39 of the 1912 Equity Rules, provided, however, as follows:
In all cases where it shall appear... that persons, who might otherwise be
deemed proper parties to the suit, cannot be made parties... because their
joinder would oust the jurisdiction of the court... the court may... proceed
in the cause without making such persons parties; and in such
3 86 cases the decree
absent parties.
shall be without prejudice to the rights of the

Rule 39 thus retained a proviso substantially similar to the one that had been

dropped from Rule 38. The trial judge evidently viewed the federal class
action by Balme as a necessary parties case, albeit also a class suit, and believed that Mrs. Cauble therefore was not bound by the earlier decree and
387
was free to relitigate the issues that had been decided in that decree.

The Supreme Court rejected this conclusion, asserting that "Rule 39

''
does not apply to a subject already specifically covered in Rule 38. 388

There is no direct support for this statement in the text of the Equity Rules
themselves or in the little existing legislative history. On its face, the trial
court's contrary opinion was just as plausible. The Court advanced two arguments in support of its conclusion. First, echoing concerns expressed in
Green and lbs, 389 Justice Day noted that:
[I]f the Indiana citizens are not concluded by the decree, and all others in the
class are, this unfortunate situation may result in the determination of the rights
which may be repudiof most of the class by a decree rendered upon a theory
390
class.
ated in another forum as to a part of the same

385See supra notes 344-49 and accompanying text (noting the deletion of old Rule 48's

reservation of absentee's rights from the new Rule 38 in the 1912 revisions).

316 RULES OF PRACTICE FOR THE COURTS OF EQUITY OF THE UNITED STATES Rule 39,

reprintedin 226 U.S. 627, 659 (1912) (repealed 1939).
387 See Ben-Hur, 255 U.S. at 362-64 (noting the district court's conclusion that "although
the original bill was a class suit, the class did not include Indiana citizens [such as Mrs. Caublef').
38s Id. at 366.
389 See Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Tbs, 237 U.S. 662, 670-71 (1915) discussed supra at
would have been destructive of [the members'] mutual rights
notes 374, 376 (stating that "[i]t
in the plan of Mutual Insurance to use the Mortuary Fund in one way for claims of members
residing in one state and to use it in another way as to claims of members residing in a different state"); Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531, 542 (1915)
(stating that "[tihe contradiction in terms is apparent which would rise from holding ...that
there was a collective and unified standard of duty and obligation on the part of the members
themselves and the corporation, and saying.., that the duty of members was to be tested isolatedly and individually.., by applying many divergent, variable and conflicting criteria").
'9 Ben-Hur, 255 U.S. at 366-67.
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The Court itself, however, admitted that "mere considerations
of inconven391
court.
federal
a
on
jurisdiction
confer
not
could
ience"
Second, Justice Day cited Stewart v. Dunham.3 92 As our previous discussion has shown, that case, involving a creditors' bill, held that a federal
court could exercise ancillary jurisdiction over nondiverse creditors who
intervened in the suit before distribution was made. The rationale of that
case, however, was that the court had control of a fund and that other claimants were permitted to intervene to protect their interest in the fund.393 In
fraternal benefit cases, by contrast, the issue was not how a limited fund
should be distributed among various claimants, but whether the claimants
themselves should be compelled to increase their contributions to meet their
mutual obligations. Put differently, the members' obligations, not their
rights, were at issue and would not be threatened by a distribution of a fund.
Accordingly, the Court in Ben-Hur would not necessarily have denied nondiverse claimants a remedy if it held them not precluded by the prior federal
decree.
The more fundamental point is that in Stewart the nondiverse claimants
actually intervened in the original action, whereas in Ben-Hur, they did not.
Stewart therefore was not authority for the effect of a representative suit because it involved parties who actually participated. To apply the reasoning
of Stewart to Aurelia Cauble and her class was to fail to come to terms with
the distinct and more difficult issues raised when a judgment is used to bar
absent members of a class in subsequent litigation. In terms of the governing Equity Rules of 1912, the omission of the final clause from Rule 38
clearly meant that the Rule no longer prevented a prior class suit judgment
from binding absentees. Neither, however, did the revised Rule-especially
when read in conjunction with Rule 39-state or necessarily imply that absentees would be bound, as a matter of law, in every case. The only way the
Court could decide that there was preclusion was by collapsing the res judicata question into the joinder question, which is precisely what it did.
The sweeping language of the Ben-Hur opinion on the issue of res judicata is comprehensible, then, only in the context of its resolution of the jurisdictional issue. When the Court stated, "[i]f the federal courts are to have
the jurisdiction in class suits to which they are obviously entitled, the decree
'9'Id. at366.
392 See id. at 365

(citing Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61, 64 (1885)) (citing the principle
in Stewart v. Dunham that the federal court could exercise ancillary jurisdiction over nondiverse complainants intervening in the original suit).
393See Stewart, 115 U.S. at 64 (reasoning that since the bill of complaint was filed by the
original plaintiffs in behalf of themselves and other creditors so choosing to participate in the
litigation, "the court, in exercising jurisdiction between the parties, could incidentally decree
in favor of all other creditors coming in under the bill").
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39 4
when rendered must bind all of the class properly represented," the conditional structure of the statement concealed the Court's true concern-that
federal class actions founded on diversity should be permitted to proceed by
looking only to the citizenship of the class representative. If establishing
that proposition required binding absentee members in any later action, the
Court seemed prepared to accept that as a general proposition true for all
class suits. The fact that this proposition was derived from a series of suits
involving a very peculiar kind of association, with characteristics not likely
to be found in other kinds of class suits, was simply ignored.
A final difficulty with the Court's analysis in Ben-Hur concerns its relationship with the typology proposed by Street and the possible incorporation of that typology into Rule 38 of the Equity Rules of 1912. The Court
assumed in Ben-Hur that Balme's original suit was a class suit within the
As discussed earlier, the revisers of the Equity
meaning of Rule 38 .
Rules evidently intended Rule 38 to apply to "genuine" class suits, appar39 6
Under Street's
ently referring to Street's category of "true" class suits.
class suit, be"spurious"
a
was
probably
analysis, however, Balme's suit
cause it concerned personal rights and liabilities rather than a fund. 397 If so,
then Rule 38 should not have applied to Balme's suit, and Aurelia Cauble's
suit should not have been precluded.
The Court's evident assumption that the suits involving fraternal benefit
associations concerned claims to a fund398 illuminates the fundamental
problem with all of the fraternal benefit cases-these cases would have been
much better conceived as receivership proceedings involving a trust fund
with inadequate assets to cover claims, rather than as class suits concerning
conflicting claims of rights and obligations. Conceptualized as receivership
cases, all claims in these proceedings could have been resolved in a single
litigation, with the associations dissolved at their conclusion. Instead, the
parties and the courts, failing to grasp fully the insoluble nature of the underlying financial problems in fraternal benefit associations, allowed the as-

314 Ben-Hur, 255 U.S. at 367.
395 Although the Court does not discuss the issue, it does refer to the finding of the master

appointed by the district court in Balme's suit that it was "strictly a true class suit." Id. at 361.
396 See supra notes 344-47 and accompanying text (explaining that Rule 38 allows one or
more persons of a class to sue or defend for the entire class in matters of common interest).
397 See supra notes 328-30 and accompanying text (describing the distinction between
"true" and "spurious" class suits, and stating that the subject of the "true" class suit is either a
fund or property).
398 That the Court made this assumption is evidenced not only by its assumption that the
case fell within Rule 38, see Ben-Hur, 255 U.S. at 366 ("Rule 38, as amended, was intended
to apply to just such cases."), but also by its reliance on Stewart v. Dunham, the creditor's bill
case, see id.at 365 (citing Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61, 64 (1885)).
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sociations to reorganize and continue. This only postponed the inevitable
day of reckoning and virtually guaranteed that the same issues would be
litigated time and again. To forestall this consequence, the courts devised
doctrines of privity and representation that allowed the decrees to bind later
complainants. These doctrines, we have seen, were ill-suited to the realities
of fraternal benefit associations. They were even less suited to class suits
more generally, to which the broad language of Ben-Hur seemed to apply.
B. FederalRule 23
When Federal Rule 23 was adopted in 1938, the state of the law on the
binding effect of class suits thus continued to be confused, despite the fact
that there now were two major Supreme Court precedents-Smith v.
Swormsted 99 and Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble4°--confidently
stating that a class suit would be binding on absentees. The drafters of Rule
23, chief among them James William Moore, continued the tradition established by these cases and by earlier commentators-they asserted that class
suits would bind absentees, but ignored or explained away the difficulties
and qualifications
this proposition entailed and the disarray among the
40 1
precedents.
The tripartite classification scheme adopted in Rule 23 was based on
Moore's position that differences in the "jural relationships" among class
members required different treatment and entailed different consequences so
far as res judicata is concerned.40 2 As promulgated in 1938, Rule 23(a)
permitted class suits:
[W]hen the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class

is

39957 U.S. 288, 16 How. at 307 (1853).
400 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
401See Moore & Cohn, FederalClass Actions, supranote

126, at 307, 314-16 (discussing
Swormstedt and Ben-Hur in the context of "true" class suits and noting the importance of
protecting rights of absentee parties through the representative of the class); James Wnm.
Moore & Marcus Cohn, FederalClass Actions-Jurisdictionand Effect of Judgment, 32 ILL.
L. REv. 555, 558-61 (1938) [hereinafter Moore & Cohn, Jurisdictionand Effect] (noting that
the decrees in suits described as "true class suits" would bind absentees). These two articles
set forth the basic rationale underlying Federal Rule 23 as proposed and adopted. See also 2
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 343, §§ 23.04, 23.07, at 2235-45, 2286-89 (discussing the three types of class suits and stating that absentees are bound by judgment in
situations classified as "true class suits").
402 See Moore & Cohn, FederalClass Actions, supra note 126, at 314 (explaining that the
classification system is "advisable" because "jural relationships" among class members, 'jurisdictional requisites and the effect ofjudgment" differ according to the type of class suit).
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(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary
right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes
entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which
do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
of law or fact affecting the
(3) several, and there is a common question
40 3
several rights and a common relief is sought.

were labeled, respectively, "true," "hybrid," and
These categories of actions
404

"spurious" class suits.

Although Rule 23 itself did not discuss res judicata, 40 5 Moore argued

that the binding effect of a class suit should depend on the category into
which a suit was subsumed. With "true" and "hybrid" class suits, he stated
that absentee class members were bound, although in the latter instance only

as to the specific fund or property involved in the action.40 6 Both of these

categories consisted of cases that, but for the class suit device, would require joinder of absentees as necessary parties. With "spurious" class suits,
absentees were not bound, although they could elect to take advantage of a
judgment favorable to the class by intervening in the action, even after
judgment. 7 Properly speaking, a "spurious" class suit, then, was not really
a class suit at all; as Moore noted, it was really no more than a permissive
joinder device.408 Most federal courts adopted Moore's statements on res

403

RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES,

23(a) reprintedin 308 U.S. 689 (1939).
404 See Moore & Cohn, FederalClass Actions, supra note 126, at 314-21 (detailing the
characteristics of true, hybrid, and spurious class suits, and providing cases that exemplify
each type of class suit); see also 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 343, § 23.04, at
2235-45 (describing the three types of class suits).
405 In fact, the Advisory Committee explicitly rejected Moore's proposal that the Rule
specify the res judicata consequences of the three categories. The Committee considered the
question to be one of substance, not procedure, and thus beyond its authority. See 2 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 343, § 23.07, at 2283 (stating that "[a]lthough it was proposed to the Committee that rules governing the effect of a class suit judgment should be incorporated in Rule 23, the proposal was rejected" (footnote omitted)).
406 See id. § 23.07, at 2294-95 (stating that the judgment rendered in true and hybrid class
actions is "conclusive upon the class" and that such a judgment only reaches the specific
property involved in hybrid actions).
407 See Moore & Cohn, Jurisdictionand Effect, supra note 401, at 561-62 (stating that the
decree in spurious class actions does not bind absentee class members and that absentees have
the option to intervene in the action and thereby "be bound by... res judicata"); see also 2
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 343, § 23.07, at 2291 (stating that the decree in
spurious class suits will "bind only those actually before the court").
40 See 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 343, § 23.04, at 2292 (stating that
"[a] person who ... may be said to be a member of a class on whose behalf or against whom a
spurious class suit is pending, may either ignore the action or intervene and become a party of
record").
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40 9
but a minority of courts, and most commentajudicata as authoritative,
410
them.
rejected
tors,
Moore created his classification system by combining Story's classification of cases 411 with Street's comments4 12 on the binding effect of class
suit decrees, 413 particularly Street's categorization of "genuine" or "true"
versus other class suits. Though it adopted Street's terminology of "true"
and "spurious" class suits, Moore's scheme differed greatly from Street's
analysis, particularly as to res judicata. Class suits concerning several rights
to funds or to property (e.g., most of the creditors' bill cases) were "true"
class suits to Street but became "hybrid" suits in Moore's hands, although

409See, e.g., Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 327 (2d Cir. 1957) (defining a "spu-

rious" class suit as "little more than an invitation to non-parties closely interested to intervene"); All Am. Airways v. Elderd, 209 F.2d 247, 248 (2d Cir. 1954) (acknowledging that
while precedent set by a court in a "spurious" suit may affect later litigation by parties who
chose not to join the class, it is not res judicata as to them); Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d
851, 852 (3d Cir. 1945) (adopting Moore's definition of a "true" class action); see also Developments in the Law--Multiparty Litigationin the FederalCourts, 71 HARV. L. REV. 874, 930
(1958) (stating that "[t]here has been an almost complete acceptance by the courts of Moore's
labels and of the binding effect which he attributes to each classification" (footnotes omitted)).
410 See, e.g., Rank v. (Krug) United States, 142 F. Supp. 1, 154-55 n.93 (S.D. Cal. 1956)
(stating that the true test of whether res judicata applies to absent parties would be whether or
not they were adequately represented in court), rev'd on other grounds, 293 F.2d 340 (1961);
see also CHAFEE, supra note 313, at 250-58 (expressing doubt regarding the helpfulness of
Moore's classification system for addressing the problem of when class judgments should
have a binding effect); Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The ContemporaryFunction
of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 710-14 (1941) (arguing that there does not always
have to be a "necessary connection between the class suit and res judicata").
In addition, a number of states rejected Moore's analysis in drafting or administering their
own class suit rules. See Adolf Homburger, State Class Actions and the FederalRule, 71
COLuM. L. REv. 609, 631 n.133 (1971) (listing states that have adopted class action provisions similar to the 1966 revision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which does not follow Moore's classification system); Jack B. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 456-57 (1960) (explaining that Maine rejected
Moore's classification of"spurious" class suits as a third type of class suit when it adopted the
Federal Rules).
The Federal Rules Advisory Committee also rejected Moore's analysis when it revised
Rule 23 in 1966. See FED. R Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note, reprintedin 39 F.R.D.
69, 106 (1966) (discarding the former rule's three-part classification system of class suits, and
maintaining a distinction only between class and nonclass suits); see also Benjamin Kaplan,
Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the FederalRules of Civil
Procedure(1), 81 HARv. L. REv. 356, 386-94 (1967) (discussing the process by which Rule
23 was revised in 1966).
411See supra Section II.A (detailing Story's classification of class suits).
412See supra notes 326-43 and accompanying text (noting Street's differentiation between "true" class suits and "spurious" class suits).
413See Moore & Cohn, FederalClassActions, supra note 126, at 310-11 n.25 (discussing
the evolution of Moore's classification scheme in Rule 23 from both Story's tripartite classification and Street's bipartite classification of class suits).
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both agreed that the decree in such suits would bind absentees. 414 A greater
difference emerged in their respective treatments of "spurious" class suits.
To Street, all class suits other than those concerning funds or property were
"spurious" and thus not binding on absentees. Moore, by contrast, created a
new category of "true" class suits that included many of the cases consigned
by Street to the "spurious" category. Primary among these were the association cases, such as Smith v. Swormstedt,4 15 in which a preexisting relationship so connected the class members that joinder416of absentees otherwise
would be required under the Necessary Parties Rule.
Moore's creation of a separate category that included association cases
harked back to Story, but Story had not specified the res judicata effects of
his categories. The Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble4 17 and the other
fraternal benefit cases had been decided in the interim between Street's
treatise in 1909 and Moore's work in the 1930s. This sequence may explain
Moore's revival of a category of "true" class suits and his endeavor to give
binding effect to cases falling within it. In fact, along with Swormstedt,
Ben-Hur is the major modem example of what Moore cited as a "true" class
suit. 418 Although the Court in Ben-Hur implied that it was dealing with a
dispute over a fund, that decision also emphasized the associational ties
between the class members, and, as noted earlier, these ties were the only
logical basis for treating the suit as a class suit.419 Moore clearly viewed
Ben-Hur in this light. Moore's typology also had the advantage of accomdictum in Swormstedt, something Street's analysis
modating the Court's
42
was unable to do. 0
Moore's categories nonetheless failed to make more sense of the precedents than had previous commentators. There were, as we have seen, a
number of cases involving either funds or preexisting relationships in which
courts had refused to bind absentees, and there were other cases that Moore

414 See 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 343, §§ 23.04, 23.07, at 2239, 2293
(stating that hybrid class suits are those in which "the rights of the members of the class
are... several" and that "[iinsofar as the proceedings operate in rem they are conclusive").
4" 57 U.S. 288, 16 How. 307 (1853).
416 See 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 343, § 23.04, at 2239 (defining
Swormstedt as a "true" class suit in which "common rights" were enforced).
417 255 U.S. 356 (1921)
418 See 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 343, § 23.04, at 2239 (citing Ben-Hur

as an example of the proper enforcement of common rights).
419See 255 U.S. at 363-64.
420 See supra text accompanying notes 338-43 (noting that Street's analysis excludes preclusion for "association" cases, cases which the Swormstedt Court had concluded had the
strongest basis for binding absent members).
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would have termed "spurious" in which preclusion had been applied.4 21
Further, although Moore categorized the Ben-Hur case as a "true" class suit,
the fact that it probably did not involve a necessary parties problem, but
rather implicated rights that could be termed "several,, 422 should have
placed it in the "spurious" category.
This discussion illustrates a more fundamental problem with Moore's
analysis. Moore assumed that the explanation for the differences as to when
courts would find an earlier decree binding lay with the type of jural relationships involved, rather than with differing judicial attitudes toward the
propriety of binding absent class members. What was needed was a persuasive rationale for determining when class suit decrees should bind absentees, not yet another attempt to make sense of the precedents. The failure of
Moore's scheme to provide such a rationale quickly became evident as
courts encountered great difficulty in applying the categories (e.g., when
was a right "common" versus "several"?) and, especially, in determining
when to bind absentees. 42

421See CHAFEE, supra note 313, at 253-54 (discussing several cases, including Ben-Hur,
which the author would have considered "spurious" under Moore's test, but in which the respective courts bound the absentees).
422See supra notes 295-96 and accompanying text; see also CHAFEE, supra note 313, at
254-56 (arguing that every member of the class in Ben-Hur had an independent right in his
own policy).
423See CHAFEE, supra note 313, at 249 (pointing out that "[i]t is not uncommon, when a
case goes through several courts, for one court to call it spurious and another hybrid"). The
difficulties of Moore's tripartite classification have often been identified. See, e.g., Shipley v.
Pittsburgh & L.E.R. Co., 70 F. Supp. 870, 874 (W.D. Pa. 1947) (stating that "[t]here has been
considerable trouble and difficulty experienced by the courts in determining under a given set
of facts whether an action filed by a group of plaintiffs is a true class suit, a hybrid class suit
or a spurious class suit"); William Weiner & Delphine Szyndrowski, The Class Action, From
the English Bill of Peace to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23: Is There a Common
Thread?, 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 935, 980-85 (1987) (discussing why Moore's classifications of
class suits were inadequate in helping courts determine whether certain claims should be
treated as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Note, Federal
Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 COLuM. L. REv. 818, 822-33 (1946)
("The task of pigeonholing operative facts into one of the three categories as of 'true,' 'hybrid,' or 'spurious' has baffled both courts and commentators." (citations omitted)). Confusion reached dizzying proportions in the Deckert litigation in which the case wound its way
through the courts and was repeatedly reclassified as either a spurious or hybrid class suit.
See Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 27 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa. 1939) (holding, in part,
that the suit was a spurious class suit and could be maintained even if the individuals seek to
recover separate judgments), rev'd on other grounds, 108 F.2d 51, 55 (3d Cir. 1939), rev'd,
311 U.S. 282 (1940), on remand, 39 F. Supp. 592, 595-96 (E.D. Pa. 1941) (holding that the
suit is a hybrid class suit because the plaintiff's interests are several and the action centers
around a fund), rev'd sub nom. Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives & Granting Annuities v.
Deckert, 123 F.2d 979, 984 (3d Cir. 1941) (holding that the suit can only be maintained as a
spurious class suit because the individual plaintiffs did not possess any right to common prop-
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The formalistic nature of Moore's categories glossed over many of the
most difficult issues involving res judicata in class suits, just as the Supreme
Court had done in its leading cases-problems such as intragroup conflicts
of interest, adequacy of representation, 424 and notice to absentees. Despite
the seeming clarity of Rule 23 and the Supreme Court's pronouncements,
these problems continued to haunt the conceptualization and adjudication of
class suits.
C. Hansberry v. Lee
In Hansberryv. Lee,425 the Supreme Court used the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to overturn an Illinois state court's finding
that a previous decree bound a class member who was not a party to the
suit. 426 The Court thus was not called upon to apply the recently adopted
Federal Rule 23. Indeed, there was no explicit discussion of the recently
adopted Rule 23 in the Hansberryopinion. By finally confronting some of
the problems that had long lain submerged, however, the Court's analysis
implicitly took issue with Moore's position that the categorization of a class
suit in terms of "jural relations" would determine its bonclusive effect. It
also implicitly took issue with its own decision in Supreme Tribe of BenHur v. Cauble.
The facts underlying the Hansberry litigation concerned a restrictive
covenant, allegedly entered into by several hundred white property owners,
that prohibited blacks from occupying property in their Chicago neighborhood. The restrictive covenant was to take effect only if signed by the owners of at least 95% of the subdivision's frontage. In 1934, one of the signers
of the covefiant, Olive Burke, initiated an action in Illinois state court in behalf of herself and the other property owners to enjoin an asserted violation
of the covenant. 42 7 The defendant, declining to provide a defense, stipulated

erty). This progression is a clear example of how the courts were unable to determine the true

nature of class suits.
424Although Moore did discuss adequacy of representation, see Moore & Cohn, Federal
Class Actions, supra note 126, at 312-13, he did so only cursorily and considered it relevant
only to the threshold question of certification; he did not discuss it in connection with the res
judicata issue.
42 311 U.S. 32 (1940). The facts and previous history of the litigation are summarized in
the Supreme Court's opinion, 311 U.S. at 37-40. For an interesting account of the background
of Hansberry v. Lee, see Allen R. Kamp, The History Behind Hansberry v. Lee, 20 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 481 (1987).
426 See Hansberry,311 U.S. at 45 (holding that the class representation was grossly short
of satisfying the requirements of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment).
427See Burke v. Kleiman, 277 Ill. App. 519, 521 (Ill. App. Ct. 1934) (describing the facts
surrounding the litigation).
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that owners of 95% of the frontage had indeed signed the covenant. The
court issued the requested injunction.
Five years later, Anna Lee and several other neighborhood residents,
also parties to the covenant, filed a class suit to enjoin the purchase of property in the subdivision by the Hansberrys, who were black.4 28 This time,
however, the defendants did assert a defense, arguing that the required 95%
had in fact never signed the covenant. The state trial judge agreed with the
Hansberrys in his findings of fact, concluding that the previous suit had
been a collusive one. Nevertheless, the trial judge sustained the covenant on
the ground that the previous suit was a class suit, and that it thus was binding on all property owners in the subdivision and their successors. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the trial court's conclusion, although it bethe stipulation in the earlier suit, while untrue, was not
lieved that
429
collusive.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court began its analysis by noting that, "to an extent not precisely defined by judicial opinion,"
class suit judgments were an exception to the general rule that a person
could not be bound by a personal judgment unless he was an actual party to
the case.4 30 The Court's qualification seemed to express new-found reservations about the sweeping declarations made in earlier cases and was
something of an acknowledgement of the peculiar nature of the cases that
had announced those declarations. Indeed, aside from Smith v. Swormstedt,431 the only cases cited by the Hansberry Court at that point in its
opinion were the fraternal benefit cases, including Supreme Tribe of BenRoyal Arcanum v. Green,433 and
Hur v. Cauble,43 2 Supreme Council
434of the
TbS.
v.
Co.
Insurance
HarfordLife
The Court next stated that the question of joinder-when a class suit
would be permitted by excusing the joinder of otherwise necessary partieswas distinct from the question of res judicata.4 35 This statement was the
See Lee v. Hansberry, 24 N.E.2d 37, 40 (Ill. 1939) (aff'rming the unreported opinion
of the trial court that found the covenant binding on the other residents), rev'd, 311 U.S. 32
(1940).
429 See id. at 39-40 (concluding that there was no evidence of fraud or collusion in Burke
428

and that the suit was brought in good faith).
430 Hansberry,311 U.S. at 41.
431 See id. (citing Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 16 How. 307 (1853)).
432 255 U.S. 356 (1921), cited in Hansberry,311 U.S. at 41.
433 237 U.S. 531 (1915), cited in Hansberry,311 U.S. at 41.
434 237 U.S. 662 (1915), cited in Hansberry,311 U.S. at 41.
431 See Hansberry,311 U.S. at 42 ("It is evident that the considerations which may induce
a court thus to proceed ... may differ from those which must be taken into account in determining whether the absent parties are bound by the decree .... ").
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Court's first clear acknowledgement that these issues could be separated.
More significantly, perhaps, the Court seemed implicitly to take issue with
Moore's attempt to tie the res judicata consequences of class suits to their
categorization. First, Moore's reading of Rule 23 gave conclusive effect to
all class suits that responded to the issue of necessary parties, denying conclusive effect only to "spurious" class suits, which, Moore said, involved
only the issue of permissive joinder.436 The Court, by contrast, implied that
preclusion could be denied even where the class suit was of a type designed
to excuse joinder of otherwise necessary parties. Conversely, the Hansberry
decision also suggested that preclusion could be applied to a decree in a
"spurious" class suit, so long as there was adequate representation.4 37
Second, and of more lasting importance, the Court virtually ignored
Moore's method of looking to jural relationships to determine when a class
suit decree would be binding. The Court instead stressed the issue of adequacy of representation by the class representative. The key passage reads:
It is one thing to say that some members of a class may represent other members in a litigation where the sole and common interest of the class in the litigation, is either to assert a common right or to challenge an asserted obligation.
It is quite another to hold that all those who are free alternatively either to assert rights or to challenge them are of a single class, so that any group, merely
because it is of the class so constituted, may be deemed adequately to represent
any others of the class in litigating their interests in either alternative. Such a
selection of representatives for purposes of litigation, whose substantial interests are not necessarily or even probably the same as those whom they are
deemed to represent, does not afford that protection to absent parties which
due process requires.

In Burke v. Kleiman,439 the case underlying the Hansberry litigation,
Mrs. Burke, the named plaintiff, clearly did not adequately represent the interest of all of the members of the class of property owners. This was true
regardless of whether the class was defined to include only current property
436 See discussion supra notes 405-08 and accompanying text (explaining how Moore
came to the conclusion that absentees should not be bound when a class suit was found to be

spurious).
437

The HansberryCourt stated:

Nor do we find it necessary for the decision of this case to say that, when the
only circumstance defining the class is that the determination of the rights of its
members turns upon a single issue of fact or law, a state could not constitutionally
adopt a procedure whereby some of the members of the class could stand in judgment for all, provided that.., those present are of the same class as those absent and
that the litigation is so conducted as to insure the full and fair consideration of the
common issue.
311 U.S. at43.
438 Id. at 44-45 (citing Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 16 How. 307 (1854)).
439 277 Ill. App. 519 (App. Ct. 1934).
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owners or also to include successors to current owners. If the class did not
include successors, the Hansberrys' interests went unrepresented; if it did
not include prior owners, the interests of the owners who sold to the Hansberrys were unrepresented. Further, the defendants in the Burke case could
not be said to have represented either the Hansberrys or the prior owners.
First, the named defendants were never designated as representatives of a
class; and second, the obviously collusive nature of the suit belied any inthe interests of those opposed to the enference that they in fact represented
440
forcement of the covenant.
In the passage quoted above, the Court cited Ben-Hur to support its
contention that a decree would be binding on a class with a "sole and common interest" in asserting a common right or challenging a common obligation, because the commonality of interest likely would ensure adequate representation. 441 As we have seen, however, there was no assurance in BenHur that the class representatives in the initial suit did indeed represent the
interests or desires of all members of Class A. 44 2 It is quite plausible that at
least some members of Class A felt their interest would be better served by
the reorganization of the Tribe effected by its officers, even though it meant
higher assessments to them. In our analysis of Ben-Hur, we noted that the
interests of at least some members of the association likely were represented
adequately by the officers of the Tribe (who, after all, prevailed).443 This
did not, however, change the fact that the Court's handling of the representation issue in Ben-Hur was severely wanting. The more searching analysis
was inconsistent with the doctrine announced so
by the Court in Hansberry
444
confidently in Ben-Hur.
The Court in Hansberry announced a rationale for determining when
class suits should be given preclusive effect-only upon adequate representation. It provided little guidance, however, concerning the content of
that standard. In particular, it did not indicate what types of procedures
were appropriate for ensuring, at the outset of litigation and during its
440

See Hansberry,311 U.S. at 45-46 (noting that the Burke defendants were not treated

by the pleadings or the judgment as representing anyone else or giving up any rights of others). The Court phrased the final point somewhat more delicately, probably because it was
foreclosed from overturning the Illinois Supreme Court's finding of fact that the suit was not
collusive. The Court said, "[E]ven though nominal defendants, it does not appear that their
interest in defeating the contract outweighed their interest in establishing its validity." Id. at

46.
441
442

Id. at 44 (citing Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921)).

See discussion supra Section V.A. (analyzing the reasoning and facts of Ben-Hur).

443 See discussion supra Section V.A. (analyzing the Ben-Hur Court's conclusion that

there was adequate representation in the initial suit).
444 See Keeffe et al., supra note 354, at 337-39 (concluding that Ben-Hur would probably
be decided differently today because of its irreconcilability with Hansberry).
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course, that representation would be adequate. Encouraging or requiring
notice to absentee class members was one obvious device, and the Court in
445
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. and Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts446 later embraced this approach. But requiring notice cannot
solve all of the problems. 44 7 Adequacy of representation frequently can be
determined only when absentees come forward claiming that their interests
have not been represented adequately. If this is indeed the case, then it
would seem impossible to guarantee prospectively the conclusive effect of a
class suit judgment.
CONCLUSION
It is probably impossible to guarantee prospectively the conclusive effect of a class suit judgment. However, that is not really a serious objection
to the class suit procedure, or to there being valid class suit judgments. It is
impossible to "guarantee" the conclusive effect of any judgment. A litigant
always remains free to say that there was no actual service of process, or
that the process was invalid in some respect, or that the proceeding was invalidated by fraud, and so on. We have had wide experience with postjudgment habeas corpus challenges to the validity of proceedings in criminal cases, and no less imagination and persistence could well be displayed
by civil litigants if the rules concerning civil judgments allowed much latitude. In civil litigation we have in fact had no such problems as have been
encountered in criminal habeas corpus. The reason is that the rules of finality in civil proceedings have generally been much more stringent and more
stringently enforced. But the binding effect of class suit judgments has been
much more problematic, as we trust has been demonstrated in this analysis.
The essential problem is one that was long ago identified by Professor
Chafee-the tension between the idea that every person has an individual
right to a day in court before being precluded, on the one hand, and the idea,
on the other hand, that some forms of adjudication should be preclusive on
individuals notwithstanding that they did not personally participate in the
44' 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ("[The] right to be heard has little reality of worth unless
one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or
default, acquiesce or contest.").
446 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985) ("[An absentee] plaintiff must receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation, whether in person or through counsel.").
447 For example, notice cannot guarantee that the attorneys for the class will represent
their clients vigorously and fairly, given the inherent conflict of interests that often exists be-

tween the attorneys and the class over issues such as settlement. See, e.g., Saylor v. Lindsley,
456 F.2d 896, 900 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating that "[tihere can be no blinking at the fact that the
interests of the plaintiff in a stockholder's derivative suit and of his attorney are by no means

congruent").
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adjudication. If there is to be a serious form of class suit, that tension must
be resolved. It may once have been acceptable for the law to try to have it
both ways: A class suit proceeding will, given certain preliminaries, purport
to be binding, but the proceeding will not be given that effect when a member of the class actually challenges the judgment. But, in the modem era,
that irresolution has become socially very expensive. The class suit is now
invoked much more often than in the past precisely because it is a means of
dealing "wholesale" justice in a world increasingly dominated by wholesale
transactions.
Our study suggests that the law has indeed been irresolute for a long
time on the question of the binding effect of a class suit judgment. The tendency has continued since the question has been constitutionalized under the
rubric of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court in Hansberryand in cases such as PhillipsPetroleum has said
that class suits can be binding. But, with all deference, it must be observed
that in cases such as Martin v. Wilks, Cooper v. FederalBank of Richmond,
and Amchem the Court has held or implied that, when push comes to shove,
a specific class suit judgment is not binding on a member of the class who
wants to relitigate.
We think that the class suit, and procedural variations of the class suit,
have important social utility. They certainly have utility in cases involving
claims to a limited fund-that is, where the amount of tenable claims
against an obligor exceeds the assets available in behalf of the obligor. The
tenable claims must be summed up and the invalid claims excluded, otherwise the distribution would be unjust to the claimants with valid claims.
This must be accomplished within some finite time, otherwise the claims
and the assets that could be used to pay them remain dormant, and to that
extent, valueless. Hence, there must be a way to foreclose claimants who
will not be forthcoming despite reasonable efforts to give them reasonable
notice. That in tum means that there must be a procedure for preclusion
against a person who did not participate. Recognition of this hard reality is
the underlying rationale of modem bankruptcy procedure. It has been recognized by the Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central HanoverBank. The
issue is presented448again in the Ortiz asbestos settlement case now pending
before the Court.
We think the class suit has still broader appropriate uses beyond "limited fund" situations. We would put the civil rights injunction class suit in
that category, and we conjecture that most other sober legal analysts would

448

Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 118 S.Ct. 2339

(1998) (mem.).
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share that view. We think the "small claims" class suit also has justification, as the Supreme Court noted in PhillipsPetroleum, although the justification is not as strong. And we think there is a place for the "mass tort" or
"bill of peace" class suit as well, particularly the "settlement" class suit in
such situations. The justification for "mass tort" class suits is simply that
the legal system cannot satisfactorily handle myriad individual claims
through individual litigation. Given modem commerce and distribution of
products, there will continue to be mass misfortunes that beget litigation,
and hence, "mass torts." There is little prospect of legislation that will displace personal injury litigation with some form of social insurance, or displace consumer litigation with more stringent administrative regulation. On
the contrary, the litigation form for resolution of social disputes-proceedings under the aegis of courts-is an essential part of our culture, as de
Toqueville long ago observed.
The question therefore is whether the litigation form can be adapted to
the mass civil wrong. The archetype of that litigation form is the class suit.
The class suit can be employed to resolve these disputes-as distinct from
simply prolonging them-only if a judgment in such a proceeding can be
really binding, that is, foreseeably binding when viewed ex-ante as well as
occasionally binding ex-post. And a class suit judgment can be foreseeably
binding only if the requirements of the Due Process Clause so permit. The
task of formulating a binding class suit rule turns on a drafting process that
satisfactorily defines "adequate representation." The requirements of due
process are in the hands of the Supreme Court. If those requirements include a right to individually participate-the classic right to a day in courtthe class suit is impossible.
The task of specifying requirements of "adequacy" that conform to due
process was laid open, but not resolved, in Hansberry v. Lee, and has not
been resolved since then. We propose to discuss the problem in a subsequent article in this Review.

